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MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK
A ROMÁNIAI KISEBBSÉGEKRŐL

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KOZÁK GYULA

MUSLIMS IN ROMANIA: INTEGRATION MODELS, CATEGORIZATION AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

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Abstract

■ The paper takes a stance toward acknowledging social distance as a prerequisite of incorporation, but it also argues that immigrants can be used as the "other" for debating "indigenous" identities, loyalties, and affiliations. More precisely, the paper looks on the struggle between different proponents of Islamic religious practice as they construct the "other" and themselves in a shifting landscape of global meanings regarding Islam. When associated with the 'indigenous', the presence of the immigrants can bring to the fore internal tensions of an ethnic community and force its members to redefine their ethnic allegiances, or establish different degrees or kinds of ethnic, regional or religious 'cultural content'. This is the case especially when a quasi standardized global discourse is at hand and different models of institutional integration pertain to different categories of Muslims. The paper describes two models of integration and two systems of categorization that these models engender.

■ Textul de faţă reprezintă o primă încercare de a înţelege modelele sau mai precis proiectele de incorporare a musulmanilor din România. Pornind de la sistemul instituţional şi discursurile liderilor diferitelor instituţii ale comunităţii am identificat două modele distincte. Primul model propune o afiliere la comunitatea de musulmani bazată pe apartenenţa la o regiune bine circumscrisă şi o istorie particulară caracterizată tradiţii culturale specifice. În acest model religia este definită ca o dimensiune aparte a unui model identitar etno-regional. Cel de al doilea, din contră este fundamentat pe o practică a islamului universal. În acest sens, dimensiunea etno-regională a identităţii apare doar în planul secundar al construcţiei identitare. Textul sugerează că în contextul unui discurs global islamofob confruntarea dintre cele două modele specifică identitatea de musulman prin categorii culturale morale.

Contents

MUSLIMS IN ROMANIA: INTEGRATION MODELS, CATEGORIZATION AND SOCIAL DISTANCE

Introduction[1]

■ Muslim identity in Romania is far from being taken for granted. Apparently the presence of Islam has become a problem in Romania after its being associated with terrorism and social upheaval. It emerges as a problem along several types of discussions on the level of European culture (for example, the implicit religious – Christian – foundation of the European Union as a cultural base for supranational solidarity), being most visible in France, Germany and Great Britain. In the context of the susceptibility of Islam, and the equation of 'immigrants' with potential terrorism and national problems, the definition of Muslims in Romania has become more sensitive. The global context of war against terrorism and Romania's immigration policies have given way to a stream of immigrants from different parts of the world, but especially from the Near East. The presence of 'new' Muslims produced a highly differentiated but massive discourse on Muslims, which in turn has visible implications on establishing social distance and closeness toward Muslims in general and to different kinds of Muslims in particular. In other words, the locally understood global discourse on Muslims and the subjective perception of immigration brought to the forefront the problem of Muslimness, which is in fact a problem of degrees, shades, and components of Muslim identity. From now on the question is not who is a Muslim, but *what kind of Muslim* s/he is.

The paper argues that different kinds of Muslims relate to different models of incorporation as these models prescribe categories of individuals that fit them. Thus the main aim is to document the categories used by Muslims and others to identify, categorize, and build a structure for conceptualizing Muslim identity. Therefore we resorted to established approaches to assess both the general trends and the implications of such categorization. We would like to delineate the processes that structure the form and content of categories used by social actors. The main finding of the research is that we cannot speak about a single thread of incorporation model. We identified three incorporation models that are present in Romania. The first could be called the indigenous Dobrogea model. This is characterized by symbolic ethnicity and religious affiliation, institutional embeddedness, re-

1 This paper is based on findings from research conducted on behalf of the Change Institute (UK) as part of a European wider study on the best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalization, commissioned by DG JLS of the European Commission. This study does not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of the European Commission or of the Change Institute, nor are they bound by its conclusions. The original report is entitled "Case study on the best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalization: Romania" by István Horváth, Gyula Kozák, Andrea Bogdán, Attila Gidó, Alina Moisă. The description of the legal system of minorities and religions in Romania was elaborated by Andrea Bogdán. Parts of her contribution to the report are reproduced without changes.

gional outreach, and ethnic exclusiveness[2]. A second one could be called scattered integration, which is characteristic for a highly dispersed small population of Arabic origin. This model also comprises national identification with the home country, it is weak from an institutional point of view (in the sense that this pattern does not employ state institutions, and its relation to the state is marginal or incidental). The third one refers to temporary migrants, mostly students from West Africa[3]. Most of them, non-practicing Muslims, are not integrated in the Romanian Muslim community at all, but form different constellations of peer groups that include Romanian students as well as foreigners. The tiny faction of observant students concentrates on available conditions for practicing their religion and do not develop other types of relationships either with co-national students or Romanian citizens. Besides acknowledging the complex set of relations that define a model of incorporation[4] the paper suggests that models of incorporation represent the base on which terms of categorization and the emergence of subsequent social distance are built on.

Representations of Muslims are most visible in public discourses both of media and of community leaders. Thus the paper looks at different systems of categorization related to different types of incorporation as they appear mainly in the discourse of community leaders. All these models make explicit the category of Muslims required in specific kinds of incorporation and conversely the categories of Muslims that do not fit a definite model. The models of proposed incorporation differ both in terms of social practices and of institutional affiliation. However, the main difference seems to be related to religious affiliation and practice, which in turn is related to specificities brought by traditions and regional belonging. The Dobrogea model comprises recourse on religious identity defined along tradition and region. For the second model religion is universal and cannot be accounted in terms of ethnic or regional traditions but in terms of the Koran and a universally accepted practice of Islam. The third one is segmented in the sense that there is a personal option that structures the attitude to religion.

Analytical perspective: a sketch

■ Social distance is a prerequisite of incorporation. My paper elaborates an analytical stance toward this perspective, also arguing that immigrants can be used as the "other" for debating 'indigenous' identities, loyalties, and affiliations. More precisely, in what follows the paper looks on the struggle between different proponents of Islam as they construct the 'other' and themselves in a shifting landscape of global meanings regarding Islam. In fact, we follow the suggestions of analytical warnings on recent migration. These stipulate a raised awareness not only in the relationship of the state and the immigrants, but also a more complex set of relations between state, immigrants and national minorities. Nay, when associated with the 'indigenous', the presence of the immigrants can bring to the fore internal tensions of an ethnic community and force its members to redefine their ethnic allegiances, or establish different degrees or kinds of ethnic, regional or religious 'cultural content'. Thus the inner structure of an existing 'indigenous' community is likely to change. This is the especially the case when a standardized global discourse is at hand, meaning a well-structured way of discussing certain categories of unambiguously defined persons.

