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

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TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF OFFICIAL ATHEISM: THE CONTEMPORARY ROMANIAN RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE

Special Issue. Guest Editors: Mălina Voicu, László Fosztó and Sorin Gog

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TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE FALL OF OFFICIAL ATHEISM: THE CONTEMPORARY ROMANIAN RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE

Guest Editors' Foreword

MĂLINA VOICU[1], LÁSZLÓ FOSZTÓ[2] AND SORIN GOG[3]

For almost half a century, religion was excluded from the public life in Romania by the socialist regime. The fall of the regime created opportunities for public manifestation of religiosity and opened the way for religious education and missionary activities. Debates on religious topics in the media, the setting up of formal religious education in public schools and the liberalization of the religious market opened space for religious revival in everyday life.

Postsocialist Romania ranks among the most religious countries of contemporary Europe, according to longitudinal and cross-sectional studies focused on religious values and behaviour. While religious practice strengthened during the last twenty years, many questions can be raised about this religious revival and the Romanian religious landscape. Is religious revival real, or is it only an artefact of comparative research? Are the standard measures used for assessing religiosity valid for the Romanian case, or not? And, more generally, how does the religious landscape look like and which are the most appropriate tools for its investigation? How can sociology, social and cultural anthropology, and, in particular, the anthropology of religion enhance our understanding of religious phenomena?

This issue of *Studia Sociologia* focuses on religiosity in post-communist Romania and on how and why the Romanian religious landscape evolved during the post-communist period. The issue includes eight articles, each of them trying to find answers to the questions listed above, using different theoretical and methodological frameworks. The first three papers approach the topic from a

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comparative cross-sectional and longitudinal perspective, comparing Romania with other post-communist countries, or with countries from Western Europe, using mainly quantitative research methods. The remaining five papers provide qualitative case studies based on anthropological investigations.

Gert Pickel, in *Revitalization of religiosity as normalization? Romania in European comparative perspective*, analyses the religious revitalization reported for Romania during the last two decades. His approach is mainly comparative, trying to explain the evolution of religiosity in Romania by quantitative longitudinal, as well as by cross-sectional comparisons with other European countries. The author uses a complex theoretical framework in order to draw his research hypotheses, employing Secularization theory, Individualization theory and the Religious market model. The main hypothesis of the article states that the secularization process occurs only when a specific society reaches a threshold of "religious normalization" The analyses, using data coming from various survey researches such as *European Values Survey*, *World Values Survey*, *International Social Survey Program*, *European Social Survey*, *Eurobarometers* and *Church and Religion in Central and Eastern Europe*, concludes that religious revival in Romania is not an exceptional development.

Gergely Rosta scrutinizes the effect of religiosity on political attitudes and behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe. His article *Religion and political values in Central and Eastern Europe*, based on quantitative analysis of the *European Values Survey* 1990 and 1999/2000 datasets, explores the existence of a religious cleavage in politics throughout post-communist societies. Controlling for contextual factors like denominational affiliation and level of secularization, the paper investigates how party preferences, left-right ideological self-identification and political participation are shaped by religious beliefs and practices. The Romanian case is approached in a comparative perspective and represents an example of how the relationship between religion and politics works in a highly religious Orthodox country.

Cosima Rughiniş and Iulia Răuţiu's article *Of priests and politics. Measuring separation of Church and State in present-day Romania* addresses the topic of incompatibility between the strong involvement of the Romanian Orthodox Church in public life and the widely shared opinion among the Romanian population that priests should not be involved in politics. The paper combines quantitative analysis of data from *European Values Survey*, *World Values Survey* and *Extremism 2003* with qualitative investigations by means of cognitive interviews. The authors point out that the disapproval of politician priests may occur in both highly religious and highly secularized societies. They set forth an improved methodological approach for further survey research on this topic.

A Spiritual Amusement Village: Manufacturing Difference in the Wallachian Countryside signed by Alice Forbess explores the multiple processes of ritual

changes. Based on her extensive fieldwork (2000-2002) in a Southern Romanian village and the nearby convent, the author reveals a complex picture of ritual inventions and revitalisations. A local intellectual, Mr. Florescu (a pseudonym), initiates the creation of a spiritual "theme park" involving a bricolage of images from Western popular culture, representations of public figures (Helmut Kohl and Princess Diana) and religious motives (e.g. Virgin Mary and Jesus) in order to call for repentance and renewal of religious devotion and also to promote the village as a tourist attraction. Mr. Florescu is not the only actor involved in the post-socialist ritual transformations. Forbess presents us the competition between three local groups, the Romanian villagers, their Rudari neighbours (a group seen as Gypsies) and the nuns of the local convent, who engage in renegotiating and recreating ritual sites and borderlines separating these groups. The local religious and ritual landscape mirrors both the new processes of social differentiation and the exclusionary tendencies present in the larger society.

Restitution of Property, Religious Competition and Sense of Justice: Claims over the Romanian Greek Catholic Church Patrimony by Stéphanie Mahieu deals with the problems related with the reestablishment of the Greek Catholic Church in Romania which was banned in 1948 by the socialist state. In the process of recreation of the Greek Catholic Church the most controversial issue proved to be property restitution. Mahieu presents the general conditions and the legal framework of this process and also offers insight into the debates between the Romanian Orthodox Church (which received the church buildings after Greek Catholics were banned) and the remerging Greek Catholics. Her anthropological fieldwork was carried out in three locations in Transylvania (Bixad, Cluj and Ieud), each of these presenting different aspects of the property restitution process. In her conclusions, Mahieu points to problems related to the relative failure of Greek Catholic renewal and the recent massive migrations from Romania which, to her interpretation, both contribute to calming down the debates and conflicts in the present.

The Sacralization of Romanian Society. An Analysis of the Profane Functions of Three Romanian Churches by Kiss Dénes investigates the social functions of the Churches during the post-socialist period. The analysis is focused on three Churches: the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Transylvanian Calvinist Church. The data for the article was gathered from church documents and the self-presentation of these churches on the Internet. Kiss compiles an inventory of the different institutions created and maintained by the churches which are oriented toward profane social tasks and offer services in domains like social work, and health care, education, cultural, social and economic entrepreneurship, as well as services offered in penitentiaries and the army. He also identifies different strategies of these institutions and

concludes that these strategies are employed in a differentiated manner by the different churches. The Romanian Orthodox Church is more inclined to consecrate public institutions, which it penetrates for its social activities, while the two minority churches are more active in the sphere of civil society, creating a large number of institutions of their own.

Part of the major transformations that took place in the two decades of Romanian post-socialism is the consolidation and institutionalization of religious pluralism. The Neo-Protestant movements have been long part of the religious system, but it is only after the abolition of Atheism as the official ideology of the State, that the different Neo-Protestant churches became active in the public sphere, making use of the newly established religious freedom.

Simion Pop's paper *The socio-cultural space of Pentecostalism in present-day Transylvania: dynamics of religious pluralization in post-communist Romania* is focusing on the distinct transformation of the religious field, which is generated by the increasing conversions to Pentecostalism taking place in Transylvania and on the establishment of new religious congregations. His argument draws on ethnographic data regarding religious conversions and on the narrative analysis of religious leaders from this community. The popularization of new forms of Pentecostal religiosity lead to the emergence of new networks of faith and religious spaces of interaction, that allow for the construction of a new type of individual religious self. The requirement of constant acts of repentance, the moralization of life through a personal interpretation of Scripture that acts as the main resource for religious guiding principles do not lead to an individualistic religiosity, but make way for the establishment of a new type of congregations, which draw strongly on communal fellowship and novel forms of religious sociality platforms.

Raluca Bianca Roman analyzes the institutionalization of Neo-protestant confessional high-schools in Romania and the different strategies of counter-secularization articulated by the Pentecostal, Baptist and Adventist churches in post-socialist Romania in order to deal with the increasingly secular life-style of teenagers. Her paper *Neo-protestant confessional education and the process of counter-secularization in post socialist Romania* compares the religious attitudes of teenagers who study in secular high schools with those from confessional high schools in order to contextualize the emergence of alternative educational institutions (mainly high schools, but often also kindergartens and universities). She investigates the different legitimacy claims by Neo-Protestant pastors, teachers, principals and students for building a distinct religious environment that parallels the secular educational system. This new type of state-funded educational system allows for the institutionalization of alternative religious interpretations, which are embedded within the educational processes that enable the flourishing Neo-protestant communities to preserve and to promote

their religious values within the contemporary Romanian society.

During the two decades of post-communist transformations, Romanian society has experienced significant changes with respect to religion and religion's impact on the social life. The religious field is more vivid and diverse. The general level of religious practice is higher, while new religious movements have flourished during the last twenty years. Is it a long term trend or just a contextual reaction? This issue of *Studia Sociologia* has tried to provide a snapshot of the current situation, while further researches have to give an answer to this very provocative question.

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REVITALIZATION OF RELIGIOSITY AS NORMALIZATION? – ROMANIA IN EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

GERT PICKEL[1]

ABSTRACT. Two different perspectives of the development of religiosity in Eastern Europe oppose each other. On the one hand, researchers assume that the cessation of socialist repressions of the church and religion will be followed by a revitalization of religion in the region. In particular, supporters of the market model of religion infer a higher chance of increasing religious competition and pluralization from the opening of religious markets, which leads to an increase in religious vitality. On the other hand, supporters of the secularization paradigm consider the situation in Eastern Europe to reflect a premature secularization. Consequently, after an initial revitalization of religion, they hardly expect any significant return to religion. However, until today, the trends of the development of religion and bonding to the church in Eastern Europe as derived from comparative analyses, prove to be contradictory. We find both trends toward the revitalization of religion as well as trends toward secularization. Apparently, quite a few countries follow the West European trend of secularization after having reached a certain peak of revitalization. Other countries – among them the countries in the Russian realm as well as Romania – continue to display a relatively continuous increase in rates of bonding to the church and subjective religiosity. The main hypotheses of this article can thus be stated as follows: the latter group of countries have not yet reached the threshold of "religious normalization" at which point they follow a process of secularization. This is mainly due to the relation of the degree of modernization. In addition, we have to take path-dependent developments into account as many Eastern European states are currently experiencing a "cultural defense", which contributes to a renaissance of "traditional" religion as it relates religion to the nation. Hence, neither the assumption of a premature secularization nor the assumption of a revitalization are likely to hold true completely. Instead, the social context is crucial. This in turn supports a contextualized secularization theory which is related to the social structure.

Keywords: religious normalization, secularization theory, individualization theory, religious market model, Eastern Europe

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Introduction: Church and Religion in Eastern Europe within the Theoretical Debates of Sociology of Religion

In order to be able to correctly interpret the current state of religion in Romania, we believe that it is most appropriate to consider it from a general and comparative perspective as opposed to a limited country-specific approach[2]. First, this approach avoids the pitfalls of (false) assumptions, based on a limited single country study; second, a broad study provides us with more general theoretical explanations by showing Romania's embeddedness in international trends. Two different perspectives of the development of religiosity in Eastern Europe opposed each other early on. On the one hand, researchers assumed that the cessation of socialist repressions of the church and religion would be followed by a *revitalization* of religion in the region. They expected believers to profess their church affiliation and openly live their faith once again as the restrictions and the social pressure of anti-religious politics had ceased. According to the researchers, such a trend would also be in line with the global trend of a return to religion (Riesebrodt, 2000; Zulehner, 2002), which is becoming apparent on a global scale. In particular, supporters of the market model of religion inferred a higher chance of increasing religious competition and pluralization from the cessation of repressions and the opening of religious markets (Froese and Pfaff, 2005). This in turn would lead to an increase in religious vitality.

On the other hand, supporters of the secularization paradigm considered the situation in Eastern Europe to reflect a *premature secularization*. They state that, after an initial recovery of the membership rates of the religious communities, one could hardly expect any significant return to religion as the communal basis of religion has eroded considerably and as the modernization processes – which has hitherto been curbed – begins to unfold and thus initiates the secularization process. Both approaches – the (new paradigm of) the market model of religion as well as the secularization theory – assume that the countries differ with regard to their initial situation as well as the speed of development across countries. However, they believe that all countries share the same basic pattern of development in the long run.

Until today, the trends of the development of religion and bonding to the church in Eastern Europe as derived from comparative analyses, prove to be contradictory. Thus, since the 1990s, some Eastern European countries have continuously experienced a revitalization of religion while other countries showed and continue to show first indications of secularization soon after

[2] I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and my colleague Olaf Müller for their helpful comments.

the major political changes (Pickel, 1998, 2009a; Pollack, 2008; Tomka et al. 2000; Zulehner and Tomka, 2008). Apparently, quite a few countries have followed the West European trend of secularization (after having reached a peak of short-term revitalization), other countries – among them the countries in the Russian realm as well as Romania – continue to display a relatively continuous increase in rates of bonding to the church and subjective religiosity.

The question is – why do the developments on the religious sector differ so remarkably in Eastern Europe? One of the author's hypotheses is that those countries where revitalization processes of religion are still taking place, have not reached the above-mentioned threshold of "religious normalization" at which point they follow the process of secularization which is taking place throughout Europe. Consequently, in general, one may say that the assumptions of the secularization theory are correct. However, they have to be supplemented by considerations of culturally embedded path-dependencies. This includes the fact that many Eastern European states are also subject to a process of "cultural defense" (Bruce, 2002). It contributes to a religious renaissance or at least helps to establish religion in the public sphere by relating religion to the renewed national identity. This collective identity results in higher religious vitality – which is also in line with the ideas behind the secularization theory. The second hypothesis is that the development of religious vitality in *Romania is not a special case* but is comparable to other Eastern European but not to Western European countries, when taking into account a model of secularization, which is sensible to the effects of various cultural contexts. From my point of view, only a comparative perspective can provide insights into the fundamental and region specific developments.

The theoretical prerequisites – three general models in contrast

In order to answer the questions raised in the introduction, we have to reconsider the current main approaches in the sociology of religion as a point of reference for a theory-driven debate. For decades, secularization theory has been the reference point of discussions in the sociology of religion. Secularization theory refers to the persistent *loss of the social relevance or significance* of church and religion in modern societies (Berger, 1967; Bruce, 1992, 2002; Dobbelaere, 2002, 2006; Wilson, 1982) and maintains the assumption that modernity or rather modernization and religion do not get along well. This *tense relationship* is a result of the processes of *rationalization* and *functional differentiation* but also democratization and urbanization inherent in modernization. While the former undermines the credibility of religious explanations (Berger, 1967) due to proliferating rational and scientific explanations, the latter results in an increasing loss of the function of religion. At the same

time, religion is increasingly ousted from public life (privatization), is becoming less relevant in the everyday life of the people and the norms set by the religions decreasingly suceed in committing the members of society to them. In addition, the number of people who turn away from the churches as social form of religion is growing as they no longer need it to alleviate existential problems and social hardship: Deprivation no longer presents such a threat to the citizens everyday life due to the increasing socio-economic welfare of modern service societies – and thus the desire for security provided by religion wanes (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). With a certain time lag, the "loss of the communal basis of religion" (Bruce, 2002: 19-21) resulting from these processes may in the end actually lead to a decrease in faith and subjective religiosity in modernizing societies. [3] However, secularization theory does not consider the latter point to be the main issue to be explained. It is rather a forward projection consistent with its assumptions. Additional to that, secularization theory is more complex than often thought from their critics. For example, Dobbelaere (1981, 2002) differentiates between "societal secularization", "organisational secularization", and "individual secularization". A lot of current thoughts in the sociology of religion run along the same vein (Bruce, 2002: 4; Casanova, 1994: 19-39[4]; Martin, 1978; Pickel, 2009b; Stolz, 2009) and integrate additional cultural processes, like "cultural defense" or "cultural transition" in their models of explaination (see Bruce, 2002).

Currently, the *religious market model* is probably the most relevant alternative explanatory approach – Warner (1993) mentioned it as "new paradigm". It regards the situation in the USA as a prime example of the social development of religion and religiosity and points to a European peculiar path and the status of "Europe as an exceptional case". According to its proponents (Iannaccone 1991, 1992; Stark and Finke, 2000; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994), Europe as a special case merely distracts the attention from the generally valid relationship between religious supply and religious demand. In the market model, religious vitality –

[3] None of the prominent secularization theorists (Wilson, 1982; Bruce, 2002; Pollack, 2008) assume that religiosity will vanish entirely. Rather, they believe that the group of the religious people will diminish in the course of advancing modernization and will be split up among several types of religious organizations (Bruce 2002: 41-43). We also need to be aware of the fact, that the core of the claim of the secularization theory refers to the *loss of social relevance* and not to the board assumption of the global disappearance of religion (Beckford 2003: 51).