2 A rich institutional system overlapping the one of Turkey is also part of the pattern. This system works on many levels including the state, the NGOs, and individual practice such as work and tourism.

3 The paper does not address the temporary integration of Tunisian students into Romanian society. Others discussed the functioning of the community and its relations to Romanians in terms of systems of categorizations and prejudice (see Lengyel 2008).

4 Throughout the paper the terms incorporation and integration are used interchangeably, meaning the ways individuals and groups are inserted into the wider context of society (e.g. into ethnic groups, institutions or the whole of the society). However we do not intend to give the terms the wide scope and content usually attributed to them along Theriault 2005.

Categorization, social distance and ethno-religious identity

Much of the studies of immigrant incorporation tend to focus on the dimensions described by structural assimilation. They look on whether the economic, social and cultural opportunities of migrants are on a par with non-immigrants. Other studies show that immigrant groups may challenge and rearrange ethnic hierarchies in a given social context. These studies concentrate on access to certain resources while they do not look on or treat marginally what some have put at the heart of the relations between immigrants and settled people, namely social distance. In a recent article (Alba–Nee 1997) the authors develop an argument for the revitalization of Milton Gordon's theory of assimilation, a revitalization that can take place when his theory is anchored in a casual mechanism. The introduction of a casual mechanism in assimilation research is essential in their view. They identify this mechanism in practices concerned with social distance.

Social distance or – on the other hand, conversely – proximity is the affirmation of similarity and difference in various degrees. This difference is expressed through particular and exclusive traits. Once someone is categorized as having traits that are not shared by others s/he is put at a certain categorical distance from us, or vice versa. This is one of the obvious mechanisms of cognitive management of difference. Social distance means proximity based on "the feeling of common identity, closeness and common or shared experiences" (Alba–Nee 1997: 838). On the other hand "when social distance is great individuals perceive and treat each other as if they belong to different *categories*" (Alba–Nee 1997: 838 - our italics). There are two points that need to be made regarding social distance. First, the feeling of common identity, closeness and common or shared experiences are expressed in different cultural forms, such as discourses or material culture. The other point is that these cultural forms make use of categorization and identification.

Categorization and the related term of identification refer to a process of identity formation or construction (Brubaker–Cooper 2000). It is an active term, a verb that suggests an action made by an agent. As such it is a contextual and situated within social practice. It means inserting individuals in classes defined by some categorical attributes (for example along ethnicity, race, or nation). The key distinction is between self categorization and categorization by others where the two may coincide or not (Brubaker–Cooper 2000; Jenkins 2008). The implication of this analytical structure is that competing models of identity occur when self and other categorization differ.

As categorization is contextual and situational, the construction of social distance and the actual extent of that distance can stem from different sources. "The most immediate source of a decline in social distance occurs when *other changes stimulate the introduction of new ideas that challenge values and cultural beliefs previously taken for granted*, as in the discreditation of white supremacist ideologies in the postcolonial world and a 'transformation of values' ensues" …" Systems of ethnic stratification begin to break down when minority people develop new self-conceptions and refuse to accept subordinate role" (Alba–Nee 1997: 840 - emphasis mine). We consider that Muslims are in such a situation as the war on terror and the flow of immigrants introduced new ideas about them.

The approach accords well with current perspectives from cultural anthropology that look for representations of the 'other' or 'othering' (Silverstein 2005; Werbner 2005). While anthropology discloses the cultural foundations of categorization, it often tends to overlook the actor-centered nature of categorization. Seeing culture as an integrated whole presumes a uniformity of meanings and the system of meanings becomes more important than the action of categorization itself. The approach taken in this paper resembles more with an actor-centered research proposed by some researchers (Brubaker–Cooper 2000; Glick Schiller et al. 2006).

It is evident that categorization and the 'discursive' social distance resulting from it are far from being the most reliable and valid indicators of the actual social relationship between groups (however be they defined). The plea for turning away from categorization to study 'real' social relationship is both legitimate and timely. Such a perspective has the potential to put intercultural relations on an empirically more grounded and richer basis. However, categories and categorization present in the public sphere and the social distance they express are relevant also in everyday life since they have the potential to structure the way we perceive others. Therefore a look on social relations does not exclude categorization as a topic for research. Categories as well as firsthand observation of everyday practices are necessary but not sufficient indicators of cultural or ethnic relationships between two groups recognized as such by their own members.

Data and methodology

The paper presents data gathered from interviews, Romanian press, and activity reports of Romanian institutions. We collected data from two regions of Romania, namely the cities of Cluj (situated in Transylvania) and Constanța (situated in Dobrogea) and reviewed the reports of state institutions dealing with immigrants and foreigners. Constanța, a port at the Black Sea, is the Romanian town with the greatest number of 'indigenous' Muslims of Turkish and Tartar origin and ethnic self-identification (there are about 20,000 Muslims in Constanța). Here their inner institutional structure is denser than in other parts of Romania, even than in other parts of Dobrogea. The bulk of the main community institutions – the Mufti, the political organizations of Turks and Tatars and Islamic NGO's also have their seats there. Community life involving certain dimensions of ethnicity and religion is organized mostly by these institutions. Moreover, these institutions mediate between the community and state structures forming the context for the definition of what we might call corporate ethnicity.

As opposed to this, there are only a few immigrant Muslims of Arab origin in Cluj.[5] Apparently they have not developed relations with the main Muslim institutions (situated in Dobrogea), they have only a few cultural organizations, and their relation to state institutions is direct and personal (i.e. without the mediation of Muslim institutions). We interviewed the following individuals: a governmental counsellor on ethnic issues of Muslim religion (A.A), a Muslim religious leader (I.B), two political leaders of Turks and Tatars (O.A and S.C), two NGO leaders (C.C and G.H), one expert in Turkish studies (F.C), one informal leader and businessman (A.K). We also participated in a group discussion led by a counsellor on education in native (Turkish and Tartar) languages (N.A).[6] Information was also gathered from public debates published in the media, a public conference,[7] annual reports of the immigration office and the Romanian information service.

Who are the Muslims in Romania?

Speaking of Muslims in general terms is as confusing as it is in the case of every nationality, ethnic group and religious community. As in other parts of the world they do not form a homogeneous community in Romania either. There are no Muslims as such, i.e. without further qualifications. Scholars have been arguing for long that ethnic, national or other categorical identifications hide complex social structures and differentiated subgroups. Internal variations are as common among them as they are in the case of Christians or Romanians (Modood 2003). An overall massive view of Muslims might strengthen a misleading perception of these groups as being homogeneous, undifferentiated mass of people. Picturing Muslims as an undifferentiated group of people is not only confusing and unrealistic but also contradicts the way Muslims portray themselves. On the contrary, a perspective that keeps in mind internal differentiation may yield important insights or can simply be more accurate.

Muslims form a small but heterogeneous minority group. They represent 0,3% of the total population of Romania. According to official data provided by the 2002 census there are 67, 566 inhabitants who declared their religious affiliation to be Muslim. Roughly half of them are Tartars, the other half being Turks.[8] However, leaders of Muslim organizations consider that the official number downplays the real size of the community, the latter having more members. They estimate that the real but unofficial number of native Muslim inhabitants is somewhere between 100,000 and 120,000. Adding the number of immigrants, refugees, permanent or temporary residents the figure increases to 150,000 or even 180,000 which is thought to be a good estimation of the total population of Muslims.

Although the main criterion of affiliation seems to be religion, the Muslim community in Romania is structured along several other criteria beside religion. Citizenship status, length of presence in Romania, ethnicity, regional affiliation is the common set of characteristics different Muslim groups are seen to be

5 There are 396 Romanian citizens belonging to the Muslim religion in Cluj. In addition there are 1503 Muslim students enrolled in the Faculty of Medicine who hold temporary residence permits; more than 70% of them come from Tunisia and the rest from Morocco and Algeria. Student community is heterogeneous regarding observance of religion.

6 12 high-school professors from different parts of Dobrogea participated at the round-table discussion and shared their experience regarding speaking, learning and teaching Turkish and Tartar.

7 Public debate on "The world without Islam", organized in Constanța at the Ovidius University on the 20th of February 2008

8 There is also a small community of Albanians.

based upon. The distinctions introduced to describe the structure of the Muslim community are the following: first, there is a key dividing line between inborn and immigrant Muslims. Inborn Muslims – constantly named 'indigenous' – live in the province of Dobrogea in the south-eastern part of Romania and form a historical ethnic and religious minority. Since they dwell in the same region in physical proximity the community is perceived also as having historically developed common regional ties.

Let us view this in a broader framework: according to indigenous Muslims' view immigrants are classified into categories according to the time and origin of immigration, and citizenship status. From this angle there are Muslims (of Arabic origin) who came to Romania to study during the socialist era, remained here and applied for Romanian citizenship. Most of them live in larger Romanian towns, usually university centres.[9] Another group, called 'foreigners' by Romanian Muslims, appeared after 1989. This group comprises individuals both from Turkey and Arab states. They are usually considered temporary residents, their stay often being related either to business or to religious and communitarian services to Muslim communities. Refugees, asylum seekers form another group that is hardly ever mentioned by others but the official authorities dealing with immigrants. These new communities have not joined the old Muslim community in Romania, the two groups living almost parallel lives (Grigore 1999). According to this classification there are three types of Muslims in Romania: indigenous people, (already established) immigrants, and foreigners (or 'new' immigrants).[10] In what follows we present the differences regarding the patterns of incorporation of these loosely defined groups after resuming the general view upon Muslims in the Romanian public sphere.

The general context of meanings related to Muslims

Media representation of Islamic fundamentalism in Romania

The representation of Islam and Muslims in Romania tends to focus on fundamentalism, extremism or terrorism. According to the current tendency of public discourse, new immigrants are considered potentially dangerous. Indigenous groups are not mentioned in these contexts, i.e. they are not taken into consideration in this framwework. Some analysts blame the weakness of the Western governments for propagating and supporting (the idea of) multiculturalism which nourishes the identity crises of the West. They consider also multiculturalism responsible for the spread of terrorism. The reckless spreading of religious schools is referred to as the real cause of terrorism. There is even a tendency to criminalize Muslims, as the press relates situations mostly involving suspicious foreign citizens being arrested. Furthermore, some politicians declare (though they never provide any clear evidence for it) that hundreds of Islamic militants ready to fight may be waiting in Romania. Most of the statements are based on the content of press articles requesting Romanian secret services to take a stand in this matter.

There are also positive perspectives on Muslims, especially regarding the common and entangled history of Muslims and Christians in Europe. Intellectuals often perceive this history as one that provided a model of religious tolerance for Europe, since the Ottoman Empire accommodated itself to the subdued religious communities. They also recall arguments of religious tolerance of Jews in Medina to counterbalance the one-sided image that is circulated in and by the media.[11]

Muslim programs: integrating migrants and surveillance of terrorists

Apart form the general measures stipulated by the laws regulating religious denominations and historical ethnic groups, Romania has not developed a special programme for the integration of Muslim communities. It is only 'foreigner' Muslims who become targeted by two types of nation-wide programs. Such a program is coordinated by the Romanian Information Service (SRI) and addresses issues of na-

9 See Appendix 1 for the territorial distribution according to historical provinces and localities were there are more than 50 individuals of Muslim religion.

10 The actual grid of classification is complicated by ethnicity and nationality since there is a distinction made between Muslims from Arab countries and Turkey irrespective to their legal status in Romania.

11 Cf. the public debate on "The world without Islam", organized in Constanţa on February 20, 2008.

tional security and fight against terrorism. This programme maps the activities of all foreigners entering Romania[12]. The other programme is coordinated by the Romanian Immigration Office (a specialized structure of the Ministry of Administration and Interior) and provides assistance for asylum seekers, refugees and temporary or permanent residents. They develop programmes to integrate immigrants who were granted a form of protection by the Romanian state.

The Romanian Immigration Office (RIO)[13] seems to be the leading institution actor in the integration of foreigners. The office has elaborated a program that aims a threefold integration of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant workers: economic, social and cultural. They facilitate access to housing, education, and language learning programmes, Romanian culture, jobs, social welfare, and healthcare. The partners of RIO are other governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations (among others ARCA – Romanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants, Save the Children, Romanian National Council for Refugees, Jesuit Service for Refugees, Women Organization for Refugees, ICAR Foundation).

In spite of being a very generous programme in terms of economic, social and cultural integration of immigrants it is not widely inclusive since it does not reach most of the targeted individuals. The services are provided mostly to asylum seekers and refugees. The involvement in the programme is unbidden and depends upon request. For example, in 2007 605 individuals submitted applications for asylum and only 66 (11% of refugees) of them entered the program in the same year. Thus the integration programme does not reach most of the refugees, let alone other categories of temporary or permanent residents such as migrant workers[14]. In 2007 there were 49.775 foreigners in Romania out of which 43.123 had temporary residence permit and 6.652 permanent residence permit. Most of the immigrants[15] came from Turkey (6.227 were temporary residents, 976 permanent residents), China (4.336 respectively 1020), and Syria (757 permanent residents). Another group of refugees and asylum seekers fled from Iraq (223) and Serbia (183). Compared to the total number of foreigners the program involves a tiny fraction of immigrants.