[4] Casanova (1994: 19-39) discerns the process of differentiation at the societal level, which manifests itself particularly in the relation between the church and the state, from the secularization assumption of a decrease in faith or a process of privatization of religion. He concludes that only the process of differentiation of social spheres occurs in a continous manner, while the latter two processes are contingent on the historical constellations in certain regions and countries.

the main issue of the market model as well as secularization theory – is mainly determined by taking the services offered by the churches and the *degree of regulation* of this market by the state into account (Iannaconne, 1992; Finke and Stark, 2006; Fox, 2008).[5] The monopoly churches can no longer satisfy the continually widening interests of the individualized believers – and in the market model, every citizen is in some way an individualized believer. On the one hand, the religious choices they provide are too unspecific due to their popular church character, on the other hand, their dedication to the believers is decreasing, as they are not pressured by any exposure to competition (Stark and Bainbridge, 1987). If the religious market continues to be limited to these established suppliers (churches), this will surely result in a decrease in the religious vitality of the citizens. This is particularly true in the case of the quasi monopoly churches, which are predominantly located in Europe. *Competitors* and competition[6] on this religious market will revive religious vitality as the religious providers will then be forced to develop suitable choices and to attend to the believers after all. The assumptions in which the market model crucially differs from secularization theory is that religious pluralism has a positive effect on religious vitality[7], the fact that modernization does not necessarily lead to a loss of relevance of religion in society and that every individual is in search of a religious model in order to find an answer to the "ultimate" questions of meaning.[8]

A third standpoint whose proponents also argue against secularization theory, differentiates between the developments on the personal level of faith and one's commitment to the church. This approach is discussed in particular in the European realm under the term "thesis of religious individualization" (Luckmann, 1967; Davie, 1994; Pollack and Pickel, 2007).[9] As in the case of the market model, individual religiosity is conceived as an anthropological constant which is inher-

[5] In return, proponents of the secularization theory accused supporters of the market model of choosing an "exceptional case" and argued that their research results depended on this selectively drawn sample.

[6] In certain cases, conflicts among religions or between religions and the state may serve as a substitute for competition (for example in the case of Northern Ireland or Poland) (see Froese and Pfaff, 2009).

[7] This contrasts Berger's assumption (1967: 127-154) that religious pluralization undermines the plausibility structures of the (in his case Christian) belief system and thus reduces religious vitality in the long run.

[8] Consequently, it is a rational choice approach which focuses exclusively on the supply side since there is constant demand for religious explanations. It is thus referred to as the "supply-side approach" (Stark/Iannaccone 1994). Stolz (2008: 7) as well as Froese and Pfaff (2005: 401-402) point out that regulations such as social control and political repression, can also affect the demand. This effect is not included as such in the basic model of the market approach and was added to a more broad rational choice perspective of religion only recently.

[9] Individualization has to be understood as a general social phenomenon which pertains to entire societies and not individuals. It must not be confused with "egoism" (Beck, 2008: 123-124).

ent in the nature of man. The social form of religion may lose importance, however, individual religiosity merely modifies its form, which does not necessarily have to manifest itself publicly.

Table 1.

Theoretical explanations in the current sociology of religion

	Secularization theory	**Individualization theory**	**Religious Market model**
Proponents	Brian Wilson, Steve Bruce, Pippa Norris	Thomas Luckmann, Grace Davie[10]	Rodney Stark Laurence Iannaccone
Relevant theory	Modernization theory	Individualization theory	Supply orientated market theory and rational choice theory
Basic assumption	Conflict between Modernity and Religion	Anthropological constant, that every individual is by nature religious	General individual demand for religion
Basic hypothesis	Modernization leads to secularization	Decline of institutionalizes religion by continuous private religiosity	Religious competition furthers religious Vitalization
Expectations for Western Europe	Decrease in the social significance of church and religion according to the level of modernization	Decrease in the social significance of church, but continuous high levels of individual religiosity in different forms	Variations in the level of religiosity depending on the degree of religious pluralism and state /church separation
Expectations for Eastern Europe	Decrease of all forms of religious orientations (depending on the country's state of modernization)	No revival of institutionalized religion, but revival of individual religiosity	Revitalization of religiosity after the breakdown of the communist regime

Source: Author's composition.

This results in the development of an *invisible religion*, which suggests a loss of faith, even though this does not occur. The new types of religiosity may take on entirely different forms than what we are accustomed to with

[10] In her publications, Davie integrates different lines of thought, such as the concept of "collective memory" by Hervier-Leger. Consequently, her position does not resemble Luckmann's position in all respects. However, the thesis of "believing without belonging" justifies her classification as a proponent of the individualization theory of religion. Jose Casanova's thoughts are also difficult to classify. Many of his central assumptions closely resemble the market model. However, due to his own position on public religion and some other arguments, it seems to me that it would not be suitable to consider him to be a general proponent of the market model.

respect to the hitherto common commitment to traditional churches. Secularization theory in turn is criticized for focusing too narrowly on questions related to the sociology of the church as well as a substantial concept of religion which is no longer in line with functionally differentiated modern societies. According to the critics, the tendentiously Christian substantial concept of religion particularly limits the scope to conventional religious phenomena and loses sight of the new forms. Thus, the false assumption of secularization does not come as a surprise. Without further ado, the proponents of the individualization thesis also concur with an inauspicious interpretation of the development of the integration of the church. But at the same time, they disapprove of assigning this loss of relevance to the subjective level of religiosity. In addition, they emphasize the development of new social movements, which in part take on the social functions of traditional religions.

Concerning *Eastern Europe*, it is more difficult to assess the situation as socialist political repressions also have to be taken into account as additional explanatory factors (see Martin 1978). In many socialist countries, religion was suppressed, though to varying degrees. While the supporters of the market model expected and continue to expect (Froese and Pfaff, 2005, 2009) a significant revitalization of religion in all of Eastern Europe now that the religious markets are free from repression, the proponents of the secularization theory assume that the changes reflect an anticipated or premature secularization. They expect that the countries will then follow a trend similar to Western Europe. The individualization thesis of religion runs along a similar vein with regard to the institutionalized church. However, proponents point out that subjective religiosity will be sustained or may even increase and a lot of new religious movements will occur in future. If subjective religiosity increases, it will then seek new forms of expression beyond the traditional and long-established (mostly Christian) churches. The question is, which of these scenarios is supported by the most empirical evidence – and which development model suits Romania?

Data measurement

As outlined in the introduction, it is better to follow a *transnational, comparative approach* in order to answer our research question and to determine the current state of religion in Romania instead of proceeding with single country studies (Norris/Inglehart 2004: 37-38). Consequently, the analyses in this article focus on the *developments at the macro-level*.[11] In doing so, we do not intend to question the (action theoretical) micro-level foundation of the

[11] Stolz (2009) – who, in his analytical model, embeds developments at the macro-level in an action theoretical concept at the micro-level - points out the necessity of a comparative research design.

theoretical concepts that we apply. Differences with regard to the assumptions at the macro-level are based on existing differences between these concepts due to varying kinds of mechanisms of transferring the micro-level to the macro-level. In order to be able to interpret the development of religion in Romania based on the three theoretical models from the sociology of religion, it is necessary to include different meaningful *indicators* concerning religious vitality.

We use the *share of those without denominational affiliation* or non-members in church as well as average *church attendance per year* as indicators.[12] We measure the subjective aspect of religious vitality with a *religious self-assessment* (religious to non-religious) on a scale from 1 to 7 as well as a question concerning *belief in God*. Following Charles Y. Glock (1954), the former indicators belong to the domain of religious rituals or religious practices while the latter indicators measure religious convictions.

In order to take the socioeconomic modernization theory into account, we use the UN *Human Development Index* as one of the *explanatory factors*. It combines several indicators of modernization such as the GDP per capita, literacy rate and life expectancy into a single index. We used the data from the homepages of the United Nations and the World Bank. We used the "religion and the state" data set by Jonathan Fox in order to measure the degree of state regulations of the churches[13]. This is the "General Index of regulation" comprising five different variables (Fox/Tabory 2008: 255; Fox 2008: 36-61). It includes the following variables: "official support" (measuring state support of one or several religions), "general restrictions" (measuring state-imposed restrictions of religious practices), "religious discrimination" (measuring state-imposed restrictions of religious practices of members of minority religions), "religious regulation" (measuring the degree of regulation of religion)[14] and "religious legislation" (measuring in how far the government allows religious norms to be incorporated in the law). The *Herfindahl index* of religious pluralization, which is used simply as a means of control, is based on our own calculations (Voas/Crocket 2002). We would like to note that the fact that we use the degree of regulations in our empirical analyses is a considerable improve-

[12] The aggregate indicator of average church attendance is more informative than the share of regular churchgoers as it also takes developments within the large group of peripheral church members into account.

[13] Please refer to the following website for details concerning the data and the construction of the indices: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/.

[14] "Religious regulation" is the main indicator of the general index. Among other things, it includes restrictions of public display of religion, religious engagement in political parties or the obstruction of church attendance.

ment compared to previous analyses from a theoretical point of view. Previous studies simply used the degree of pluralization (as measured by the Herfindahl index) which considered the consequences but ignored the reasons for religious vitality from a market model perspective.

We classified the countries as having a Catholic or Protestant heritage based on a number of sources. The World Values Surveys were used as survey data (1990-1991; 1995-1998, 1999-2002; 2003-2006). Information on the individual countries were complemented by data from other studies. We also used the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the Eurobarometer studies (EB/CEEB), the European Social Survey (ESS) as well as the study on "Church and Religion in an Enlarged Europe (C&R)".

The development of religiosity in Europe in comparative perspective

One main starting point of every secularization debate is the reference to the communal basis of religion and the declaration that church attendance rates and membership in religious organizations are decreasing (Bruce, 2002: 3; Dobbelaere, 2002: 137-140). A look on institutionalized religion in Eastern Europe reveals that in this instance, religion is not disappearing. Apart from the two "problem cases" of Estonia and East Germany, a broad *culture of church affiliation* remains prevalent in the European realm.

Table 2.

Non-members in Church in European comparison[15]

	1990-1991	1995-1998	1999-2000	2004-2006		1990	1991	1995-1998	1999-2000	2003-2006
Italy	15	12[a]	17	18[f]	Poland	4	4	4	4	4[c]
Portugal	8	8[a]	11	11[c]	Lithuania	42	26	16	18	15[e]
Spain	15	16[a]	17	18	Slovakia	22	22	16[a]	14[a]	15[e]
Cyprus	-	-	-	4	Slovenia	29	-	30	35[b]	33[e]
Irland	4	6[a]	4	4[c]	Hungary	45	37	-	33	22[c]
France	39	40[a]	40	40	Croatia	-	-	14	11	5[c]
Luxemburg	9[d]	17[d]	28	29[d]	Czech Republic	-	59	60	66	66[e]
Belgium	28[e]	30[d]	36	44[d]	Germany (E)	65	-	68[a]	71[a]	71[c]
Austria	12	12[a]	12	14	Latvia	74	44	34[a]	40	34[a]
Netherlands	49	53	56	56[d]	Estonia	92	65	73	75	55[c]

[15] Due to the fact that survey data are highly susceptible to small changes in the question wording, surveys on denominational affiliation have to be treated with caution. This particularly applies to the most recent data, as we could not validate them with other data sets as opposed to data from previous time points.

	1990-1991	1995-1998	1999-2000	2004-2006		1990	1991	1995-1998	1999-2000	2003-2006
Switzerland	12	11	12	17[f]	Romania	6	2	-	3	1
Germany (W)	11	15	17	18[f]	Bulgaria	68[a]	37	34	30	14
Great Britain	44	48	48	50[d]	Mazedonia	-	-	9	14	-
Northern Ireland	11	14	14	-	Serbia-Mont.	-	-	22	6	4
Sweden	23	28[a]	25	26[f]	Russia	68	57	46	49	26[c]
Denmark	9	11	11	11	Belorussia	-	-	37	48	-
Norway	11	10	9	10	Ukraine	-	-	37	44	28
Finland	12	12	12	14	Georgia	-	-	11	6	-
Island	-	4	4	4	Moldavia	-	-	16	-	2
Greece	3	3[d]	4	9[d]	Albania	-	6	-	13	-
Turkey	4	4	2	1	Bosnia-Herzeg.	-	-	30	24	-

Source: Author's calculations using data from World Values Survey 1990, 1995-98, 1999/2000, 2005/2006; [a] = ISSP 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2004; [b] = PCE 2000; [c] = C&R 2006; [d] = European Social Survey (ESS) 2002/2003; 2006; [e] = Eurobarometer/Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB); [f] = WVS 2006 and Eurobarometer 2006.

In most Eastern European countries (for example Hungary, Russia, Croatia, Bulgaria etc.) membership rates have increased since 2000. Starting out with a high initial rate of membership, this was also the case in Romania. The abolition of political repressions has led many people to return to the church in Eastern Europe – at least during the first years after the radical changes (Tomka et al., 2000; Tomka, 1995). In contrast: except for Finland, Ireland and Portugal, where the membership rates have remained rather stable during the past 15 years, church membership rates have continuously decreased in Western Europe, according to survey data (Pickel, 2009a: 14). East Germany is the only "Eastern European country" which does have a continous negative balance between those leaving and those joining the church. Here, the de-ecclasiasticalization appears to have passed a certain threshold, which prevents a revitalization of the participation in church.

Because membership rates are a relatively imprecise indicator for measuring religious vitality, as they hardly provide any information on the active involvement in church life, considering the *church attendance rates* appears to be a much more informative indicator, as it presupposed a minimum of active participation of the respective persons. Here, the empirical point of reference of the secularization theory becomes evident, as the number of churchgoers in nearby all Western European countries has continuously decreased independent of the level of this activity in the respective country. Using the average annual rate of churchgoers as a benchmark, we find that Finland, Sweden or Norway are the only countries in Western Europe where the number of churchgoers have been stable in the last years. It remains to be seen whether a lower threshold of integration in the church has been reached, as the average rates in Russia

and East Germany are not considerably lower. Thus, a large number of church members hardly pursue any religious activities and they remain (often passive) church members out of tradition, due to their socialization or social desirability.

Table 3.

Integration in Church in European comparison

	1981	1990-1991	1994-1998	2000-2002	2003-2006		1990	1991	1994-1998	2000-2002	2003 - 2006
Italy	23	23	21	24	20	Poland	38	37	32	33	33
Portugal	-	23	22	21	17	Lithuania	-	14	12	12	10
Spain	24	18	17	15	11	Slovakia	20	22	-	20	20
Cyprus	-	-	11	-	11	Slovenia	15	14	14	12	12
Ireland	45	43	38	35	34	Hungary	14	8	11	8	8
France	7	7	8	6	6	Croatia	-	-	15	20	19
Luxemburg	23	19	15	14	10	Czech Rep.	4,5	9	6	5	4,5
Belgium	18	16	14	11	6,5	Germany (E)	-	3	3	3,5	3,5
Austria	-	18	16	15	11	Latvia	4	6	6	6	5
Netherlands	16	13	10	9	8	Estonia	-	4	3,5	3,5	3,5
Switzerland	-	16	10	9	8,5	Romania	13	17	-	17	17
Germany (W)	13	12	11	11	10	Bulgaria	4	6	6	7	6
Great Britain	10	10	10	9	8,5	Macedonia	-	11	8	14	-
Northern Irl.	30	30	27	27	-	Serbia-Mont.	-	-	6	8	9,5
Sweden	5	4,5	4,5	4	3,5	Russia	2	4	3	3	4
Denmark	4	4	4,5	4	3,5	Belorussia	3	4	5	5	-
Norway	5	5	4,5	4	4	Ukraine	-	8	7	7	7,5
Finland	5	4	4	4	4	Georgia	-	10	9	8	-
Island	3,5	3,5	-	4	4	Moldavia	-	10	8	11	10
Greece	17	16	15,5	11,5	17	Albania	-	9	-	13	-
Turkey	-	20	23	21,5	19,5	Bosnia-Herzeg.	-	-	19	18	-

Source: Author's calculations based on different data sets of the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys; the rate reflects the average church attendance per year per person (17 = the average Romanian attend religious services 17 times a year).