Besides having a limited outreach, the programme uses a particular approach to cultural integration. It focuses on building knowledge about the host country. Hence activities relate exclusively to enhancing Romanian language proficiency, cultural knowledge and relations with Romanian individuals. The programme gives little or no attention to the immigrants' culture and the maintenance of ties with the country of origin. Although the role of transnational connections in the integration of immigrants is a fiercely debated and controversial issue, including transnational relations in integration programmes might make them more attractive to immigrants and raise their participation. Seen as a whole both media images and the underlying concept of Muslims in the RIO and SRI are suppositions that have to be 'tamed'. The 'indigenous' Muslims are conspicuously absent from these programmes. They are hardly ever referred to either in press or in the wider national programmes elaborated for Muslims.

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12 According to the "National strategy of preventing and combating terrorism" elaborated in 2002 (cf. www.sri.ro, Annual reports) the Romanian intelligence services have specialized activities that prevent and combat terrorism. The actions and measures taken towards this end are specific: monitoring and controlling groups and individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, security services provided to embassies and other objectives (seen as potential targets of terrorist action), expulsion or denying entrance of certain individuals, etc. The measures of SRI have intensified during the last five years. For example, in 2002 32 individuals were declared p*ersona non grata* compared to 58 in 2005; the number of luggage controls on airport have also increased with 77,75% in 2005 compared to 2004. The control of individuals also raised with 39,70% in the same period. These actions are perceived as repressive and discriminating Muslims, especially Arabs: "Someone, who is not a practicing Muslim, told me that during his travel to a European country he was stopped at the customs and told that he had a Muslim name, therefore he had to go through a minute control. He told the custom officer that he was not a practicing Muslim, he did not pray. The officer replied that it did not matter, he had to go through a minute control anyway. And this is the problem." Muslims are subjected to this programme due to fears from terrorism and since cross-border organized crime related to terrorism is associated with Arabs, Kurds and Turks. The programme does not address integration issues as means of prevention.

13 See www.aps.mai.gov.ro for the programme and the annual reports upon it.

14 For a comprehensive analysis of post-socialist immigration trends in Romania see Horváth 2007.

15 The data does not cover people coming from Moldova. The linguistic and cultural proximity of Moldova and Romania supposedly does not make necessary special programmes of accommodation and integration.

Dimensions of incorporation

Institutional integration

Institutional structures of Romanian Muslims have a separate history and current structures are partly shaped by this history[16]. Obviously from the 13th century to the present these institutions have undergone a series of changes, and a detailed history of institutions is needed to describe continuities and ruptures. Nevertheless a summary sketch would suffice to suggest that the institutional tradition of Muslims is ethnically selective almost to the degree of exclusiveness. In other words, these structures have been developed for communities that are now 'indigenous'. In the modern and contemporary era institutions have seen a period of flourishing during the annexation of Dobrogea to the Ottoman Empire, they went through a period of decline when Dobrogea came under Romanian authority, and they were consolidated again in post-socialism. Two points of continuity are obvious in this history. First, the organization of religion in a Muftiat remained relatively unchanged. These institutions were built by Turks and Tartars for Turks and Tartars – this being the other core of continuity. Therefore during socialism immigrants encountered an already structured institutional network. They faced the situation as a given fact and these arrangements are partly responsible for their pathways of incorporation as they are also responsible for the models of incorporation for Turks and Tartars as historical national minorities.

The first Muslims arrived to the present territory of Romania in the 13th century when the khan of the Tartar Empire colonized approximately 10,000-15,000 Selçuk Turks in the Northern part of Dobrogea[17]. The first Tartar communities settled in the region during the same period. The Tartars of Dobrogea converted to Islam at the middle of the 13th century. Because of annexing Dobrogea to the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim population of the region increased significantly and developed a rich institutional Muslim life. The Turks were the largest population during the first half of the 19th century: those living in rural areas were engaged in agriculture while the urban Muslims earned their living out of trade and small services (like pottery). After the Crimean War a new wave of Tartar immigrants arrived to Dobrogea. Between 1873-1874 there were 100,000 Muslim and 60,000 Christian inhabitants living in the sand-drifts of Tulcea and Varna. The most important Muslim centers were Babadag, Tulcea, Constanţa and Hârşova. After 1877 when Dobrogea entered under Romanian control, Romanian authorities took a series of legal and economical measures (e.g. parceling out and selling lands exclusively to newly arrived Romanian colonists). This led to a significant decrease of the Muslim population. In 1930 a number of 154,000 Turks and 22,000 Tartars representing 1% of the entire population were living in Romania.

After World War II Muslim religion was organized and functioned according to a statute adopted in 1949. The Muslim cult was autonomous, being led by a mufti together with a synod of 23 members according to this statute and the Law on Religious Denominations. However, after a promising prelude of accommodating minority politics, the communist regime gradually shifted towards a more assimilative policy as Marxist discourse on class differences was replaced and superseded by nationalist discourse and policies promoted by the Communist Party. The communist regime consolidated the ethnic identification of co-living nationalities only to dismiss it as nationalizing policies were strengthened. The shift from recognition to marginalization heavily hampered on both written and oral Turkish-Tartar culture and the functioning of the Muslim cult.

Beginning with the school year 1956/57 religious and laic educational institutions were gradually closed down. The Muslim seminar in Medgidia (established in 1610) and the Tartar section of the Faculty of Oriental Languages at Bucharest University were closed down and schools with instruction in Turkish and Tartar languages gradually disappeared. Furthermore, the elites of the Turkish-Tartar communities were marginalized and the media in their native languages severely curtailed. All these measures resulted in a rather quick assimilation of the Turkish Tartar Muslims of Dobrogea. Although Muslim religious institutions were allowed to function, their presence and impact on public life, their possibilities to provide qualified personnel were heavily restricted under the circumstances of state promoted atheism and anticlericalism.

16 The history recounted here builds on information provided by the following literature: Cardini 2002; Felezeu 1996; Gemil 1984; Grigore 1999; Nicoară 2006.

17 A region of Romania on the coast of the Black Sea.

The breakdown of the communist regime has given a new course to minority policies facilitating the expression and development of the ethnic, linguistic and religious identity of minorities. These new circumstances contributed to the strengthening of the particular ethno-religious identity of Turks and Tartars of Dobrogea. On the one hand, general policies in relation to religion and churches, including Muslims, has changed. On the other hand, Turks and Tartars have been recognized as national minorities benefiting of various types of state support. According to the logic of this policy Muslim faith was considered a particularizing dimension of their identity along with their ethnicity.

Today Muslims are organized in a Muftiat with its headquarters in Constanţa, headed by an elected Mufti. Communities made up of all Muslim believers from a locality are the basic unit of this denomination and they are headed by a committee made up of 5-7 members elected for 4 years. In Romania there are 50 Muslim communities and 20 smaller units spread throughout Constanţa county (in the aggregate consisting of 63 units), Tulcea county (4) and one unit in Brăila county, Galaţi county and Bucharest.[18]

On January 8, 2007 Law no. 489/2007[19] on the freedom of religion and the general regime of religious denominations was published. According to it on the date of its coming into force there were 18 recognized religious denominations operating in Romania (including also Islam). Yet it summoned them to submit their statutes and canonic codes to be approved by the Ministry of Culture and Religious Denominations within a year from the coming into force of the above-mentioned law.

According to the framework of the above-mentioned law the recognized denominations are of public utility. On request they can receive state funds for their clerical and non-clerical staff through contributions based on the number of their believers. These have to be Romanian citizens and their request for funds should be based on their genuine needs of subsistence and activity, material support for expenditures related to their operation, for repairs and new buildings, based on the number of believers resulting from the latest census. These funds should also be based on their genuine needs, support for their social services, fiscal facilities etc.

Besides their recognition as religious denominations, under Law no. 489/2006 religious communities may also choose to function as religious associations which also have a distinct legal entity status (they shall be formed of at least 300 persons who are Romanian citizens or Romanian residents) or as religious groups without a distinct legal entity status. However, only recognized religious denominations are entitled to receive state funds for their functioning expenses.

The two major ethnic groups of Muslim confession also benefit from the provisions of laws granting particular rights to ethnic minorities. As such, they are entitled to send a representative to the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the Romanian Parliament). This representative only needs to collect 5% of the average number of votes that a regular deputy is required to. They are also represented in the Council for National Minorities[20], being able to exercise institutionalized influence on various governmental decisions and access various resources for activities related to the preservation and promotion of their ethnic identity.

Within the general framework of the change in the minority regime several spaces of identity performance were enhanced. For instance, education of and in Turkish and Tartar as mother tongue improved significantly in the last decade. In 2004-2005 there were two pre-school units and one high-school where the language of teaching was in part Turkish. Today there are three high-schools (one in Medgidia and two in Constanţa) with the same profile. However, there are some obstacles in teaching the Turkish language, but these occur at the level of management and not of the policies. Finding classrooms and transportation for pupils is the main problem in localities where the number of Turks and Tartars[21] is very small. There is also a lack of Turkish-speaking teaching staff. Leaders of the Tatar and Turk Unions have been complaining that there are not enough teachers for teaching in Turkish because the socialist regime destroyed education in minorities' mother tongue. In 2005 there were 3448 pupils enrolled in Turkish language schools. The number of instructors totalled up to 69, resulting a ratio of 49 students for an instructor. Along education in minority languages religious education also improved. It became part

18 For further details on the Muslim Cult in Romania see http://www.muftiyat.ro/.

19 Between 1948 and 2007 religious denominations in Romania worked along Law no. 177/1948 for the general regime of religious denominations. 18 religious denominations were recognized, the Muslim Cult being among them.

20 A consultative body of the central government.

21 Tartars adopted Turkish as their mother tongue because apparently there are no standardized Tartar language manuals available.

of the school curricula and has become organized according to the religious belonging of the students. Consequently, basic notions of Islam are taught within the public education system on demand. Several schools have locations designed for Muslim religious practice and teaching.

Institutional incorporation is double-edged since it provides a legitimate avenue for expressing identity, but it is also restricting the justified forms of identity as well as the legitimate claims based on ethnicity or religiosity. The type of ethnicity promoted by the progressive minority policies is a corporate, symbolic and private one. It is corporate in the sense that special associations and institutions are mandated to define and to assure the maintenance of identity. It is symbolic since it concerns mainly public display and representation. Finally it is private because the relevant experience of identity is transferred to the home. Regarding the content of the identity promoted it can be argued that the Ottoman model on which is based is evaluated as moderate Muslim religiosity. In fact this signifies the "true Muslim" identity for 'indigenous' Muslims in Romania[22].

To sum up, the Dobrogea model of incorporation promotes symbolic and corporate ethnicity and religion meaning that it circumscribes the activities that are taken as a group. These activities are managed by ethnic and religious institutions in the institutional space of the nation-state. The main characteristics are their institutional and local embeddedness, cooperation between local/regional political and religious institutions and/or with state institutions (especially with the Department for Ethnic Relations) in performing activities related to the preservation of tradition, language, customs and religion. Religious holidays, pilgrimages, traditional fights, a soccer league, festivals of ethnic cuisine, dance and music are jointly supported reproducing folklore based ethnic affiliation and sense of belonging. Traditions and customs are also basic building blocks for the kind of Islam promoted by religious leaders: "We practice our religion according to what we have seen from our parents and grandparents, according to our customs". Moreover, in certain contexts ethnic affiliation supersedes religious ones. This is clearly demonstrated by the joint programs that promote education in the mother tongue of minorities where Muslims and Christians alike participate. Given the powerful regional and ethnic dimension of Muslim identity Muslims of other nationalities or living in other regions of Romania are not fully, if at all, incorporated in this model.

Indigenization and islamization of religious identity

There are at least two reactions to present-day models of integration of Muslims, or more precisely to what these models assume regarding religious identity. First, there is an 'indigenization' of identity, a discursive move that legitimizes the Dobrogea model. This move refers to and makes use of "common roots, homeland which are more and more associated with local, historical and cultural particularities" (Knörr 2008: 4) to create a category of proper Muslims. On the other hand another discursive process inverts the indigenization of identity and proposes what we may term the 'islamization' of religious identity. Islamization not only does not use direct ethno-religious identity to build a category but consciously avoids it and builds an alternative one. The alternative model rests on a universally homogeneous image of Islamic practice according to the Koran. In the remaining part of the paper let us briefly illustrate the two processes of islamization and indigenization, and sketch some further paths of interpretation in the concluding remarks.

The discourse of indigenization revolves around the centre piece of ethno-religious characteristics as a fundamental element in identification and categorization. The main dimensions are recounting local history (tradition), religion as personal option, symbolic religion, and ecumenism. In this discourse religious practice is shaped by local tradition meaning that cultural identification in the form of ethno-regional imagery supersedes or more precisely qualifies the religious one. For the Turks and Tartars in Romania the characteristics take the shape of a history of being here, choosing religious affiliation, and being 'tolerant' with other confessions.

> "First of all, we as Muslims have lived here on this soil since 1283 … we are a community that have had a good relation to the majority since than up to the present. Ottomans as well as the Romanian state have respected everyone religion, identity, ethnicity. Therefore Dobrogea has been free of ethnic or religious conflict." […]

22 For a similar differentiation within religious communities see Birt 2006; Buckser 1999; Haddad – Golson 2007.

> "We should differentiate between Romanian and Bulgarian Muslims on the one hand and Muslims from Western states. First, Muslims from Romania are indigenous, we have martyrs, and we fought side by side with Romanians in the two world wars. Our ancestors contributed to the economic development of Romania." (interview with I. B.)