As depicted in Chart 3, the churches' hopes for a broad wave of return to religion with regard to religious activity were fulfilled only in part in the post-socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Even though we can assert an increase in membership rates in all Eastern European countries except for East Germany, if anything, the church service attendance often decreased after an initial increase after the radical changes or stabilized at a relatively low level (see also Müller, 2009: 75). Romania is one of the countries, where a stabilization occured shortly after the political changes, which brought about an initial increase in religious activities. The *distribution of church attendance* as well as the frequency of individual prayer across the countries show a similar

pattern to that of the membership rates. Poland and Ireland have the largest number of church service attenders, followed by Italia, Portugal, Croatia – and Romania. There are general differences between Catholic and Protestant countries: In historically Catholic countries, the commitment of the faithful to their church in the sense of personal activities is generally higher than in Protestant, denominationally mixed or even Orthodox countries. If we define religious vitality as religious activity, in all of Europe (with the exception of Northern Ireland), Protestant countries report a rather low level of religious vitality. Concerning this trend as well as its societal context, *Romania is no exception in European comparison*. However, among those countries with an Orthodox heritage, it shows the highest level of integration of believers in their church.

Based on these results, we cannot speak of a broad revitalization of bonding to the church in Eastern Europe – as concerns active participation.[16] However, there are considerable differences between the Eastern European countries concerning their degree of religious vitality. This may possibly be due to an adjustment process during which the Eastern European countries adapt to a *normality* of religious vitality: Consequently, the growth rates increase the level in the Eastern European countries to a degree which they would have reached due to their degree of modernization if it had not been for their socialist past. According to the assumptions of the secularization theory, they would join the common European process at this point. Hence, variations due to path dependency have to be taken into account: If modernization takes place, the return to religion will be limited both temporally as well as spatially and a process of secularization will occur.

In order to verify the individualization thesis, it is necessary to consider *personal religiosity*, as it alone informs us about the validity or invalidity of a comprehensive loss of social relevance of religion according to Luckmann (1967). Maybe the commitment of the people to the church is decreasing – however, in the course of a change in the form of religion, they make out other possibilities to satisfy their anthropologically founded religious needs in private or outside the established churches.[17] The indicators of subjective religiosity, such as self-assessed religiosity or the belief in God, point to three conclusions: First, in line with the individualization thesis, personal religiosity is more wide-spread than commitment to the church. The process of de-ecclesiasticalization is not immediately followed by a loss of faith – even in Western Europe. Second, we

[16] This contrasts with former statements from Tomka et al. (1999, 1995) pointing out a broad revitalization. However, they link the developments of the differences to the different age cohorts and refer to a selected group of countries in their observation. In the discussion of the results of their replication study 2007, they have to admit the same developments like pointed out here (Zulehner et. al., 2008: 29).

[17] This approach is also relevant from the perspective of Protestantism, as it refers to the individuality of the relationship with God. Low church attendance rates do not reflect a loss of social relevance of Protestantism.

have to maintain, however, that subjective religiosity has also (slowly) decreased over time in Western Europe. Perhaps these indicators of subjecttive religiosity are still closely related to the interpretations of religious convictions of the dominant (mostly Christian) churches. Third, the development in Eastern Europe deviates from that of Western Europe. In addition, it is not uniform.

In most Eastern European countries, more people considered themselves to be religious or to believe in God in 2006, compared to 1990 or 1996. Only very few countries deviate from this trend. These include the socio-economic success stories of Central Eastern Europe – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia – and particularly East Germany. Together with the successor states of the Soviet Union, Romania is one of the countries with the most prominent growth rates in individual religiosity. After the cessation of socialist repressions, people appear to rediscover their individual religiosity more so than integrate themselves in church. However, we also have to take into account that people's return to religious institutions is almost exclusively a return to traditional religious institutions and not – like the individualization theory predicts – to new religious groups or forms.

Table 4.

Subjective religiosity in European comparison

	Self-classification as a religious person				Belief in God (WVS)			Belief in a personal God	
	1990	**1996**	**2000**	**2006**	**1990**	**1996**	**2000**	**2000**	**2006**
Italy	85	-	86	88	88	90	93	71	-
Portugal	75	-	88		-	89	96	79	81
Spain	67	69	61	45	92	86	85	49	-
Zypern	-	-	-	61	-	-	96	-	-
Irland	72	-	74	-	97	95	95	67	67
France	51	-	47	-	65	62	62	22	-
Luxemburg	-	-	63	-	-	-	73	33	-
Belgium	69	-	67	-	86	72	71	30	-
Austria	81	-	79	-	-	87	87	31	-
Netherlands	61	-	62	-	71	65	60	24	-
Switzerland	73	59	57	63	-	84	83	-	-
Germany (W)	65	65	62	61	80	78	77	38	28
Great Britain	57	-	42	-	81	79	72	32	-
Northern Ireland	72	-	62	-	97	95	93	59	-
Sweden	31	33	39	33	60	56	53	16	-
Denmark	72	-	76	-	63	64	69	25	-
Norway	47	47	47	-	73	65	69	-	-
Finland	59	57	69	60	-	76	83	47	46
Island	75	-	74	-	85	-	84	51	-
Greece	-	-	79	-	-	-	91	66	-
Turkey	75	75	80	82	-	98	98	-	-
Poland	95	94	94	94	97	-	97	65[b]	56

	Self-classification as a religious person				Belief in God (WVS)			Belief in a personal God	
	1990	1996	2000	2006	1990	1996	2000	2000	2006
Lithuania	55	83	84	-	-	86	87	46[c]	-
Slovakia	66	-	82	-	-	82	83	43[b]	-
Slovenia	73	69	70	72	63	64	65	24[b]	-
Hungary	57	-	59	-	65	66	68	42[b]	53
Croatia	-	72	85	-	-	80	93	38	52
Czech Republik	35	-	43	-	-	42	39	8[b]	-
Germany (E)	38	28	29	28	36	29	30	17[b]	14
Latvia	54	64	77	-	58	73	80	8[c]	-
Estonia	21	36	42	-	-	52	51	18[b]	14
Romania	74	-	85	93	94	97	97	61[b]	-
Bulgaria	36	52	52	63	40	67	66	35[b]	-
Mazedonia	-	66	84	-	-	89	90	-	
Serbia-Montenegro	-	60	74	85	-	69	83	-	-
Russia	56	64	66	-	44	69	70	27[b]	31
Belorussia	41	70	73	-	43	77	83	64[c]	-
Ukraine	-	64	75	82	-	76	80	43[c]	-
Georgia	-	86	89	-	-	93	93	-	-
Moldavia	-	82	91	84	-	90	96	-	-
Albania	-	-	68	-	-	-	92	78[a]	-
Bosnia-Herzegowina	-	70	74	-	-	85	88	-	-

Source: Author's calculations World Values Survey 1990/1991, 1995-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2006; C&R 2006; [a] = PCE 2000 [b] = PCE + EVS; [c] = EVS 1999/2000.

For the interpretation of the country-differences, we have to keep in mind that the initial situations of the Eastern European countries differ. Especially, the percentage of those who are religious in this sense is lower in Protestant countries than in the non-Protestant countries of comparison. From the point of view of the cultural commitment power of denominations, we cannot but consider Protestantism to be at a disadvantage as opposed to Catholicism overall. Maybe Bergers' (1967: 158) argument – which assumes that secularization is inherent and immanent in Protestantism – will prove to be true at least in part and Protestantism includes too much rationality to withstand secularization. On the one hand, this may be due to a polarization between religious and non-religious people in society, on the other hand, it may result from an increasing *interlinkage between religion and nationalist ideas*.

But does this result indicate the success of the individualization thesis in Eastern Europe? One statement of the individualization thesis refers to the dissolution of socio-structural relations of religion in modern times which liberates the individual with regard to his religiosity in the end. As a result of the loss of social control due to a separation from the social structure, the in-

dividual is provided with the chance to believe what he chooses to believe. This line of thought reflects a basic assumption of the individualization thesis – the substitution of the social norm of "heteronomy" with the new norm of "self-determination". Considering different empirical analysis, *we cannot detect a complete detachment of religious beliefs from social structures*. Particularly in rural areas, older women with a lower degree of formal education and a comparatively low income, report the highest religious vitality – but they also believe in God the most (Pickel, 2009b: 108; see also Pollack and Pickel, 2007: 620; Pollack 2008: 179). And Chart 5 show a strong relationship between individual religiosity and integration in church. In countries, where the belief in God is widespread, higher rates of attendance in church can be noticed. The form of the correspondence line gives the impression, that on the macro level *first the integration in church decline and with some time between, also the subjective religiosity lacks* over the populations. The same relation can be found between indicators of societal secularization and individual secularization (see Dobblaere, 1999; Pickel, 2009b). Societal secularization seems to be the first dimension of secularization that occurs in society, but individual secularization follows, because of the connection to the first with a – from country to country variable – time-lag.[18] A correlation analysis measuring the changes in church attendance (1990 to 1996) and the changes in belief in God (1995-2000) shows that the development of the institutional aspect of religion and subjective religiosity correspond to a great extent (r = .68).

And at least, if the individualization thesis is correct, then we also should be able to observe alternatives or substitutes in the form of alternative religiosity in countries where traditional religiosity is losing its social relevance. However, empirical results with data from different studies (ISSP, C&R 2006, PCND 2000) clearly show that there is a rather low demand for these forms of religiosity (Pickel, 2009a: 15; Müller 2009: 77). At most, a third of the citizens in the countries under research in these studies state that they have an affinity for one of the forms (Astrology, Magic, New Age, Spiritualism etc.) presented to them. More importantly, not the countries with a loss of rele vance of traditional religiosity and bonding to the church have the highest proportion of alternative religiosity but rather those countries with a strong Christian religiosity (Ireland, Portugal, Poland). Hence, *if traditional religiosity is rejected, then most other forms of alternative religiosity are not accepted either*.

[18] Additional empirical analyses with time lags (1990/1991-1999/2000) support the results presented in chart 5. Both correlate with r =.59. The data selection in chart 5 is due to a larger country sample.



Graph 1: Correspondence between Church Attendance and Belief in God

Source: Author's calculations based on different data sets of the World Values Surveys and the European Values Surveys 1999/2000.

The consequences that arise from this observation are straigthforward: the selected forms of alternative religiosity do not serve as substitutes for traditional religiosity. Even these results does not suffice to reject the individualization thesis as Luckmann (1967) makes allowance for a whole range of additional possibilities for an "invisible religion"[19], the results raise doubts with regard to the validity of religiosity rooted in anthropology which only manifests itself via a change in form. It rather appears more plausible to allow for the possibility of religiously indifferent as well as non-religious persons who will find their place next to those whose religious beliefs truly transformed into a different kind.

[19] According to him, many of these cannot be measured by means of survey research.

This does not mean that there is no process of individualization at all. Nevertheless, (in Europe) the influence of individualization appears to be rather consistent with the process of secularization instead of serving as a substitute. The developments in Western Europe in particular consistently indicate a gradual process of a loss of faith which unfolds in line with the secularization theory. In Eastern Europe, we find both processes of an increase as well as a decrease among the groups of indifferent and non-religious people. Due to the fact that we can hardly expect to observe an increasing individualization in these Eastern European countries at present and as the increase in the number of faithful is also accompanied in part by a revitalization with regard to church integration, the assumptions of the secularization theory appear to hold true more so than those of the individualization thesis.

The bases of religious vitality – modernization or religious competition?

What accounts for the differences in religious vitality in Europe? A macro-analysis can perhaps help to detect the central sources for the differences. The majority of the argumentational structure of the market model refers to the distribution of religious vitality and the macro level of observations. However, since recently, the merely supply-oriented market model has been complemented by the relevance of the regulation of religious demand particularly with regard to Europe. The quintessence of these analyses is that this type of regulation was particularly effective in Eastern Europe and is responsible for the low degree of religious vitality in East Germany for example. But if you test the preconditions of the market theory with a scatterplot combining an indicator of religious regulation (Fox, 2008) and the attendance at church – which is traditional way of the supporters of the market model (Iannaccone, 1997; Fox and Tabory, 2008) – there is no linear correlation for the European countries (also in subgroups along cultural heritage).[20] This fit with other results (Chaves and Gorski, 2001; Pollack and Pickel, 2009) and speak against the validity of the market model, at least within Europe.You have to remember, regulation of religion is the core part of the market model, because it is the source for religious pluralization.

Even if we take into account, that religious conflict can substitute religious pluralism, we may say, that until today, the market model has not suitably explained religious vitality in Europe – as opposed to North America, New Zealand or Australia. This includes Eastern Europe. Admittedly, the cessation of socialist repressions has opened the religious markets, and this in turn has cleared the way for a revitalization of religion. However, this has not really taken place due to an increase in competition on the religious market. Rather, believers have returned to previously suppressed churches. This is also reflected by the macro correlations in Chart 7.

[20] The results remain stable if outliers such as Poland, Malta, Turkey and Ireland are excluded from the analysis.



Graph 2: Religious regulation and religious vitality in Europe

Source: Own calculations based on different data sets of the World Values Surveys and the European Values Surveys, Religious Regulation (Fox 2004, 2008).

Rather, long-term cultural traditions, such as Catholicism and Protestantism, appear to be more relevant in explaining the variations in the trends in the development of religiosity and religious vitality, than religious competition. Maybe they determine the trajectories of secularization (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). While the Catholic countries succeed in committing their church members on a long-term basis, the Protestant churches fail to do so. Apparently, Protestantism was less able to oppose the politically enforced fight against religion in the socialist countries.

Table 5.

Macro effects – (partial) correlation analysis[21]

	Church Member	Church Attendance	Belief in a personal God	Subjective religiosity
Europe				
Socialist Past	-.30	-.27	n.s.	n.s.
Level of Modernization (UN Human Development Index)	n.s.	n.s.	-.48	-.37
Protestant Heritage	n.s.	-.39	-.54	-.50
Degree of religious regulation (Fox)	+.44	n.s.	+.35	+.25
Degree of religious pluralization0 (Herfindahl index)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Dummy variable Romania	n.s. (+.16)	n.s. (+.07)	n.s. (+.20)	n.s. (+.09)
Subgroup with socialist past (Eastern Europe)				
Level of Modernization	-.55	n.s.	-.64	-.43
Protestant Heritage	-.74	-.34	-.74	-.70
Degree of religious regulation (Fox)	+.43	n.s.	+.40	+.43
Degree of religious pluralization (Herfindahl index)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Dummy variable Romania	+.30	n.s. (+.20)	+.31	n.s. (+.15)
Partial Correlation (controlling for the level of modernization)				
Level of Modernization	-.44	-.28	-.41	-.23
Protestant Heritage	n.s.	-.45	-.39	-.46
Degree of religious regulation (Fox)	+.40	n.s.	+.29	n.s.
Degree of religious pluralization (Herfindahl index)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Dummy variable Romania	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Source: Author's calculations based on data sets of the World Values Surveys, European Values Surveys; Eurobarometer; European Social Surveys; degree of religious Regulation from "Religion and State" data set by Jonathan Fox; combinded indicator for religious regulation (Fox and Tabory, 2008: 251-255).

One of the reasons – which Protestantism shares with the Orthodox church – is the fact that they were less able to fight off political encroachments on the national level due to their organizational structure, which consists of regional churches. In this respect, Catholicism had an advantage due to the fact that its

[21] Because of the high multicollinearity between the independent variables, it is problematic to conduct a regression analysis given the limited number of cases available. We consequently decided to conduct a partial correlation analysis in line with the theory-driven research questions. Tests with additional countries or time-series-cross-section analyses are left for future analyses. Regression analyses, whose meaningfulness is limited due to multicollinearity, did not result in any fundamental deviations compared to the results presented here.

point of reference was in Rome – outside the socialist territory. The fact that processes of collective *identity building* combining a sense of national identity and religion occur in Catholic countries in particular also certainly matters. We can observe this in Ireland as well as in Poland and Croatia. Bruce (2002: 30-33) refers to these processes as "cultural defense", which could be regarded as a counter movement against comprehensive processes of globalization in accordance with Huntington's assumptions (1996), apparently presuppose a closer individual relation to the churches than envisaged by Protestantism.

While the religious-cultural heritage marks the starting point of religious vitality in a given country, the *changes in religious vitality* depend on other processes. The negative influences of rationalization and functional differentiation as propagated by the secularization theory have greatly advanced at the societal level. Even in countries with a high percentage of church members, religion is hardly accorded any influence on any other social spheres. We were not able to show whether this is directly related to a trend toward privatization. However, the communal basis of religion and the bonding to the church continue to decrease. This comes as no surprise, since people need religion less and less in order to explain the events in their surroundings. Thus it seems as if the decreasing social roots of religion would undermine subjective religiosity in the long run. In prosperous societies, religion is no longer necessary as a compensation for mundane problems (Wilson, 1982; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Stolz, 2009). This implies that increasing material wealth contributes to the loss of relevance of religion. The determination of the dynamic effects of modernization proved to be difficult due to the fact that accelerated processes of modernization coincided with concomitantly decreasing ‚legacies' of anti-religious socialist socialization in Eastern Europe after 1989.