Local history plays an important role in rooting Muslim religious identity in the region of Dobrogea. The quotes above establish some characteristics of the historical narrative of Muslims in Romania. First, it emphasizes continuity referring to a venerable 800 years of being in the same place. It suggests that the descendants of the first migrants are sedentary in contrast with flows of the 'new' Muslim immigrants in Romania and elsewhere in Europe or the United States. Another interesting point is that the history of Romanian Muslims begins with immigration and settlement and it is not a history of voyage or travel from the country of origin and the colonization of Dobrogea. There is no mention of origin other than the settling the first Muslims in Dobrogea. The second quote widens the scope of the first by stating a relationship between the majority and the Muslim population. Dying for the country represents here the ultimate sign of loyalty towards the Romanian nation.

Good relations with the Romanian state and the institutions of majority are presented elsewhere in the form of ecumenism practiced by the *muftiat*. This explicit attitude is part of the ideology of the Dobrogea model that states a harmonious system of relations between ethnic and religious groups dwelling in the region and between religious and lay organizations. The quality of relations is attributed to a historically developed model of cohabitation with the state and other religious or ethnic groups.

> "As an institution we have our own special activities. However we also have common activities with other cults. For example, we organized a humanitarian campaign with the Orthodox Church. We went to a mosque, a church; we visited Christians and Muslims alike."
> […]
> "You cannot force someone to embrace a religion. Not even Islam, because the person has the ability, the reason to decide for himself. He is the one accountable in front of God. Therefore you cannot force a Muslim to practice religion. The person has to choose to practice the religion on a daily basis."
> "Our religious council has 25 members. 8 of them are lay persons. I think this is very good for the management of our community, although many disagree. Lay persons represent a factor of balance." (interview with I. B.)

Through paradigmatic relations this discourse is also directed towards 'new' immigrants and 'fundamentalists'. Every aspect of it tends to maintain control of the Romanian Muslim community within the confines of the institutional structure of the Dobrogea model and conversely denies the legitimacy of claims formulated by 'new' Islamic movements regarding the public representation of Muslims.

Islamization constructs a different view of integration of Muslims from Romania in a well-knit community. It is almost a point by point counter argumentation of the indigenization. Its view of Arabs and Islam on the one hand and the Dobrogea model on the other is the opposite of what the discourse of 'embedded' institutions suggests. It states that religion is foundational for identity. Moreover, religion appears as vocation and a way of life worth to be pursued. Finally, religion is freed from traditions, be it regional, ethnic or national and it is stated as an independent dimension of identification. In other words, 'islamization' creates a category in which universal religion is the most relevant, foundational and specific dimension of Muslim identification.

Religion is viewed first as the main pillar of identity. The Dobrogea model and the discursive indigenization processes are put in opposition with 'islamization' exactly on the role attributed to religion, tradition and ethnicity. "As the gates of liberty have opened in 1989 everyone became interested in religion, in their identity, sent their children to the mosque to learn their own religion" or "[f]or example, if you consider the Muslims from Dobrogea you realize they know nothing about their identity as Turks or Tartars. They do not know their language, traditions, history or religion. I think religion is the last resort to maintain our identity in face of an invisible but real force of assimilation". (interview with E C.)

The centrality of religion is confirmed by a set of expectation regarding religious practice, experience and dedication. To study Koran is a matter of personal endeavour and dedication. It is emphasized to be initiated and vigilant:

> "I have studied the Koran as much as it was possible in Romania […] As a child I received religious education from my grandparents, but they were not truly initiated. Immediately after the revolution I started to take lessons in the mosque" and "[n]ewly converted persons are more vigilant. They are conscious about their religion. Muslims from Dobrogea are not." (interview with E. C.)

This practice ought to be supported by education, by truly dedicated and professionally trained people.

> „...religion is taught in every school. Who are the teachers? They are individuals that do not have any qualification in this domain, people who do not practice their religion; they are people who have nothing to do with Islam. The teacher of Turkish language teaches religion and they say that Islam means something, but maybe it does not mean anything of what they say. How then we expect the pupil to learn the religion. We have to fill this void as we can, because [religion] it is extremely important". (interview with E. C.)

The quotes try to take the Dobrogea model systematically apart. The existence of an 'embedded' institutional structure is shadowed by the lack of dedication and the poor management of the possibilities. The proponents of 'islamization' of religious identity resent the fact that the 'indigenization' does not leave any space for other types of religious identification than the symbolic and formal one. Since 'indigenization' is related to the Dobrogea model of incorporation and its constructed form of tradition, historical continuity and regional particularity, 'islamization' questions these grassroots. First of all, Islam is unique and universal for them. Its original form should not be altered and replaced by these allegedly non-authentic copies.

> „Euro-Islam means together or separately. Of course some were saying that we needed to adopt a European Islam which, in my opinion, is not possible. And it is wrong, too. It would mean to change Islam and to make a copy of European Islam. And in Turkey we should make a Turkish Islam and in Indonesia an Indonesian one." (interview with E. C.)

Although the universal uniqueness of Islam is one of the main dimensions of the discourse the attitudes are ambivalent towards it. Resorting to global Islamic imagery puts them in a vulnerable position. The prospect of unitary global Islam is cherished and seen as an aim to be achieved, but its proponents are well aware of the fact that speaking of global Islam will send them into the arena of a discourse they oppose: the discourse of religious fundamentalism that views Muslims as ignorant, backward, anti-modern people. They are also aware that today this categorization conflates severe observance with terrorism and the prospect of jihad. Accordingly, it keeps distance from potential confusion of Islam with terrorism.

> "We established a commission on verdicts to help Muslims from Romania to find an answer to their questions. They do not need to address questions to others from Saudi Arabia or Great Britain. They can contact us directly because we are the ones to know the problems in Romania, the mentalities, the traditions. We established this NGO to gather all Muslims form Romania, no matter of their nationality. We try to guide them towards the religion and mentality that are the most widespread in the global Muslim community". (interview with E. C.)

On the other hand, renouncing to or mitigating the importance of global Islam would mean proximity to the Dobrogea model and embracement of ethno-religious and regional identity. It also brings to the forefront the acceptance of the discourse that sees Muslims as the feared 'other' or potential terrorist. Therefore, carving out a particular space seems difficult enough. Being in-between the possible

and probable accusations of terrorism and renouncing to universal Islam in the favour or the particular Dobrogea religious model seems to elicit ambivalence:

> „That's why we decided to establish the Association of Romanian Muslims with a local management because we are Romanian citizens, and we know best, we understand the mentality, the tradition and the habits of local people. The youth outside Dobrogea has a greater potential. The youth from Dobrogea are not conscious of this fact. But the individuals who became Muslims are more vigilant, more active because they choose the religion and not born in it."
> […]
> „We have and extremely important role in guiding these newly converted Muslims along the moderate path because there is unfortunately a tendency to take on a more extreme way. For example, there are several English-language sites with verdicts, and so on. These sites are stricter and we are convinced that this type of thinking cannot develop in Romania, and we do not see any interest in that. That's why we talk to these new Muslims, but we also guide them because otherwise there is a danger to spread this [more strict] mentality and we don't want that. Importing verdicts is not good for us. That's why we made our own commission on verdicts. If a Muslim from Romania has a question he does not have turn to Muslims from Saudi Arabia or England. He can address his question directly to us because we know what are the local problems, traditions and mentalities. And I think this is one of the most important objectives of the association: to discover and guide Muslims from Romania, no matter of their nationality or region, and to guide them towards the general and most widespread religion and mentality in the Muslim community worldwide." (interview with E. C.)

The tensions generated by this position are evident in the quotes above. The excerpt is carefully built on three structuring oppositions between 'new' and 'old' Muslims, foreign and local situation, tradition and religion. However, on the most general level the above illustrated discursive moves suggest that religion does matter in defining Muslim identity. It confirms the point made by Goody in a general overview on the role and history of Islam in Europe (Goody 2004). Although religion has an undeniable social significance, authorities in the study of Islam have avoided counting it or accounting for its relevance. Instead they saw it as part of the rubric 'ethnicity'. On the contrary Goody argues – and the discourses described in this paper support his view – that religion has had an impact on national struggles and ethnic endeavour.

Our case shows that in both models presented ethnicity and religion are in competition. The Dobrogea model favours ethnic and regional qualifications of the religion, while the other one tries to exclude any other type of traits other than religion. Thus on the one hand ethnicity tends to be a more powerful dimension of identity than religion for groups and institutions that would like to preserve the status quo in the present management of cultural diversity. On the contrary, dissenting movements advocate a symmetrically inverted model in which religion would qualify or even annul ethnicity in the form of regionally specific affiliation.

Concluding remarks

■ Differential models of incorporation give rise to different discourses on identity. The two models of incorporation described in the paper differ in institutional dimensions and in the practices these dimensions involve. The Dobrogea model of incorporation is designed for Turks and Tartars from a relatively well-defined region. It promotes symbolic ethnicity and religious practice based on traditions. The corresponding discourse on identity is structured according to the moves of 'indigenization' where the religious practice is anchored in the vision of common roots, homeland and cultural traditions. On the other hand, the other model stresses the lack of the local and ethnic component and promotes a universal Islam, which discursively responds to 'indigenization' by 'islamization'. The factor that gives strength

to the Dobrogea model is exactly the one that precludes the integration of 'new' Muslims who have found themselves outside this model. We could state that in this sense the particularity of the Dobrogea model constructs its own opposition.

The case presented has at least one implication for reconsidering intercultural relations. It questions the common wisdom on interculturalism (as a regime of management of cultural differences) and the creation of hybrid cultural forms (e.g. identities). In other words, it suggests that intercultural relations are hardly aptly described as some kind of harmonious system stemming from (supposedly symmetrical or balanced) cultural interchange (Anthias 2001). Cultural contact of whatever kind has multiple consequences and these occur unexpectedly. Contact between cultures might rearrange an existing order not only between already hierarchically structured ethnic or cultural communities but also in the core of the groups. The case presented shows how a 'foreign' Muslim presence tends to pluralize discourses on ethnicity and cultural belonging and make space for the fragmentation of communities. 'Dissent' from established categories and performances of ethno-religious identity might transgress ethnic boundaries and make new alliances across ethnic groups on religious basis.

The further aim of the paper has been to suggest possible paths of interpretation for the heterogeneity of systems of categories. To be sure, conflicting systems of categorization indicate the rise of new movements on the part of Muslims. The question is why these movements appear and why they take the shape they take and what is that it makes the majority population to think of Muslims as they think? A path of the literature dealing with the emergence of Islamic movements considers that they are generated by the Muslims' encounter with modernity and colonialism. On the contrary, others state that movements rise due to the holders of knowledge in different positions within a single religious movement (Werbner 1996). This perspective rightly points to the immediate context of in-group relations and considers the segmentation or fragmentation of ethnic or religious groups. The divergent systems of categorizations suggest a dissent from the established form of indigenous community structure and practice where the areas of contention are moderate religious observance and loyalty towards the nation-state and the majority population on the one hand, and a more vigilant religious practice and loyalty to the pure Islam on the other. The path of interpretation suggested is the restructuring of the religious authority in the context of transition and the subsequent changes underwent within the Muslim community[23].

Competing definitions of identity also indicate the various degrees in which policies sustain different claims on ethnicity and religion. The Romanian policies sustain multiculturalism in the form of symbolic, private ethnicity and religion for established or historical minorities and confessions recognized by the state. These groups benefit from state subsidies and they function as corporate cultural groups (Kastoryano 2004). Although other movements or institutional arrangements also function as corporate ethnic or religious groups they do not fit into these policies and they are compelled to look for other financial sources and sources of recognition.

The third stream of interpretation might consider the effects of immigration on majority population. On the level of state policies and integration some scholars squarely put the question of racial 'othering' into the context of a structural tension between "demands of capital for socially disunited 'abstract labor' and the demands of state for culturally unified 'abstract citizens' (Silverstein 2005: 364). As immigration is seen as a "persistent challenge to the stability of rule […] local national integration and unity" (Silverstein 2005: 365) it transpires also on everyday life. Day-to-day contact might single out foreigners to form an arena for expressing and debating disturbing aspects of social life, especially in times of transition (see Gullestad 1995; Lengyel 2008; Verdery 1993). From their perspective Muslims are the 'other' who aid deciphering problem areas in the formulation of majority population's self identity in turbulent times.

23 Once religious practices have been freed and 'de-centralized' and all sorts of alternative religious movements have made their apparition, established religious institutions encounter the problem of loyalty of believers. Thus struggles within Muslim religious leaders can be interpreted as struggles for believers. Here we do not consider this instrumental perspective on religion although we recognize its importance and we will take it up in another paper.