In order to enforce these rather long-term processes, *socialization* is of crucial importance. Whether it is integration in church or belief in God – a lack of religious socialization undermines the religious vitality of the citizens. This holds for all European countries to the same extent. If you correlate the statement "parents brought me up in faith" with Church attendance or belief in God, you get correlations from $r > .45$ for all countries at hand in the surveys (including Romania for 2000).[22] According to the main assumptions of the secularization theory, the decline in the social relevance of religion is a slow but nevertheless continuous process. It is not the individual as such whose bonding to the church and maybe even to religion decreases dramatically. Rather, it is a process which goes on for generations. Individual religious socialization

[22] The question "parents brought me up in faith" is only available in the studies C&R 2006 and PCND 2000.

highly corresponds to the degree of religious vitality, both at the micro and macro level (also Pollack, 2008: 179-180). The transmission of religious knowledge, religious experience and religious practices thus represents an interface to the persistence of a vital religion.

The fact that *socialization* is highly relevant for the spreading of religious vitality is problematic with regard to the comparative analysis of religious vitality. In Eastern Europe, the "inertia" of family socialization causes the revitalization effect to drag on over a longer period of time. In addition to religious beliefs, non-religious or indifferent mindsets are passed down as well. Consequently, it is even more difficult to identify for certain the conflicting dynamic developments of revitalization after 1989, due to the fact that both the cessation of political repression and secularization (which reflects increasing modernization gains) exist in parallel in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the development process of religion seems to be clear, it is a long-term reduction in religious vitality – and probably an even slower decrease in religious beliefs – which goes on for generations.

Whether the process does assert itself highly depends on the context and could be faced with counteracting processes, namely the revival of a national identity or an increase in social inequality which deprives certain social groups of prosperity and thus renders possible a return to religious patterns of interpretation.

And Romania? In order to prove that a country is indeed an exceptional case, we have to show that its situation substantially differs from that of the other countries in the region. A macro analysis serves to do just that. If we include Romania as an independent component in the macro analysis (by including a country dummy), two things become apparent: First, its deviations from the European mean are not very distinctive. Compared to all of Europe, they are insignificant at the $p<.05$ level, without exception. The same holds true for a comparison within Eastern Europe. Most likely, this is due to the small number of cases in the aggregate data analysis. However, it is of some relevance, as the alternative indicators prove to be significant. When considering the figures apart from their significance level, we notice that church attendance and self-assessed religiosity lie only marginally above the mean European values, while belief in God and church membership are slightly higher. We may cautiously consider this to indicate that Romania has a lower degree of secularization compared to other Eastern European countries. However, the result has to be qualified in the light of the degree of modernization. After all, compared to the other European states, Romania is less modernized from a socio-economic perspective. This in turn explains or even demands a higher degree of religious vitality. When controlling for the degree of modernization, Romania does not differ from the other European or Eastern European countries at all (entirely insig-

nificant correlations). In conclusion: the degree of Romania's religious vitality may be one of the highest in (Eastern) Europe. However, this is largely due to the social context.

Summary – Romania as part of a normalization process of religiosity

Comparing the alternative theoretical approaches, the secularization theory promises to be of greater assistance in explaining religious vitality in (Eastern) Europe than the market model. Attempts to explain the development in Eastern Europe by the market model suffer from the fact that the assumptions upon which they are based are vague, even though supplementing ideas which merely focus on the supply with considerations regarding the regulation of the demand has gained in substance. This neither implies that we should not take into account single elements of the market model as supplementary influential factors in addition to the secularization theory, nor that these elements cannot be of greater importance outside of Europe or in future. However, for comparisons in Europe, the market model appears to have a limited applicability, in particular because it neglects alternative contextual elements of cultural path dependencies more than the secularization theory.

The *thesis* of *religious individualization* only provides a limited amount of additional information for cross-country comparisons, too. In Eastern European countries, which are most likely to report trends of religious revitalization, increasing (subjective) religiosity is accompanied by a rise in participation in religious events. Thus, the differentiation between subjective religiosity and integration in the church as pointed out by the individualization thesis is more likely to occur in Western Europe. At present, we cannot say whether this represents a detachment of individualized religiosity from the socio-cultural basis or whether it is a delayed process. Additional, the explanatory power of the individualization thesis remains limited as it considers new religious movements as substitutes for previous forms. We can hardly find evidence for such a development in Eastern Europe, instead, people seem to return to established forms of religion.

But an explanation, which is limited to a *linear modernization* or *secularization* does also not sufficiently do justice to the complex development of religious vitality in Eastern Europe (and sometimes in Western Europe as well). Comparative results show that the different *cultural development paths* of the countries in particular are of great importance for the determinable degree of religious vitality. Especially the denominational legacy of a country affects the spreading and speed of a loss of religious traditions: Catholic countries succeed fairly well in committing their church members, effectively oppose processes of secularization and successfully maintain religious vitality, the Protestant countries do not manage to do so to the same extent. Apparently, the rationality inherent in Protestantism (Berger, 1967: 111-113; Bruce, 2002: 7-8) as well as

their comparatively strong integration in allday politics through the regional churches seem to have unfavorable effects on the social relevance of Protestantism. A lot of the Christian Orthodox churches are affected by similar problems, but here national legacies and the relations between church and state in socialism and now seems to be relevant.[23]

As the *cultural path dependencies determine the initial level of religious vitality* and the extent of the resistance against processes of secularization, we can hardly deny the secularization process in Western Europe. The results reflects a high degree of "compartmentalization" (Dobbelaere, 2002), which is accompanied by a decrease in bonding to the church as well as an increasing religious indifference at the individual level. The situation in *Eastern Europe* is more difficult: *Socialist repression* of the church and the resulting ideological position against religion are additional factors in explaining regional differences in religious vitality, which complicates the identification of the degree of influence of the secularization process. Thus, the processes of modernization, political repression and cultural legacy have partly counteracting or mutually increasing effects. A radical social change is occuring in the religious realm, whereby counteracting effects of a *catch-up modernization* (which subdues religious vitality) and the *withdrawal of political repressions* of the church and religion (which is favorable for religious vitality) intermingle. One could even argue that the Eastern European countries should report a far higher degree of religious vitality than they do given their degree of modernization. In comparison to the highly modernized Western European states, their level of modernization is – in part considerably – lower.

Hence, according to the assumptions of the secularization theory, we would expect to find a more pronounced religious vitality, due to the fact that rationalization, differentiation as well as existential security are given to a lesser extent compared to Western Europe. However, in most of the Eastern European states, the consequences of socialist repression have caused an unnatural situation of *subdued religious vitality*, which has slowly begun to disperse after the repressions ceased. In cases where the communal basis of the religions has not been destroyed as substantially as in East Germany or in parts of Estonia and the Czech Republic, the observable *revitalization effects* do not come unexpectedly. The slow elimination of socialization effects explain the long duration of this process. This development is counteracted by continuous *increases in modernization*. When combining the two processes, there could be a *peak*, at which point the revitalization processes cease and the development joins the Western European trend toward secularization. In Slove-

[23] In Eastern Europe the situation is even more complex: While the tradition of regional churches of the Protestant churches in Eastern Europe provided a particularly inadvantageous basis for maintaining religious vitality especially under repressive circumstances, the Catholic churches probably managed to avoid political repressions better due to the fact that they had an external authority they could refer to in Rome.

nia (the most modernized country in Central Eastern Europe) and Poland (with it exceptionally high initial level of religious vitality), we find first indications that they have reached such a peak. The problem is that the two processes are hard to distinguish empirically, which renders difficult a clear determination of the development trends of religious vitality in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe.

As if that were not enough, *additional factors* undermine or at least moderate the universality of the secularization processes in some of the countries. They may also be assigned to the cultural path dependencies. While religiously charged political conflicts cause an above average religious vitality in Ireland (and Northern Ireland), the confluence of *religion and nation* is increasingly coming to the fore in several Eastern European states. Both patterns form and maintain *collective identity.* Consequently, religion is a main resource for identity-building (Huntington, 1996; Fox, 2004), whereby it may be accorded social relevance in return. Examples in Europe include: Poland, Russia, Croatia – and at least Romania. Especially in countries where the majority of the population is Catholic or Orthodox Christian in Eastern Europe, we often find a close connection between the concept of the nation and religion, which involves a revitalization of religion in association with an identity-building process in the course of an emerging nationalism.

To do justice to reality, it is obligatory to combine the assumptions of the secularization modell with the cultural and political *path dependencies* of the countries. These particularly include the historically evolved religious cultural heritage, the massive socialist political repressions but also patterns regarding the relevance of religion in society particular to the individual countries. The assumptions of the secularization theory can be applied, if (1) these path dependencies are taken into account and (2) the analysis focus on the tension between modernity and religion and less on the assumption that secularization is irreversible.[24] Thus, on the one hand, modernization can in part proceed in the opposite direction (modernization losses affecting an entire nation or a large social group in the course of rising social inequality), on the other hand, it can be impeded by counteracting factors (political repression, processes of identity-building and identity-determination, radical social change). All in all, establishing a "contextualized secularization theory" as a frame of reference for empirical analyses has a lot to commend it (see also Bruce, 2002; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Pollack, 2008; Stolz, 2009).[25]

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[24] By now, even dedicated proponents of explanatory models based on modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) take path dependencies into account.

[25] Stolz (2009) suggests an alternative approach, which is also integrative in a detailed model based on action theory. He starts out from the determination of religious beliefs and practices at the micro level and considers the developments at the aggregate level as consequences of the individual processes. Stolz also points out that the pronounced mutual isolation of the three main approaches in the sociology of religion is relatively unproductive. In his opinion, the future lies in integrative explanatory models which can be tested empirically.

In this respect, Romania's religious developments are not exceptional. Instead, they show several characteristics typical of the complex development in Eastern Europe since 1990: Currently, the country is undergoing a process of religious revitalization, which was facilitated by the cessation of state repressions. This is accompanied by features of the "cultural defense", i.e. an increasingly closer relation of the nation and religion, which is currently taking place in Croatia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia. What is remarkable is the relatively high degree of institutionalized religiosity in Romania, compared to other Eastern European countries with a Christian Orthodox heritage. This points to (path dependent) particularities of the relation between the church and the state during socialist times. Concurrent secularization effects caused by an increasing socio-economic modernization have been too weak to turn the trend from a revitalization of religion to a trend similar to Western European secularization. Due to the process of "cultural defense", it is hard to say when and whether the change in trends – which has already taken place in Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland – will actually take place.

Certainly, it is sensible to consider and assess the development of religiosity and bonding to the church in Romania in comparison to the development in other post-socialist states. This is the only way to adequately test in how far the main theories of the sociology of religion are appropriate and to study the country and region specific development paths. Still, quite a bit of research needs to be done in this field.

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RELIGION AND POLITICAL VALUES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT. The aim of the paper is to study the change of the relation between religiosity and political attitudes in the first decade after the fall of the communism. The basic theoretical background is Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage theory (1967), as well as the secularization thesis. On the empirical basis of the 1990 and 1999 waves of the European Values Study, the changing effects of religiosity on party preference, left-right ideological self-identification and political participation are investigated. As alternative explanatory factor to "cleavages", Inglehart's postmateralism-index (1990) was also introduced in the analysis. The micro-level scrutiny of contextual effects of denominational affiliation and the level of secularization is employed for explaining cross-country differences at the macro level.

Keywords: religiosity, political attitudes, secularization, CEE, cleavage theory, postmaterialism

Introduction

If we aim at study the relation of religiosity and political values in Central and Eastern Europe, one should be aware of the diversity of the traditions and roles which religion had played in the creation of national identity and the development of political systems in this region over the centuries. The region is by no means a homogeneous entity neither from a religious nor from a political perspective. (Broek and Moor, 1994; Miller et al., 1998; Halman, 2001). Trends of modernization and secularization were strongly influenced by the economical structure as well as the denominational traditions of the different countries. (Tomka and Zulehner, 1999; 2000; Nagle and Mahr, 1999). The political traditions are deeply rooted in the heritage of old empires with very different political cultures: the Habsburg Monarchy, the Russian or the Osman Empire. And even the most common part of the history, the era of the soviet-communist regimes itself could not fully abolish the differences of the political cultures, in contrary,"as communist rule matured, it became increasingly differentiated." (Miller et al., 1998: 41)

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Unlike in the case of Western-Europe where we have a number of sources (Knutsen, 1995; Brécon, 2003; Rosta, 2004) the comparative empirical study of the connection of religious and political values in Central and Eastern Europe is rather neglected. One finds case studies for individual countries (Jerolimov and Zrinsčak, 2006; Stan and Turcescu, 2007) but no general overview of the whole region as a whole.

It is not a goal of this paper to discover the specific historical roots and developments of each examined societies, but to try to identify common characters and grouping features. The main emphasis of my analysis is to be given to the changes in the relation of religiosity and political values since 1989, the common directions of development, and the possible clustering of countries.

Historical background

Religion and politics had a unique relation in Central and Eastern Europe before 1990. The process of secularization which had been accelerated by the socialist modernization and the atheist ideology of the regimes lead in many of the cases – though with different intensity – to a decrease of religiosity and a weakening of religious impact on other spheres of life. (Tomka, 1991; Tomka and Zulehner, 2000) This is true both at macro-level (the shrinking social significance of churches) and at micro-level (the erosion of the role played by the religion in the everyday life of the people).

In the political realm the lack of democratic rights, the non-democratic political socialization, the general depolitization of the communist societies and the loss of trust in social institutions (in many cases with the exception of the churches) were the most significant common features of the countries of the Soviet block. This common heritage was the background for another common occurrence, the transition process into a democratic political system.

Though the main goal of the atheist regimes was to minimize the influence and on a long term to abolish the churches, the relationship between the communist state and the church(es) was not uniform in the different Central and Eastern European countries. Each of the states had some kind of autonomy in their church-policy which was influenced by the social significance of the churches as well as their cooperation or resistance. We find examples for the preservation or even strengthening of church influence against all attempts of suppression (Poland), for rising conformity with official restrictive state policy towards churches going along with weakening social position (Hungary), or even for the role of a kind of legitimizing actor of the national-communist rule (Romania). The role played by the churches during the transition from the communist regime into a democratic system is also diverse. The East German and the Polish examples of an active organizing role in the resistance can be contrasted with the Czech or Hungarian case where churches had much limited part on preparation and realization of the democratic changes.

The church-state relations during the communist period in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is especially determined by the denominational composition and dominance of the various societies. Its influence is both direct and indirect, firstly trough the different traditions and teachings on political roles and activity played by the churches, and secondly through the different relations toward secularization. The three main Christian traditions that are significantly represented in the region (Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy) interpret historically differently their claim for totality against the world and their role in the worldly authorities. The Catholic Church insisted on its power-privileges in the past which led to a sharp conflicts between conservative and liberal forces, culminating in the *Kulturkampf* on the secularization of the educational system. The institutionalization of the religious-secular conflict in the political system resulted in a long-lasting cleavage in catholic countries. Also the issue of the separation of church and state gained importance mainly in Catholic countries.

In predominantly protestant countries these conflicts appeared with a much lower extent. This is partly due to the different interpretation of the roles of the Protestant churches in the world, but in some Western European cases also a result of a strong state-control over several national churches which hindered the development of religious parties. Protestantism arose as a rejection of the supranational domination of the papal state and therefore developed a strong connection with national movements especially by promoting the foundation of national churches.

Also the Orthodox Church played an important role in the nation-building of the respective societies. In orthodox societies national Orthodox churches have been formed since the Byzantine rule and the question of the separation of state and church, secular and religious authority has never been truly raised historically. The somewhat exaggerated formulation of Huntington, "In Orthodoxy, God is Ceasar's junior partner" (Huntington, 1997: 70) gives a rough picture of the relationship between state and church.

In denominationally mixed countries like Germany, or Hungary another cleavage arose in addition to the religious-secular one: the denominational cleavage. In several Western-European countries the institutionalization of the denominational subcultures generated religious pillars in the society. (Enyedi and Körösényi, 2001)

The socialist-communist type of modernization is another significant event that had various social impacts and different effects on religiosity. The state-forced industrialization and modernization destroyed to a different extent the traditional-rural society. Poland or Romania are good examples for the relatively strong preservation of rural structures and culture whereas the Czech Republic, Hungary or East Germany are opposite cases with a quite high level of urbanization. Though we have only a few data about the changing level

of religiosity from the communist times, one can conclude from the extent of the generational differences in religiosity after 1990 that the level of subsistence of traditional-rural society gives greater chance for the preservation of religiosity as well. (Tomka and Zulehner, 2000)

After 1990 the suppression of religious attachment and practice by the state authorities ceased and the new religious freedom raised expectations throughout the region about a growing level of religiosity. The diversity of historical roots however resulted in different paths of development. As the latest results of the Aufbruch 2008 comparative study on religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe shows, only in three out of ten countries involved show a significant increase of the proportion of religious population compared with the results of the first wave of this research (Romania, Ukraine and Slovakia) whereas stagnation (Poland, East Germany and Hungary) as well as slight decrease (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania and Croatia) can be also found in other cases. (Zulehner et al, 2008). Based on the indicators of religious practice and God' importance on one's life by Halman and Petterson (Halman and Petterson, 2003) Latvia can also put into the first category whereas other countries can be labelled with the two latter categories in their analysis too. The pattern of change can be connected with the abovementioned types of communist modernization: the rural society and culture survived the most in those countries that show religious upsurge.

Religion as a cleavage

In their analysis about the origins of the virtually unchanging Western European party systems Lipset and Rokkan (1967) found their roots in the great social conflict lines of the 19th century. The stability of the parties and their voting camps was based on the stability of the underlying cleavages.

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) differentiate four socially institutionalized, in the social structure embedded and politically effective cleavages. (1) *Centrum-periphery*: This dichotomy refers not only to the geographical division between central and more outlying areas but also to the autonomous or depending relation to resources. (2) *State-church*: This conflict goes back to the opposition of the growing national state and church that was seeking to preserve its former privileges. (3) *Urban – rural*: the conflict line has its roots in the traditionally lower level of education and political awareness of the rural population. (4) *Owner – worker*: The class-cleavage of the industrial revolution is the origin of the left and right division of the political sphere.

The cleavage that is of utmost importance for our analysis is the church-state conflict. Historically the oldest cleavage, it dates back its origins to the time of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. In countries that

remained predominantly Roman Catholic the Church retained its loyalty to the external power of the pope which was a serious source of conflict whereas in Protestant countries there was less confrontation of interest between church and state. In addition the Catholic Church had a much stronger claim of preserving privileges than its Protestant counterparts which also contributed to church-state relation loaded with conflicts. As a counter reaction this also resulted in an ambiguous social acceptance of church influence in political issues.

Since the cleavage-theory of Lipset and Rokkan was originally formulated for Western European societies, we find no implication in it for the orthodox tradition. However, considering the traditional relation of state and the national church in the orthodox countries no conflict line similar to the Catholic one is to be expected. "Whereas Catholicism affects social and ideological divisions in historically Catholic countries, Orthodoxy has very little effect on attitudes or cleavages where it is the dominant religion" (Whitefield 2002: 191)

After 1989 the new democratic party systems in Central and Eastern Europe were built up to a great extent along the old cleavages of the pre-communist era. Religion became an important social issue again and the influence of religiosity on political-ideological positions became visible in many post-communist societies.

The first hypothesis states that religiosity is still a significant cleavage for political and ideological positions in Central end Eastern European countries with a primarily catholic tradition (Hypothesis 1).

The impact of secularization

A common interpretation of secularization suggests that parallel with the social modernization process and the emancipation of secular fields religiosity plays an ever weakening role on other spheres of life (Casanova, 1994, Berger, 1969). In this sense a rather weak religious impact can be expected on pluralizing political attitudes in the new democracies. On the other hand empirical studies gave great importance to religion and religiosity as one of the cleavages in post-communist countries that divide people into different political camps after a period of unanimous political preferences (Plasser et al., 1998; Körösényi, 1996). This stands especially for countries with historically predominantly Catholic traditions where the religious-secular conflict is still more intensively present and regained on importance after 1990.

In his analysis of Western European countries Knutsen formulated two alternative hypotheses regarding the effect of secularization on the relation of religion and political attitudes. (Knutsen, 1995) According to one, the decreasing control of the churches on behaviours in other (non-religious) fields of life and the weaker and weaker community integration of the believers result in a declining

impact of religiosity on, among other things, political attitudes. The hypothesis of decreasing correlation says that religiosity can less and less explain the differences in the political attitudes of the individuals. Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere also predict a decline of religious effect on political views and behaviour as a result of shrinking church religiosity (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere, 1995: 115).

According to the alternative hypothesis, the decrease in the number of the religious citizens does not necessarily mean the weakening of the correlation between political attitude and religiosity. The change of religion in this sense can be interpreted as the ever decreasing number of those whose personal religiosity is close to the complex systems of beliefs and behaviour mediated by the churches, but the belonging to this group, strongly integrated in religious sense, still affects political attitudes to a large extent and remains a decisive factor for the explanation of the differences.

In his analysis of the impact of various factors on party choice in Western Europe Knutsen found the stable effect thesis to be supported by the data and he found a stronger religious impact in Catholic countries. When looking at the potential impact of secularization on the relation of religious and political attitudes in Central and Eastern European countries after 1990, the first question is about the universal applicability of secularization theory. Increasing religiosity is characteristic for some countries of the region, first of all societies with an Orthodox tradition. Religious upsurge might have an opposite result on the relation of religious and political attitudes compared to the hypothesis of loosening ties of secularization.

Concerning the plausibility of the alternative hypotheses of weakening or stable relation in Central and Eastern Europe we can expect both kind of development. We expect Catholic countries showing a greater stability of correlations since church integration of religious people is more intensive in this tradition than in the Protestant churches.(Hypothesis 2a) Whereas stability in Protestant societies can be expected only if the connection itself is already weak and no former weakening is possible (Hypothesis 2b).

The materialistic *versus* the post-materialistic value orientations

Besides of the theory of secularization social modernization theory has another significant implication for our study. Whilst cleavage theory states that mass political behaviour is deeply determined by “old conflicts” like religious-secular opposition rooted in the 19th century or even earlier, according to Inglehart (1990) post-war modernization has brought new, post-materialist value-orientations. The theory of a “silent revolution” is based on two pillars. (1) The scarcity hypothesis says that. „An individual’s priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment. One places the greatest subjective value on those

things that are in relatively short supply." (2) The socialization hypothesis states that the relationship between socioeconomic environment and individual values is not direct; "one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years." (Inglehart, 1990: 56)

Following the scarcity hypothesis, the economic development in industrialized societies after World War II resulted in material conditions of life never experienced before in the history. The high level of social welfare and individual economical security has led to the rise of new needs and values. Self-expression, individual freedom, environmental issues and other post-materialist value orientations gained upon in many Western societies. But the socialization hypothesis implies that this change does happen rather slowly. The change of values of a society follows the shift of generations and the replacement of older cohorts with the younger generations.

Central and Eastern European countries have undergone a socialist-type modernization which also contributed to a rising standard of living whereas the lack of democratic discourse hindered the rise of post-materialistic values. In many countries the policy of the communist rule inspired materialistic views and goals as supplements of political freedom and self-expression.

The fall of the iron curtain was followed by economic decline and growing existential insecurity in this region. This might have resulted in an increasing level of materialistic views and a weakening effect of post-materialism on political attitudes. For our topic the question is whether the new themes of a post-materialistic worldview are gaining on importance for the political-ideological positions of the individual in Central and Easter Europe or rather the old cleavages like religion and religiosity regain – country by country differently – their pre-communistic significance. Considering the rising level of materialistic value preferences we can not realistically assume a change in sense of post-materialization of political attitudes. According to our third hypothesis materialism remains stable in the former communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe (Hypothesis 3).

Methodology

For the empirical data verification of the hypotheses the two last waves of the European Values Study, the data of EVS 1990 and EVS 1999 were used. We have data from questions for nine Central and Eastern European countries involved in the analysis: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and East-Germany.[2]

When looking at the connection between religiosity and political attitudes we have to distinguish between micro and macro level of analysis. The micro level approach studies statistical relationship between indicators of the two

[2] In some cases there were missing data from one or another country. It is shown in the tables.

fields on an individual level in each of the countries involved, whereas at macro level countries are compared for the impact of denominational composition as well as the level and dynamics of secularization or desecularization on the nature of the relation between religious and political values. While national samples provide a chance for multivariable analysis of effects on micro level, the low number of cases (e.g. the countries) does not allow the same statistical analysis on macro level. In the latter case therefore we can only make a heuristic attempt to show possible contextual effects.

Religiosity is a complex phenomenon not easily measurable with one indicator. For our analysis at micro level we opted for an indicator measuring the dimension of religious practice by the frequency of church attendance because the paper focuses on the influence of church-involvement on political positions. A number of previous studies have shown that church attendance strongly correlates with a number of other religious indicators.

The other indicator of religious orientation included into the analysis is denominational affiliation. This provides an opportunity to show the differences between the adherents of the three major denominations, the Catholic, the Protestant and the Orthodox country by country.

The level of secularization which might have a weakening effect on the relation of religious and political values is an important factor for the explanation of the macro-level differences. In this paper we use the operationalization of Halman and Pettersson (Halman and Petterson, 2003: 62-64) who created a ranking of countries based on the level of church attendance and the importance of God. They formed five categories of secularization from the most secular to the most religious groups of countries by splitting up the ranking. Table 1 shows the categorization of the nine involved CEE countries:

Table 1.

Degree of secularization

Degree of secularization	Country
1. most secular	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East-Germany
2.	Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia
3.	Slovakia
4.	Romania
5. most religious	Poland

Source: Halman and Petterson, 2003: 64. Own computations for Slovenia.

Two third of the countries are in the two most secularized categories, which is approximately the same rate as in the case of Western Europe (60%). Not only the level, but also the dynamic of secularization can be considered as

a possible explanatory factor for the different ways of the changing relation between religiosity and political values. In order to measure the extent of the secularization or desecularization process in the former communist countries after 1990 the same indicators were computed for 1999. We opted for the same way of operationalization as Halman and Petterson (Halman and Petterson, 2003) using two different indicators of religiosity (importance of God in one's life, frequency of church attendance). A compound index of the change of religiosity was created from the average change of the means of both indicators.

On the basis of this index we can clearly define a group of countries with an increasing religiosity during the 1990s (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Slovakia), a second category of those with stagnating level (Slovenia, Czech Republic and Poland), and the last category with slightly decreasing religious indicators (Hungary, East-Germany). Latvia is a special case with Protestant roots but strong Orthodox and Catholic minorities. Both the religious heterogeneity and the presence of orthodoxy could contribute to the increasing level of religiosity. (Table 2)

Table 2.

Dynamic of secularization or desecularization (mean of values)

	How important is God in your life			How often do you attend religious services			average change
	1990	1999	change	1990	1999	change	
Bulgaria	3,56	5,15	1,59**	2,58	3,70	1,12**	1,36
Romania	7,45	8,63	1,18**	4,66	5,18	0,52**	0,85
Latvia	4,46	5,65	1,19**	3,13	3,25	0,12	0,65
Slovakia	5,97	6,63	0,66**	4,29	4,75	0,46**	0,56
Slovenia	4,75	5,02	0,27	4,08	3,85	-0,23*	0,02
Czech Republic	3,54	3,63	0,10	2,59	2,45	-0,14*	-0,02
Poland	8,43	8,39	-0,04	6,31	6,09	-0,22**	-0,13
Hungary	5,41	5,36	-0,05	3,41	3,03	-0,38**	-0,22
East-Germany	3,65	3,15	-0,49**	2,82	2,42	-0,40**	-0,45

Source: For 1990: Halman and Petterson, 2003: 63;
Own computations for Slovenia and for 1999. ** $p < 0,01$, * $p < 0,05$

The third explanatory variable for the differences between countries is denominational tradition. In this regard historical roots might be more important than contemporary proportions of denominational belonging. Table 3 shows the main denominational background of each country, though in some cases it is not an easy task to categorize them. For instance, the majority of the Czech society does not belong to any denomination today, and Catholic traditions were weakened by a strong anti-Catholic national movement since

the Reformation. (Tomka, 2006) Latvia was a predominantly Protestant country before the soviet occupation, but today three religious groups of similar size (Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox) are present. Hungarian society is not homogenous in terms of denominational belonging, either; a significant minority adheres to the Calvinist church.

Table 3.

Denominational tradition

Denomination	Country
Catholic	Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic
Protestant	East-Germany, Latvia
Orthodox	Bulgaria, Romania

Source: Author's classification.

The impact of religious values on political attitudes can be also examined through different types of political positions and behaviours. For our analysis political activity was measured with the index of participation in different political actions,[3] whereas political-ideological preferences were operationalized on both nominal as well as scale level of measurement: with party choice and the ideological self-positioning on the left-right scale.

In addition to the search for an empirical correlation between the variables representing either religiosity or political attitudes, we can also look at the acceptance or rejection of church influence on the political field. In the questionnaire of the EVS1999 wave there was a set of four questions on the views of the respondents about the influence of religion and churches in the political sphere. An index of these – strongly correlating – four variables represents the general level of acceptance or rejection of the religious impact in the field of politics which is also part of our analysis.[4]

As for the verification of the third hypothesis, the three categories of Inglehart's materialistic–post-materialistic value-orientations (materialistic, mixed and post-materialistic) were measured with the answers given to the question about the most important goals of the country.[5]

[3] The index is composed from five potential political actions: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, occupying buildings or factories. For each respondent the number of actions were counted which he/she has already done or might do.

[4] The statements are as follows: "Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office", "Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections", "It would be better if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office", "Religious leaders should not influence government decisions". Answers ranged from 1 = "agree strongly" to 5 = "strongly disagree". An aggregate of these four questions (the first and the third recoded into the reverse order) resulted in an index with scores from 4 (lowest acceptance of religious impact on politics) to 20 (highest acceptance).

[5] The answer possibilities: maintaining order in the nation; giving people more say in important government decisions; fighting rising prices; protecting freedom of speech.

Religion as a cleavage

The empirical evidence of the European Vales Study (EVS) demonstrates that religiosity plays a decisive role for the political positions in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990. In all of the countries involved into the study church attendance has a significant semi-strong effect on party choice in every case. The connection of the two spheres of life – both regained their freedom as a result of the political changes – show that religion resumed its role as an important cleavage of the party systems of the Central and Eastern European countries after the communist oppression.

The historical denominational context is still an important factor since countries with a Catholic cultural heritage show a slightly closer connection of the two fields then the orthodox countries. East-Germany is a special case with Protestant roots since the Lutheran Church had an important part in the abolition of the communist system. But ten years after the fall of the wall in Berlin we find a significantly weaker connection between church attendance and party choice than ten years earlier. (Table 4)

Table 4.

The association between church attendance and party choice, 1990-1999

Denominational tradition	Country	1990	1999
Catholic	Czech Republic	0,22**	0,20**
	Hungary	0,17**	0,22**
	Slovenia	0,21**	0,20**
	Slovakia	0,21**	0,19**
	Poland	0,21**	0,13*
Protestant	East-Germany	0,19**	0,14**
	Latvia	(a)	0,15
Orthodox	Bulgaria	0,12**	0,16**
	Romania	0,16**	0,18**

Source: Author's computations based on the 1990 and 1999 EVS datasets.
Figures indicate Cramer's V association coefficients significant at * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01.
(a) Question on party choice not raised.
Note: The ranking order of the countries reflects the level of religiosity, starting for each type of religious tradition from the least religious country.

Similar patterns of relations can be found regarding the relationship of religiosity and left-right orientation. Out of nine countries, ideological self-positioning depends to a significant extent on religious practice in seven ones even when the effects of gender, age, education, urbanization, and denomination

are controlled. The direction of the correlation between religiosity and the left-right scale is homogeneous in all the countries examined: the higher level of religious affiliation makes a right-wing orientation more probably. We find the strongest relation in Catholic countries like Slovakia (1990) and Slovenia (1999), but the example of the protestant, highly secularized East-Germany and the orthodox Bulgaria shows that religious practice plays a role in ideological self-assessment not only in Catholic countries. The predominantly Orthodox Romania and Protestant-Orthodox Latvia are the only countries without significant connection between left-right orientation and religiosity. The intensity of religiosity or the religious change does not seem to make an unambiguous impact on this relation (Table 5).

Table 5.