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Appendix

REGION	COUNTY	LOCALITY	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MUSLIM POPULATION
Dobrogea	Constanța	MUNICIPIUL CONSTANȚA	18245	
Dobrogea	Constanța	MUNICIPIUL MEDGIDIA	8154	
Dobrogea	Constanța	MUNICIPIUL MANGALIA	3138	
Dobrogea	Constanța	COBADIN	1725	
Dobrogea	Constanța	VALU LUI TRAIAN	1423	
Dobrogea	Constanța	DOBROMIR	1327	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ORAŞ TECHIRGHIOL	1128	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ORAŞ HÂRŞOVA	1045	
Dobrogea	Constanța	BĂNEASA	961	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ORAŞ OVIDIU	855	
Dobrogea	Constanța	CASTELU	840	
Dobrogea	Constanța	CUMPANA	781	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ORAŞ BASARABI	771	
Dobrogea	Constanța	INDEPENDENȚA	695	
Dobrogea	Constanța	TUZLA	637	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ORAŞ EFORIE	607	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ORAŞ CERNAVODĂ	583	
Dobrogea	Constanța	23 AUGUST	521	
Dobrogea	Constanța	MIHAIL KOGĂLNICEANU	509	
Dobrogea	Constanța	AGIGEA	490	
Dobrogea	Constanța	LUMINA	460	
Dobrogea	Constanța	TOPRAISAR	452	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ORAŞ NĂVODARI	430	
Dobrogea	Constanța	CIOCÂRLIA	394	
Dobrogea	Constanța	AMZACEA	330	
Dobrogea	Constanța	MERENI	283	
Dobrogea	Constanța	LIPNIȚA	279	
Dobrogea	Constanța	COMANA	206	
Dobrogea	Constanța	LIMANU	195	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ORAŞ NEGRU VODA	135	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ALBEŞTI	123	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ION CORVIN	121	
Dobrogea	Constanța	POARTA ALBA	104	
Dobrogea	Constanța	ADAMCLISI	99	
Dobrogea	Constanța	PECINEAGA	82	
Dobrogea	Constanța	SILIŞTEA	53	
Dobrogea	Constanța	TÂRGUSOR	50	
Dobrogea	Tulcea	MUNICIPIUL TULCEA	1433	
Dobrogea	Tulcea	ORAŞ BABADAG	1426	
Dobrogea	Tulcea	ORAŞ MACIN	340	
Dobrogea	Tulcea	ORAŞ ISACCEA	223	
Dobrogea	Tulcea	CASIMCEA	103	
Dobrogea	Tulcea	CIUCUROVA	82	
TOTAL DOBROGEA			**51838**	**77.07**

REGION	COUNTY	LOCALITY	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MUSLIM POPULATION
Moldova	Bacău	MUNICIPIUL BACĂU	77	
Moldova	Galați	MUNICIPIUL GALAȚI	124	
Moldova	Iaşi	MUNICIPIUL IAŞI	635	
TOTAL MOLDOVA			**836**	**1.24**
Muntenia	Arges	MUNICIPIUL PITEŞTI	94	
Muntenia	Brăila	MUNICIPIUL BRĂILA	190	
Muntenia	Bucureşti	MUNICIPIUL BUCUREŞTI	9488	
Muntenia	Călăraşi	MUNICIPIUL CĂLĂRAŞI	271	
Muntenia	Călăraşi	MUNICIPIUL OLTENIȚA	75	
Muntenia	Dolj	MUNICIPIUL CRAIOVA	305	
Muntenia	Ilfov	VOLUNTARI	61	
Muntenia	Mehedinți	MUNICIPIUL DROBETA-TURNU SEVERIN	57	
Muntenia	Prahova	MUNICIPIUL PLOIEŞTI	192	
TOTAL MUNTENIA			**10733**	**15.96**
Transilvania	Arad	MUNICIPIUL ARAD	90	
Transilvania	Bihor	MUNICIPIUL ORADEA	146	
Transilvania	Braşov	MUNICIPIUL BRAŞOV	180	
Transilvania	Cluj	MUNICIPIUL CLUJ-NAPOCA	396	
Transilvania	Mureş	MUNICIPIUL TÂRGU MUREŞ	59	
Transilvania	Timiş	MUNICIPIUL TIMIŞOARA	952	
TOTAL TRANSILVANIA			**1823**	**2.71**
TOTAL MUSLIM – LOCALITIES WITH MORE THAN 50 MUSLIM INHABITANTS			**65230**	**96.99**
TOTAL MUSLIM POPULATION IN ROMANIA			**67257**	**100.00**

DESPRE INSTITUTUL PENTRU STUDIEREA PROBLEMELOR MINORITĂȚILOR NAȚIONALE

ABOUT THE ROMANIAN INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON NATIONAL MINORITIES

A NEMZETI KISEBBSÉGKUTATÓ INTÉZETRŐL

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Schimbare de abordare în România, în domeniul politicilor față de minoritățile naționale: analiza politico-instituțională a istoriei recente;
Dinamica etno-demografică a minorităților din România;
Revitalizare etnică sau asimilare? Identități în tranziție, analiza transformărilor identitare la minoritățile etnice din România;
Analiza rolului jucat de etnicitate în dinamica stratificării sociale din România;
Patrimoniul cultural instituțional a minorităților din România;
Patternuri ale segregării etnice;
Bilingvismul: modalități de producere, atitudini și politici publice;
Noi imigranți în România: modele de încorporare și integrare;

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■ Aim

The inter- and multidisciplinary study and research of the preservation, development and expression of ethnic identity, as well as social, historic, cultural, linguistic, religious or other aspects of national minorities and of other ethnic communities in Romania.

■ Major research areas

Changing policies regarding national minorities in Romania: political and institutional analyses of recent history;
Ethno-demographic dynamics of minorities in Romania;
Identities in transition – ethnic enlivening or assimilation? (analysis of transformations in the identity of national minorities from Romania);
Analysis of the role of ethnicity in the social stratification dynamics in Romania;
The institutional cultural heritage of minorities in Romania;
Ethnic segregation patterns;
Bilingualism: ways of generating bilingualism, public attitudes and policies;
Recent immigrants to Romania: patterns of social and economic integration.

A kolozsvári székhelyű, jogi személyként működő NEMZETI KISEBBSÉGKUTATÓ INTÉZET (NKI) a Román Kormány hatáskörébe tartozó közintézmény.

■ Célok

A romániai nemzeti kisebbségek és más etnikai közösségek etnikai identitásmegőrzésének, -változásainak, -kifejeződésének, valamint ezek szociológiai, történelmi, kulturális, nyelvészeti, vallásos és más jellegű aspektusainak kutatása, tanulmányozása.

■ Főbb kutatási irányvonalak

A romániai kisebbségpolitikában történő változások elemzése: jelenkortörténetre vonatkozó intézménypolitikai elemzések;
A romániai kisebbségek népességdemográfiai jellemzői;
Átmeneti identitások – etnikai revitalizálás vagy asszimiláció? (a romániai kisebbségek identitásában végbemenő változások elemzése);
Az etnicitás szerepe a társadalmi rétegződésben;
A romániai nemzeti kisebbségek kulturális öröksége;
Az etnikai szegregáció modelljei;
A kétnyelvűség módozatai, az ehhez kapcsolódó attitűdök és közpolitikák;
Új bevándorlók Romániában: társadalmi és gazdasági beilleszkedési modellek.

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