The impact of religiosity and post-materialism on left–right self-identification, 1990-1999 (standardized beta-coefficients)

Denominational tradition	Country	Church attendance		Post-materialism	
		1990	1999	1990	1999
Catholic	Czech Republic	-0,15**	-0,11**	0,09**	0,19**
	Hungary	-0,10*	-0,12**	0,02	-0,07
	Slovenia	-0,10*	-0,22**	-0,06	0,01
	Slovakia	-0,22**	-0,20**	0,05	0,12**
	Poland	-0,14**	-0,17**	0,04	0,03
Protestant	East-Germany	-0,19**	-0,10*	-0,06*	-0,12**
	Latvia	(a)	-0,06	(a)	0,07
Orthodox	Bulgaria	-0,19**	-0,13**	0,14**	0,08
	Romania	-0,04	0,03	0,24**	0,03

Source: Author's computations based on the 1990 and 1999 EVS datasets. Figures indicate standardized beta coefficients of linear regression significant at * $p < 0,05$, ** $p < 0,01$. Control variables introduced in the regression models: gender, age, education, urbanization, denomination (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox).
(a) Question on post-materialism not raised

The acceptance of religious or church influence in politics is rather low in all former communist countries. The value of the created index is below its mid-level (12 points) for all of the nine countries with a highest score of 11,1 for Romania and Latvia being the only other country over 10 points. Countries with orthodox majority or minority show a slightly greater acceptance than catholic and/or highly secularized countries (Czech Republic, East-Germany, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland) are more likely to show a lower degree of acceptance than orthodox countries (Table 6).

Table 6.

Mean of the index for the views on the religious effect on politics, 1999

Denominational tradition	Country	Mean
Catholic	Czech Republic	8,37
	Hungary	8,79
	Slovenia	8,32
	Slovakia	9,54
	Poland	8,70
Protestant	East-Germany	8,38
	Latvia	10,07
Orthodox	Bulgaria	9,33
	Romania	11,09

Source: Author's computations using the 1999 EVS dataset.

The positive correlation between individual religiosity and the acceptance of or wish for a high degree of religious effect on politics is obvious in each of the examined countries. Not only the Catholic macro-cultural denominational heritage, but also the individual denominational belonging to the Catholic Church has an impact on the acceptance of religious influence in politics. In two third of the countries in study being a member of the Catholic Church makes a positive opinion on church influence more likely. Only in the two orthodox countries with small or no Catholic minorities and in the unanimously Catholic Poland - where being a Catholic does not make a real difference - there is no Catholic impact. The strength of the Catholic denominational affiliation is somewhat stronger in the less religious countries, where religious belonging can result in a greater difference of views between the religious and the non-religious part of the population. Protestantism and Orthodoxy have in fewer countries and weaker - but also positive - correlation with the approval of religious influence in political matters (Table 7).

Table 7.

The impact of religiosity and denominational affiliation on the views about the religious effect on politics, 1999 (standardized beta-coefficients)

Denominational tradition	Country	Church attendance	Catholic	Protestant	Orthodox
Catholic	Czech Republic	-,24**	,17**	,07**	-,01
	Hungary	-,31**	,18**	,06	,04
	Slovenia	-,30**	,12**	,00	,07**
	Slovakia	-,43**	,13**	,06*	,01
	Poland	-,33**	,02	-,00	,05

Denominational tradition	Country	Church attendance	Catholic	Protestant	Orthodox
Protestant	East-Germany	-,39**	,14**	,20**	,09**
	Latvia	-,26**	,10*	,07	,11**
Orthodox	Bulgaria	-,35**	-,05	,09**	-,03
	Romania	-,16**	-,02	,05	,01

Source: Author's computations based on the 1999 EVS dataset. Figures indicate standardized beta coefficients for linear regression, significant at * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01. The control variables introduced into the regression models: gender, age, education, urbanization.

The impact of secularization

The 1999 wave of the European Values Study provides a chance to get a view about developments concerning the changing relations of religious and political values during the first decade after the fall of communism. The most important general statement that can be formulated on the basis of the empirical evidence is that if there was a change in the strength of connection, it is very likely a weakening one. Independently from the figures at the beginning of the period growing religious impact is rather an exception. In the case of party choice Hungary is the only country with a significantly stronger bivariate connection between the party preference and the frequency of church attendance in 1999 then in 1990. Behind the slight decrease of religious impact on party choice no obvious connection can be found to the general level of religiosity or the dynamic of religious change in the different countries of the region. The most religious Poland with a stagnating level of religious practice as well as the least religious East Germany with a religious decline are the two examples of the most significant weakening of the interdependence between the two fields. Still Orthodox and Protestant countries – along with Poland – have a weaker religious effect on party choice than the Catholic ones (Table 4).

Left-right self positioning is another example for slightly decreasing religious effect on political attitudes in most Central and Eastern European countries. While religious practice is still a factor for right-wing ideological self-categorization, in half of the countries involved in the study the correlation has lost strength whereas Slovenia is the only country where we can register a significantly increasing interdependence. Though East-Germany has one of the highest rates of decrease, there is no definite relation between secularization tendencies and loosening in the religious impact as countries with increasing social level of religiosity like Slovakia or Bulgaria too show 1999 a lower correlation than right after the changes (Table 5).

The materialistic *versus* post-materialistic value orientations

Post-materialism is barely characteristic for Central and Eastern European societies. On the basis of Inglehart's four items question (Inglehart, 1977, 1997) there is only one country where the proportion of individuals with a clear post-materialistic value-system is over 10% (East-Germany) whereas clear materialistic value-preferences are not dominant in most of the cases either, but mixed types have the highest response rate. According to Inglehart, post-materialism corresponds with economic development of a country, but in our case there is no such a clear connection. The country with the highest level of materialistic attitudes is Hungary, one of the economically most developed countries in the region (Table 8). Protestantism seems to correlate with a low rate of materialism, but neither the level or dynamics of secularization nor the denominational background can provide an unambiguous explanation for country differences.

Table 8.

Materialistic value preferences, 1990-1999 (%)

Denominational tradition	Country	1990	1999	Change
Catholic	Czech Republic	32	25	-7**
	Hungary	48	51	+3
	Slovenia	31	17	-14**
	Slovakia	39	46	+7**
	Poland	35	37	+2
Protestant	East-Germany	13	33	+20**
	Latvia	27	35	+8**
Orthodox	Bulgaria	30	49	+19**
	Romania	45	45	0

Source: Author's computations based on the 1990 and 1999 EVS dataset.
Change is significant at ** $p < 0,01$.

Compared to church attendance there are clear differences with regard to the impact of materialistic–post-materialistic value preferences on political attitudes. When having both factors in the same model – and controlling for a number of socio-demographical features – post-materialism has only in a low number of cases an impact on left-right self-identification. There are only two countries in the study that show a statistically significant post-materialistic influence on left-right self-identification in 1990 and 1999 (Czech Republic and East-Germany), both being among the most secularized ones of the region (Table 5).

The theory of Inglehart (1990) suggests that post-materialism supports political participation. The analysis of the empirical data shows a reverse picture compared to the ideological self-assessment: while church attendance has practically no influence on the participation in various political actions, post-materialism shows a significant connection for almost each countries in both waves, while cross-country differences are rather small.

Table 9.

The impact of religiosity and post-materialism on political participation, 1990-1999 (standardized beta-coefficients)

Denominational tradition	Country	Church attendance		Post-materialism	
		1990	1999	1990	1999
Catholic	Czech Republic	0,02	-0,02	0,12**	0,07**
	Hungary	0,06	-0,06	0,03	0,10**
	Slovenia	0,07	0,09*	0,11**	0,07*
	Slovakia	-0,04	0,01	0,09**	0,13**
	Poland	-0,08	0,01	0,15**	0,06*
Protestant	East-Germany	0,03	-0,02	0,15**	0,10**
	Latvia	(a)	0,02	(a)	0,09**
Orthodox	Bulgaria	-0,02	-0,09**	0,16**	0,13**
	Romania	0,02	0,06	0,11**	0,10**

Source: Author's computations based on the 1999 EVS dataset. Figures indicate standardized beta coefficients for linear regression, significant at * p < 0,05, ** p < 0,01. Control variables introduced in the regression models: gender, age, education, urbanization, denomination (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox).
(a) Question not raised.

Regarding the change of the post-materialistic impact on political attitudes over time, in the case of left-right scale there is a steady lack of effect whereas the case of the political participation provides evidence for the weakening influence of the declining level of post-materialistic value preferences (Table 9).

Conclusions

Our first and perhaps the most important conclusion is that the Central and Eastern European region is – to a great extent – differentiated regarding the effect of religiosity on political values. The differences cannot be easily traced back exclusively to one or another socio-cultural background effect like historical denominational culture or the level or dynamic of secularization. Country-specific historical developments make a search for common patterns of development rather difficult.

The first hypothesis of the existence of a religious cleavage in the former communist countries has found the most empirical support in our analysis. Party preference, left-right positions and the opinions about church influence on the political field are all influenced by church involvement in most of the cases. The differences in the strength of the influence can be at least partly contributed to the Catholic heritage, but there is no cleavage in these terms between Catholic and other Central and Eastern European countries.

The decade after the fall of the communism brought different developments regarding religiosity, but this diversity is not directly reflected in the changing effect of religiosity on political attitudes. The basic pattern of change is weakening, mainly independently from the state or the dynamics of secularization in a particular country. Stagnation is primarily characteristic for cases where the interdependency of religious and political attitudes is very weak already at the beginning of the period in study. The difference between Catholic countries and countries with other denominational heritage is small but, at least in the case of the party choice still existing.

Post-materialism has lost on influence in the former socialist countries during the first decade of democracy and market-economy. The new value orientations have limited effect on political-ideological positions compared to religiosity and this situation has not changed significantly between the two waves of the European Values Study. At the same time post-materialism is more stimulating for political participation than church-involvement, but also in this case weakening is the typical direction of change during the 1990s.

Almost another decade has elapsed since the last wave of the European Values Study. The 2008 round of the study will provide an excellent chance to observe the process of change over a longer period of time. In addition to the examination of longer trends a more thorough analysis can put an emphasis also on the country-specific developments as well.

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OF PRIESTS AND POLITICS. MEASURING SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN PRESENT-DAY ROMANIA

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ABSTRACT. We analyze quantitative indicators for the separation of religion and politics in Romania, using data from the World Value Survey 2005, the European Value Survey 1999, and the Extremism 2003 survey. Quantitative information is considered in the context of current debates concerning the influence of the Romanian Orthodox Church in various areas of public life. We explore possible validity issues for the indicators, using secondary analysis of statistical data, and cognitive interviews with 25 Romanian respondents, conducted in November 2008. Based on quantitative and qualitative information, we discuss the relevance of these indicators for understanding secularity, in the context of comparative survey research.

Keywords: Secularity, public opinion, cognitive interviews, indicators, validity

Introduction

The Romanian Constitution stipulates that "religious cults are autonomous from the state and they benefit from its support, including facilitation of religious assistance in the army, hospitals, penitentiaries, asylums and orphanages" (Parlamentul României, 2003). Thus, the state is responsible for supporting religious cults, diverging from strict principles of laicism which require that the state does not subsidize any denomination or church, assigning religious matters to private life. However, Romania does not have a state church and all "religious cults are free and they organize themselves according to their own bylaws, in conformity with the law" (Parlamentul României, 2003).

Still, several public events and debates in recent years have raised the question whether there is a growing degree of ingression of the Orthodox Christian Church in public institutions in Romania. There has been a consistent

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tendency towards a greater presence of Christian Orthodox religion in schools, in politics and in legislation – as we will argue below. At the same time, survey information on public opinion about the separation of Church and politics in Romania indicate surprisingly high levels of support for secular viewpoints in the political area. In this paper we will present and discuss this apparent contradiction.

The article[3] is structured as follows: we first discuss the concept of secularity and its measurement in several surveys. We then go on to discuss possible sources of error in indicators for political secularity used in World Value Survey[4] (WVS) 2005 and European Value Survey[5] (EVS) 1999, using comparative data from the WVS 2005 and results of 25 cognitive interviews on Romanian subjects, in November 2008. After this methodological discussion, we illustrate the enigma of Romanian secularity: debates in the public sphere consistently indicate the prevalence of support for religious involvement in the public sphere, while survey estimates (with data from EVS1999, the Extremism 2003 survey[6] and WVS 2005) lead to the conclusion that Romanian people strongly reject the involvement of priests in politics. The article ends with a tentative explanation for this dissonance revealed by quantitative estimates within the context of public debates, and with recommendations for further research.

Measuring secularity

Dimensions and levels in definitions of secularity

A review of the literature indicates multiple definitions for secularity and processes of secularization. We will use the term "secularity" to refer to a state of facts, and "secularization" to refer to social processes that lead to secularity.

Dobbelaere (1999: 230), in his classic discussion of secularization, distinguishes three levels of analysis. The macro, societal level, comprises processes such as "functional differentiation" or "rationalization". The meso, organizational level, includes processes of "pluralization" or "this-worldliness" of church organizations. The micro, individual level, refers to "individualization" of belief, "unbelief", "bricolage" and the decline in church membership and attendance.

Following Dobbelaere's approach, it is possible to classify definitions according to the level of observation, on one hand, and according to the dimension they refer to. At the societal level one can differentiate aggregated

[3] This article relies on research work conducted with the support of the REVACERN project, March – August 2009.

[4] More information on the World Value Survey is available on: www.worldvaluessurvey.org

[5] More information on the European Value Survey is available on www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu

[6] The Extremism 2003 survey was conducted by Institutul pentru Politici Publice Bucureşti (www.ipp.ro) and The Gallup Organization Romania.

indicators (such as the proportion of atheist or non-religious people), commonly used in quantitative models, from institutional indicators (such as the degree of Church-State separation). This distinction helps to distinguish descriptions of populations from descriptions of social structures since, as Sommerville (1998) notices, there can be a secular society which contains a religious population: the USA and Turkey are obvious examples to this point.

As regards the main dimensions of the definition used in the literature, the first dimension consists of the degree and evolution of personal religiosity, defined as a multidimensional concept including aspects such as belonging, belief and behavior (Marshall, 2002). From this perspective, "secularization" is often used to mean a decrease in personal religiosity, such as the variable used by Hallman and Petterson (2004). Secularity may also refer to people who consider themselves atheistic or agnostic, but also to people who adhere to non-theistic spiritual worldviews. Also, secularity can be used with regard to people who consider themselves members of a theistic religion, but who live secular lives (Ben-Porat, 2008). Secularity also points to the uncoupling of the different aspects of religiosity, and to the increased individualization of religiosity.

The second dimension refers to the functional differentiation of spheres of individual thought and of social institutions, by which religion becomes increasingly specialized in dealing with spiritual matters, losing its grip over scientific, political, economic institutions and modes of reasoning. Secularity then involves, at individual level, "beliefs and practices related to the 'non-ultimate' aspects of human life" (Yinger, 1967: 19), and their relative importance. Secularity is analogously defined at societal level as functional differentiation of institutions, or as decline of religious authority over other spheres of social life (Chaves, 1994).

On a third dimension, secularity may pertain to the tolerance of alternative religious worldviews, including religious people's tolerance of non-religious or non-theistic people, and the reverse. For example, secular people may hold negative views towards religion or clerics, they may be indifferent to them, or they may acknowledge equal value to alternative life paths; conversely, non-religious people may be more or less accepted as members of a given community. A related topic refers to the rights granted to people with other religious worldviews (Jelen and Wilcox, 1997), including the non-religious and the non-theistic, in issues such as free expression, observing religious rituals, or making choices shaped by such worldviews (such as abortion, enrollment in the military, using medical care, religious education for children etc).

Last but not least, the fourth dimension of secularity regards the salience of religious issues, including debates on secularity. For example, people may lead similar secular lives either because of thoroughly-thought ethical principles, or without giving much thought to such issues, due to modernizing lifestyle changes (Ben-Porat, 2008).

These four broad conceptual dimensions of secularity are interdependent to some degree. For example, it is likely that strongly religious people may use

religious explanations more amply than less religious people; still, this is not always so, and religious people may have various patterns of integrating religious and secular reasoning.

Indicators of secularity

When measuring secularity, quantitative analyses often use a multi-dimensional approach, reflecting the complexity of the concept. For example, Fox (2006) measures secularity at institutional level, defining the governmental involvement in religion (GIR) on six specific dimensions: state support and state hostility towards various religions, comparative treatment of various religions, restrictions on minority religious practice, regulation of majority religious practice, and religious laws. These indicators lead the author to the conclusion that most countries have significant governmental involvement in religion – with the notable exception of the US, the only country which scores zero on the total measure.

Wilcox (1993) measures public attitudes towards religion establishment issues in the US, at individual level, using several items that measure, on one hand, general orientations concerning the separation of government and religion and, on the other hand, specific issues – such as prayer in Congress, Government funds for religious schools, or teaching evolution. Wilcox (1993: 171) concludes that "First, the public is far more supportive of church-state separation in the abstract than on concrete issues. (...) Second, a number of Americans have weakly held preferences on church-state issues, and are therefore strongly influenced by question wording and ordering".

Secularity is often defined as a low level or low influence of religiosity. Raymond and Norrander (1990) define secularists as people who claim no religious affiliation (p. 152). Alternatively, many other analyses use religiosity itself as predictor for secularity, measuring it on multiple dimensions: faith and other related variables, such as religious orthodoxy or religious particularism (Eisenstein 2006, Eisinga et. al. 1995), church involvement and attendance, or religious behavior – such as frequency of prayer, religious salience, and denomination.

Measurement of secularity in Romania

In Romania, Voicu (2007) measures secularity by the association between religious values and other values – such as support for democracy, support for women employment, and family gender roles, and she concludes that family life is the least secularized area, while employment is the most secularized; political values fall in between (Voicu, 2007:109-110). Rughiniş (2007) uses indicators of religious belief, church attendance and importance of religion to estimate degrees of secularity in Romania.

Additional indicators of secularity in the political sphere, seen as rejection of religious presence in government and for priests' involvement in politics, are included in the European Value Surveys, and in the World Value Surveys. Voicu (2001) uses these indicators from the EVS 1993 and EVS 1999 to classify respondents according to their degree of secularity, and to test multivariate regression models for secularity.

Besides several items on religious behavior, belief and attitudes, the WVS 2005 and the EVS 1999 include four items referring to the separation of religion and politics, measured on a five point scale, from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree":

> "How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following..."
> (Item A.) "Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office" (translated as: "Politicienii care nu cred în Dumnezeu nu ar trebui să ocupe funcţii publice");
> (Item B.) "Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections" (translated as: "Preoţii nu ar trebui să influenţeze modul în care votează oamenii");
> (Item C.) "It would be better for... (your country) if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office" (translated as: "Ar fi mai bine pentru România dacă funcţiile publice ar fi ocupate mai ales de oameni credincioşi");
> (Item D.) "Religious leaders should not influence government decisions" (translated as: "Preoţii nu ar trebui să influenţeze deciziile politice").

The Extremism 2003 survey includes three of the previous indicators of political secularity (A, B and C), albeit with a different measurement scale. Item D has been replaced by:

> (Item E.) "Priests should not run for office" (Romanian original item is "Preoţii nu ar trebui să candideze în alegeri".

Extremism 2003 also includes some additional indicators of opinions concerning the separation of church and state, such as: "All children should learn religion in school", "The state should fund the Church" and "All sects should be forbidden" (IPP, 2003: 26).

Unfortunately, comparative surveys that include Romanian samples, such as the EVS and the WVS, do not use other indicators of secular opinions on the separation of religion from the public sphere. Moreover, such indicators were present in the ISSP 1991 (such as whether "Right and wrong should be based on God's laws", "decided by society" or "be a matter of personal conscience", or whether books and films that attack religions should be prohibited) – but they are not included in the ISSP 1998 or the ISSP 2008 surveys dedicated to religion. Even more, the ISSP 1998 and ISSP 2008 only use the two indicators on political secularity related to the involvement of religious leaders in politics.

We can conclude that the WVS, EVS and ISSP international comparative surveys mainly rely on the definition of secularity as "low religiosity or absence of

religiosity", and only allow for a summary investigation of secularity understood as uncoupling of religiosity from other spheres of life, by including some indicators of political secularity.

Given the increased importance of these indicators in international surveys, as the main measurements of secularity defined as separation of religion from other areas of public life, it is important to further investigate their relevance. As we argue below, the two indicators concerning the involvement of priests in politics measure only a specific sub-dimension of political secularity. They also seem to be affected by response errors due to their negative formulation and to the ambiguity inherent in the concept of "influence".

Error in answers to WVS 2005 secularity indicators

The validity of the WVS 2005 indicators is discussed by Pettersson (2003), who points to possible problems due to the double negation in Item A, and to the negative formulation of Items 2 and 4. Pettersson concludes that "a set of confirmatory factor analyses have not supported the suspicion that similar responses to statement B and D would be caused by the fact that both of them are negatively formulated" (Pettersson, 2003: 9).

Even if the correlation of the two items is not significantly inflated by a response style bias, there may still be a risk of random error due to difficulties in expressing one's opinion related to items B and D. The items refer to situations which are not subject to daily reflection, and it may well be that the negative formulation is confusing for the respondents.

In order to estimate the magnitude of such errors, we have computed proportions of respondents whose views on priests' involvement in politics seem to be inconsistent with their religious views. There are four main combinations of answers:

Table 1.

Combinations of answers on religiosity and political secularity

Religion should be involved in politics:	Religious respondents	Non-Religious respondents
Yes	Consistent answer	Possibly inconsistent answer
No	Possibly inconsistent answer	Consistent answer

Source: Authors' composition.

It is nevertheless possible that a divergent answer does not reflect errors, but true opinions. It is especially difficult to differentiate error from opinion in the case of religious respondents: it may well be that a deeply religious person believes

that religion should not be involved in politics, defending a secular conception on the separation of Church and State. This is why we focus on divergence for non-religious respondents, starting from the assumption that it is much less likely that a non-religious person believes that religion should be involved in politics. In order to minimize the possibilities that such response patterns reflect actual opinions, we have defined as strictly as possible the non-religious profile of the respondent, including: his or her answer to the specific question on being a religious person[7], and the opinion that the church is not giving adequate answers to social problems. Moreover, for the two items concerning priests, which load on a different factor than items A and C (see also Halman and Pettersson 2004, and Müller 2009 for a discussion on the dimensional structure of the four indicators), we have also added the requirement that respondents answer "No" to item C, thus clearly indicating that they do not believe that religion is beneficial in public administration (see Table 2). This additional condition makes it more likely that the divergence is an inconsistency that reflects error, and not a real configuration of opinions.

Table 2.

Structure of four inconsistent response patterns

Item		Inconsistent response patterns for non-religious respondents			
		Atheists-Government (AG)	**Priest-Vote (PV)**	**Religious-Benefits (RB)**	**Priest-Government (PG)**
	Generally speaking, do you think that the church is giving adequate answers to.The social problems facing our society	No	No	No	No
A	Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office	**Yes**			
B	Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections		**No**		
C	It would be better for... (your country) if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office		No	**Yes**	No
D	Religious leaders should not influence government decisions				**No**

Source: Authors' composition.

[7] "Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are (read out and code one answer): 1 A religious person, 2 Not a religious person, 3 An atheist". "Non-religious respondents" are those who have answered "not a religious person" or "an atheist".

Patterns of inconsistent answers for non-religious respondents

In Table 3 we can see the percentage of respondents for all inconsistencies, within the subsample of non-religious respondents.

Table 3.

Distribution of inconsistent answers across countries: "church involvement inconsistencies" (CII) and "religious benefits inconsistencies" (RBI) from subsamples of non-religious respondents

Item	Inconsistency	IT	ES	SE	FI	PL	SI	BG	RO
A	% AG of Non-religious respondents	3	4	1	2	2	2	5	9
B	% PV of Non-religious respondents	10	10	11	14	4	9	10	17
C	% RB of Non-religious respondents	1	5	2	2	0	2	7	25
D	% PG of Non-religious respondents	6	11	13	14	9	12	12	15
	Total number of non-religious respondents in analysis	107	612	625	379	56	237	286	100

Source: Authors' calculations using the WVS 2005 dataset.

Table 3 indicates that the Priest-Government and the Priest-Vote inconsistencies are more frequent than the Religion-Benefit inconsistency, which could be due to their negative formulation. The notable exception is Romania, in which a quarter of the around 100 self-declared non-religious respondents would still prefer strongly religious people in public office.

It is interesting that, despite the double negation included in its formulation, item A has the lowest proportion of inconsistent answers. The double negation is probably alleviated by the fact that "people who do not believe in God" is a common and easy to understand phrase.

Cognitive testing of secularity indicators

In order to further explore the meaning of these four items for respondents, we have conducted a cognitive testing inquiry. Cognitive interviews explore in-depth the process of answering survey questions, focusing on issues such as item comprehension, information retrieval from memory, motivation to answer the question and social desirability, and response mapping with answer categories (Willis, 1999 and 2004).

We have surveyed 25 subjects, a convenience sample selected such as to cover a diversity of professions, age and education categories, and to include men and women as well. Interviews were conducted by Iulia Răuţu. Within the given time constraints, we decided that the 25 interviews were enough to provide an indication of error patterns in answering survey items; for a more detailed and precise investigation, a substantially larger number of interviews would be necessary (Blair et al, 2006).

The cognitive interviews included two stages. The first stage consisted of applying a short questionnaire, without any other explanation; subjects' answers were noted as such. This face-to-face questionnaire included 10 items regarding religiousness, secularity and socio-demographic information from the WVS 2005 survey; its application lasted on average around 5 minutes.

The second stage consisted of a more in-depth approach to the questions about religiosity and particularly the last four affirmations on separation of religion from politics. These more intensive cognitive interviews were recorded and lasted – on average – about 20 to 25 minutes. Initially the subject was asked about what the affirmation made him/her think and what he/she thought the affirmation referred to. Then, the subject was asked on his/her opinion on the matter, the justification of that opinion, and the answer given by the subject during the interview was compared to that from the questionnaire. In the end, the subject was asked if he/she thought that the phrase should be reformulated and, if yes, how he/she would reformulate it.

Therefore, our approach did not register subjects' thought processes as they answered the survey questions; instead, after having completed the whole list of items, we compared the spontaneous answer to the short survey to the more reflected opinion expressed in the interview.

We were particularly interested in items A, B, and D, due to their negative formulation. Concerning item A, with a double negation, 3 out of the 25 people interviewed gave an answer opposite to their opinion due to the misinterpretation of the phrase's meaning. As regards item B, we have found 5 erratic answers; a number of 6 out of the 25 interviewed experienced difficulties interpreting item D, which lead them to giving a different answer in the questionnaire than in the interview. On total, we observed discrepancies between the questionnaire and the interviews for more than a third (9 out of 25) of the people interviewed, as displayed in Table 4.

Out of these 9 subjects, five encountered problems for one of the four items, three encountered problems for two of the four items and one for all three items which included some form of negation. The socio-demographic traits and characteristics of these nine respondents are displayed in the table below:



Figure 1. Number of response errors in cognitive testing interviews
Source: Authors' calculation

Table 4.

Socio-demographic traits for subjects with observed discrepancies between answer and actual opinions

Resp. no.	Sex	Age	Education	Occupation	Items with response errors
1	F	30	Secondary	N/A	B
2	F	41	High-school	Cashier	A, D
3	F	49	Secondary	Janitor	A
4	F	58	High-school	Shopkeeper	B
5	M	33	Secondary	Bodyguard	A,B,D
6	M	34	High-school	Construction worker	D
7	M	60	Secondary	Retired, N/A	B, D
8	M	63	High-school	Doorman	D
9	M	64	Secondary	Retired, N/A	B, D

Source: Cognitive testing research carried out by the authors.

Another general issue encountered was the fact that sometimes people had difficulties answering questions related to hypothetical situations and to ethical aspects, such as "what it should be like". In such cases, justifications were grounded in the de-facto situation they perceived in the real society -

especially for items B and D. For example, one respondent answered "Agree" for item B and justified her answer stating that "I don't know of any case where a priest told people what to vote" (woman, 41, cashier). The same issue was observed for item D, where answers were justified by real (rather than hypothetic) examples, such as "Priests are involved as well... but at a high level, that we – ordinary people – don't have access to" (man, 33, doorman) or "I never saw that... they didn't go asking «Why are you giving those people a raise?» or «Why not?»" (woman, 41, cashier).

Item A: Politicians who don´t believe in God are unfit for public office

Respondents who agreed with the item justified their answer by a connection between religion and morality. For example, they argued that "if they don't somehow obey the religious norms... neither do they believe in ethics" (woman, 29 years old, engineer) or "there are some politicians who... they steal and... they should have some belief, some pity, some fear of God" (woman, 41, cashier).

Regarding its reformulation, some respondents only changed only a small part of the phrase, shifting the meaning towards the more general sphere of ethics, replacing "politicians who do not believe in God" with "politicians without moral values" (woman, 29 years old, engineer), while others offered a more personal approach, such as "Before being invested in a position, it would be suitable that a politician know religion" (woman, 49, janitor). Two of the respondents even mentioned – in the case of item A – the fact that the double negation confuses them. One of these two respondents, when asked to reformulate, did so by simply removing the two negations, changing the affirmation to "Only politicians who believe in God should occupy public positions" (man, 56, researcher), whereas other three respondents also reformulated the item by removing the two negations, into "It would be good that politicians believe in God" (woman, 69, retired, former teacher), "All politicians should be religious" (man, 32, teacher) and "Politicians who do not believe in God should occupy public positions" (woman, 24, shop-assistant). However, when asked to reformulate the items, the majority of respondents said that the affirmation was well formulated and that they did not feel it was necessary to change it.

Item B: Religious leaders should not influence people's vote

Five people gave questionnaire answers contrary to their opinions expressed in the interview. For example, one person answered "I don't agree" when told the sentence from the questionnaire, but when asked why he did not agree, he argued that "they have no right to influence people" (man, 60, retired).

Also, the use of the term "to influence" seemed to have two possible meanings for respondents. The first understanding is more general, and relates to principled discussions on choosing a candidate with strong moral values (generally considered a good thing); the second understanding, more specific, involves telling people whom to vote (which was considered a bad thing). One of the persons interviewed also argued that "if they try to influence people only on the basis of Christian principles, that at least has some limits... If they try to influence people not necessarily in the name of principles but in... their own name, then not" (man, 50, programmer).

Item C: It would be better if more people with strong religious beliefs were in public office

The interviews did not reveal any discrepancies between questionnaire answers and respondent's opinion on the matter. Also, none of the subjects thought it was desirable to change the phrasing of the item. However, it should be noted that in several cases the reasons offered for agreeing with the item involved general ethical principles, rather than specific religious doctrine, in that "I suppose that religious people also have moral values and principles they have to obey" (man, 33, teacher).

Item D: Religious leaders should not influence government

Here too, apart from the already mentioned issues related to the negation, the difference between the two meanings of the term "to influence" was brought up by some of the people interviewed. One respondent explained that, in his opinion "Church should not interfere with state affairs... It's true that it can express its opinion concerning certain decisions made by the administration... But I don't know if it would be in the position to actively get involved in these issues" (man, 32, teacher).

Some respondents had difficulties relating to the difference between items B and D, in that the terms "how people vote" and "political decisions" seemed to refer to the same thing and therefore, item D was often regarded as simply re-asking item B. For example, a person – talking about item D – said that his opinion was "the same as for the second question, earlier... They shouldn't, but they should counsel people for what's good" (man, 33, teacher), while another person argued that priests should "make people get closer to God, not to a political party" (woman, 69, retired, former teacher). When asked what he thinks on the matter, one respondent said that "no-one has the right to interfere with a person's options" and reckoned that political decisions refer to "whether or not one votes and for whom one votes" (man, 26, programmer).

For this item, most respondents preserved the negative formulation when rephrasing, and only changed the term "political decisions" into other terms, such as "political sphere of the state" (woman, 56, teacher).

Overview of errors illustrated by cognitive interviews

Overall, items B and D, concerning the influence of religious leaders on government decisions and how people vote, have the highest proportions of inconsistent answers among non-religious people – with the notable exception of item C in Romania. If we accept the assumption that these inconsistencies do not reflect actual opinions, but response errors, then it follows that the two items are rather difficult to answer.

Cognitive interviews are useful to explore and illustrate the sources of this difficulty. Among our 25 subjects, the highest number of errors, defined as answers which did not correctly represent the subjects' opinions, also occured for items B and D. One such source of consists in negative formulations, which, if answered negatively, must rely on double negations to acquire positive meaning. A second source of error resides in the ambiguity of the concept of "influence" – which may be understood as a legitimate process of democratic expression based on principles, or an illegitimate bias in favor of some persons or political parties. This ambiguity is also acknowleged by Müller (2009: 7-8), who writes that:

> While items a and c ask about the (religious) criterions for the selection of politicians, items b and d ask about the influence that religious leaders should exert on the political process (cf. Carlson & Listhaug 2006). Another interpretation would also be possible: the two first mentioned items represent attitudes towards a legitimate representation of religious interests, whereas the last two items represent a more illegitimate form of exerting influence in the political sphere. In order to reduce complexity and validate the claim of two different dimensions, a factor-analysis has been undertaken (results not shown). Clearly the two hypothesized dimensions emerge (...).

Still, factor analysis cannot in itself validate the two items in relation to their purpose, since it is not clear what they measure. This may be a cause for the low explanatory power of micro- and macro-variables in models that account for the influence of priests, in comparison with models that account for the importance of religiosity in politics (items A and item C) (see Müller, 2009: 16).

Separation of Church and State in Romania

We will review secularity in present-day Romania by starting with a discussion of the public debates on the separation of church and state. We interpret the conclusions of these controversies as indicators of low and maybe even decreasing secularity at institutional level. We then discuss quantitative indicators from the European Value Survey 1999 and the World Value Survey 2005, as aggregate indicators for public opinion on political secularity.

Secularity in public debates

Recent public debates reveal a strengthening of institutional connections between the Christian Orthodox Church and the public sphere. For example, in the context of discussions taking place about whether or not the state should accept civil marriages or unions for persons of the same sex, the Romanian Parliament adopted on the 4th of February 2008 a change in the Family Code. The change, put forward by the "Greater Romania" nationalist party (PRM), comes as a precaution against possible claims of homosexual couples. The Family Code stated, in its former phase, that the family is based on the consented marriage of the spouses. The new form explicitly mentions "the marriage between a man and a woman", thus excluding any interpretation which might give homosexual couples the right to civil marriage. Moreover, the Parliament defended the decision by invoking the Holy Scriptures and the "Christian values of the Romanian people" (Duca, 2008).

Another example refers to the construction of a monumental cathedral for the salvation of the Romanian people. The decision of erecting the cathedral was adopted by a governmental decree – which allocated land and money from the state budget – in 1999; the initial plan involved building it in the center of the capital (Cernea 2008 - interview). Due to the proximity of the Dâmboviţa river and the subway, the location was changed several times, also by governmental decrees. While the initial Governmental Ordinance OUG 19/ March 17, 2005 stipulated that the Cathedral will be financed by the Orthodox Patriarchy, the Parliament has subsequently adopted the Law 376 / December 28, 2007 which stipulates that the cathedral will be funded by the Patriarchy, by the Government, and by local public administration. Governmental funds for the Cathedral are to be specified in the national budget of the Ministry of Culture and Cults. The Patriarchy estimates the total cost of the Cathedral at 400 million Euro (Manoliu, 2009).

The presence of religion classes in school has also been disputed in recent years. In 1995, the Law of Education (subsequently revised in 1999), stated that Religion was compulsory for children in primary school, optional for children in secondary school and facultative for those in high school. However, given that the original law was declared unconstitutional by the High Court in 1995, the law was modified, and the current form states that Religion is included as a subject for all classes, including high-school, and that the pupil, with the agreement of the legal tutor, chooses the religion and denomination. Nevertheless, the pupil can choose not to take part in Religion classes, if the legal tutor solicits it in writing (Parlamentul României, 1999). The same provisions are stipulated in the new project for the Law of National Education (Ministerul Educaţiei, Cercetării şi Inovării, 2009).

Another public debate on the relationship between religion and the public sphere concerns the widespread practice of displaying Christian icons on the classroom walls. This custom has begun in the first decade after 1989

and has extended to most schools in the country in the past few years. This practice has not been mandated by the Church or by Government, and this is the main argument used in its favor by representatives of clergy: "We know that the presence of the icon is beneficial. The re-entering of icons in schools after 1989 was a natural one, not a legislative one", declared priest V. Gavrilă, representative of the university parish "Sfântul Nicolae" (Ion, 2007).

However, in 2006 debates on the subject became more visible as a teacher from Buzău, E. Moise, registered a complaint with the National Council against Discrimination (CNCD), arguing that this practice contradicted constitutional rights. After deliberation, CNCD issued the Decision 323/2006, with a recommendation for the Ministry of Education asking for the removal of icons from classrooms, with the exception of religion classes and spaces designed exclusively for religious study. The Ministry of Education and the Pro-Vita Association for the born and unborn first attacked in court the decision of the CNCD and lost in the Appellate court level. The judges argued that the state, according to the Romanian Constitution, must respect parents' right to educate their children according to their religious beliefs and the "unlimited and unregulated exposure of icons in schools injures this very option of parents" for it "suggests which is the option to be followed, which is taken on, favored in this way, indirectly, by the state" (Andreescu, 2008: 59).

As a result of the negative output of their demarche, the Pro-Vita Association pursued the court trial to the High Court, arguing that "to be Christian is primarily to be human. To be human is to be Christian. Humanity is not annulled by Christianity (manifested also by exposing icons in various places), but is transfigured by it, it is lifted to the rank of holiness, of Godliness" and that "a cause, especially like this particular one, should also be analyzed from the perspective of Christian conscience and that of human conscience in general" (Andreescu, 2008: 56). The arguments were convincing enough to the High Court and Pro-Vita's plea was sustained by a decision passed on the 11th of June 2008, and reconfirmed in May 2009 (Ziua Online, 2009).

Secularity in numbers

An observer of the consecutive victories that the religious agenda has attained in recent public controversies could assume that the Romanian public opinion opposes separation of Church and State. Still, at popular and institutional level, there has been a systematic hesitation concerning the direct involvement of Orthodox priests in politics. The Orthodox Church position itself has been oscillating: in 1996 the Synode postulated the political neutrality of priests; in 2000 priests were allowed to run for office, but the Synod of February 2004 stated that priesthood and political office are incompatible (Preda, 2008). Finally, in March 2008 the Orthodox Synod has allowed priests

to run for office, within several constraints: they has to obtain prior approval from the Church, they had to run as independents, and they could only occupy the position of local or county councilor, without the possibility of becoming Mayor or Member of Parliament.

The decision has been debated, and challenged by prominent Orthodox public figures, such as Radu Preda (2008) or Horia Roman Patapievici (in Blagu, 2008). After elections, out of the 40 Orthodox priests that run for office in June 2008, 22 have become local councilors – a proportion similar to those of Reformat priests (24 elected out of 50 candidates), who have a tradition of involvement in local administration in Romania (Biro, 2008).

Still, survey data lead to a surprising observation: a majority of Romanian respondents consistently oppose the influence of priests on voting or public policy. In Table 5 we can see that around three quarters of Romanian respondents agree with the statements that "religious leaders should not influence people vote" and "religious leaders should not influence government". A similar proportion asserted in the Extremism 2003 survey that "priests should not run for office". This public opinion comes in sharp contrast with the comparatively low proportions of people who consider that they are not religious or are convinced atheists, and people who attend church rarely or not at all. A similar situation has been noted in Pakistan (Tanwir, 2002). At the same time, indicators A and C show that religious principles are better received in Romanian politics than priests, at least according to public opinion surveys.

Table 5.

Indicators of secularity and religiosity in the EVS 1999, WVS 2005 and Extremism 2003. The table includes the proportion of answers reflecting a secular / non-religious viewpoint

Indicator	Answer (%)	RO	RO	RO	IT	ES	SE	FI	PL	BG
		EVS 1999	Extre-mism 2003[8]	WVS 2005	WVS 2005	WVS 2005	WVS 2005	WVS 2005	WVS 2005	WVS 2005
A. Politicians who don´t believe in God unfit for public office	Disagrees or neither	22	*(43)*	51	87	89	97	90	83	72
B. Religious leaders should not influence people vote	Agrees	78	*(85)*	73	71	74	81	70	83	83
C. Better if more people with strong religious beliefs	Disagrees or neither	35	*(23)*	39	82	87	95	88	71	73

[8] The indicators concerning separation of church and politics have a 5 point scale in the EVS 1999 and WVS 2005 but a 4 point scale in Extremism 2003.

Indicator	Answer (%)	RO	RO	RO	IT	ES	SE	FI	PL	BG
D. Religious leaders should not influence government	Agrees	78		76	70	73	76	64	79	77
E. Priests should not run for office	Agrees		*(72*)							
Churches give answers: the social problems	No	48		55	50	76	80	62	54	82
The state should fund the Church	Agrees		84							
All children should learn religion in school	Agrees		90							
The respondent is…	Not a religious person	14		6	9	47	49	36	4	31
(the difference to 100% represents the proportion of religious persons)	A convinced atheist	1		1	3	7	17	3	2	5
How often do you attend religious services	Once a year, less often or not at all	17	21	23	21	63	83	62	11	44

Source: Author's calculations. Data indicate valid percentages from national samples for the respective answers.

How can we account for this discrepancy, in particular to the strong opposition to priests' involvement in politics? Voicu (2001) analyzes the EVS 1999 data and concludes that "the public space, in particular the political space, has become secularized, separated from religion, as a consequence of modernization and the communist regime policy" (Voicu 2001: 88). The question remains, though, why did modernization and the communist policy of official atheism influence only opinions concerning separation of church from politics, while allowing for a clear rejection of secularity in other domains. For example, the Extremism 2003 survey indicates that 84% of Romanian respondents agree that the State should fund the Church, and 90% agree that all children should learn religion in school.

A possible explanation, suggested by arguments from the 2008 public debates around the involvement of priests in politics, is that at least part of its rejection is grounded on the experiences of postcommunist Romanian politics. For example, Patapievici (in Blagu 2008, paragraph 21) argues that the political fight…

> involves in our society a decrease of the level of personal dignity in the public space. The political class is depreciated in our eyes because it is engaged in a certain type of politics which decreased the human value of a person.

In a similar vein, Preda (2008) writes that:

> In a country in which trade union leaders become allies with employers' associations which, in turn, provide ministers for the Government, the local councillor-priest does nothing less than to legitimate a political system and a politicianist practice, while all common sense people hope to witness their change – also by the prophetic voice of a Church which stays free of ideological contracts and political servitutes.

Overall, it seems that rejection of religious involvement in politics is also meant to protect the autonomy and dignity of the religious sphere, not only to ensure the autonomy of the political sphere against religious interference. Hypothetically, we can identify two different patterns of secular reasoning that account for the high proportion of people who dissaprove of priests' involvement in politics. On one hand, some respondents, presumably including the non-religious ones, argue against the presence of religious arguments in politics; on the other hand, other respondents, especially religious people, argue against a contamination of religiosity by politicianism.

Conclusions

An overview of Romanian debates on secularity and of aggregate public opinion indicators indicates that a clear rejection of priests' involvement in politics may co-exist with a general positive appreciation of the role of religion in the public sphere. This observation supports the general conclusion of Müller (2009) concerning the low variability of public opinion concerning the influence of religious leaders in politics. In brief, it seems that debates on the political involvement of religious leaders in politics are a distinctive and rather independent sub-dimension of debates concerning the influence of religion in the public sphere. Therefore, information on this topic alone is not sufficient to understand the broader configuration of public opinion on secularity issues: disapproval of politician priests may occur in highly secular societies and in highly religious ones as well.

There are also several methodological reasons for caution. On one hand, the negative formulation of items requires respondents to formulate a double negation in order to express support for religious leaders' involvement in politics. This may account for the relatively high proportion of incongruent answer patterns among non-religious respondents. On the other hand, the concept of "influence" is ambiguous, insofar it may connote illegitimate means for attaining an objective. This ambiguity is reflected by our cognitive interviews, and it is also briefly discussed by Müller (2009).

Therefore, for substantial and methodological reasons as well, it would be useful to include in large comparative surveys dedicated to the study of religiosity several indicators to study secularity. Focusing on political secularity only, and in particular focusing on the two items on religious leaders, may lead to an over-estimate of secularity in public opinion in religious societies, and to an under-estimate in the variability of secularity as a function of social context. As our literature review indicates, secularity may be measured across different levels and different dimensions. Current comparative research risks to be overly focused on the definition of secularity as non-religiosity, and on the very specific issue of religion in electoral politics, instead of understanding various processes and patterns of secularization across different societies.

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A SPIRITUAL AMUSEMENT VILLAGE: MANUFACTURING DIFFERENCE IN THE WALLACHIAN COUNTRYSIDE

ALICE FORBESS[1]

ABSTRACT. This paper[2] presents an enthnographic snapshot of the religious field in the Wallachian countryside at the turn of the millennium. It examines how three local groups, Romanian villagers, Orthodox nuns and Rudari villagers made use of fields of social action newly opened by the collapse of socialism, such as democratic politics and religious devotion, to gain access to power and economic resources during a period characterised by accelerated social differentiation. It is argued that issues of morality and social justice, economic interests and cosmic concerns became inextricably interwoven as rights and entitlements were claimed and contested on the basis of both historical 'evidence' and religious notions and practices, with the latter often being used to offset the unreliability of the former. As the three groups grew apart under the new economic and political conditions, the interplay of memory and amnesia, interwoven official and alternative local histories and a newly found Orthodox religiosity became the tools of choice for articulating difference.

Keywords: Eastern Orthodox Christianity, memory, history, post-socialism.

One summer evening in 1997, an elderly retired geologist from Mihăileşti had a vision:

> Myself, my wife, Helmut Kohl and Princess Diana were standing on a tall precipice which was called the Golgotha of Zoreni. Far below us, in the abyss, a great crowd wailed in terror. The Virgin Mary appeared in the sky and asked us to tell them they must try to save their souls (*să se mântuiască*). We began to throw icons with the face of the Virgin and the Saviour to them.

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It inspired his conception of a grandiose project to transform a large part of the village Mihăileşti into an amusement park called "the Holy Place, the Village of Faith, Love and Liberty, Zoreni-Mihăileşti[3]". Located near the Zoreni convent, a UNESCO world heritage monument which attracts large numbers of tourists, the Holy Village would be a place of pilgrimage for cultural tourists and devout Christians. It would contain the reconstructed sites of historical events linking Mihăileşti to the history of the Romanian nation and of the world. Upon entering, one would see the Berlin Wall being broken down by a Helmut Kohl mechanical puppet with a drill, whilst Gorbachev stepped through the break from the other side "for the salvation of this mad world". There would be a replica of the Istanbul palace where the Sainted Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu had been tortured and executed along with his sons, and of the Bosporus strait, where their bodies were disposed of. The park would offer tourists spiritual and physical healing at a spa with six mineral springs, one for each Brâncoveanu saint. There would be a chance to be baptised by someone dressed as St John the Baptist, monastic cells for meditation, sheepfolds, tents, as well as five star hotels, an airport and helipad, and access to the nearest mountain by cable car.

At the centre of the park, the 'Holy Place' would contain a pantheon of heroes, with the statues of Princess Diana, Mother Theresa, Pope John Paul II, King Ferdinand of Romania, Patriarch Justinian (the leader of the Church during the communist takeover), Zoreni Convent's former abbess Furmentia, Mr. Florescu's father (formerly a mayor of the village), and I. G. Duca, a former prime minister born in a nearby locality who was assassinated by the fascists in 1939. Further up, on a mountain called the Golgotha of Zoreni, Mr. and Mrs. Florescu, Helmut Kohl and Princess Diana (the four visionaries) would be buried in a mausoleum with eternal flame. The village was also to contain the "Angels of Timişoara Cemetery" (for the dead of the Timisoara uprising, which started the Romanian revolution), and another cemetery of the "unknown heroes of every nationality: Romanian, Jewish, American, English, Polish, Hungarian and Russian", reburied here "to save them from being defiled by their murderers". Why, I wondered, did his redemptive fantasy take this particular form – of a yearning to transform an idyllic village into a post-socialist Hades filled with bodies of martyrs?

Mr. Florescu saw his project as not just a tourist attraction but also a means of spiritual and physical healing, of bringing peace to both the living and the dead. It involved a re-appropriation of religious faith and the inscription into the landscape of formerly hidden, unauthorised histories, so

[3] The names of places in the immediate research area, and those of informants, are pseudonyms.

that they could never be forgotten again. In her book *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies* (1999), Katherine Verdery observes that, in the post-socialist reconfiguration of spatio-temporal orders, the 'peripatetic dead', the bodies or statues of heroes, became a preferred form of political and symbolic currency in the contestation taking place among the living. The public reburial of dead heroes stands for their incorporation into a common genealogy—they become 'ours'. Such claims index not only inclusion, but also exclusion, and Mr. Florescu's choice of heroes involved a rewriting of history that excised the communist period, joining the pre-communist era directly to the post-communist. Mr. Florescu saw himself as a link between Mihăileşti's pre-communist past and the present. He was heir to a formerly prominent village family and his father, a schoolteacher, had been village mayor for over 25 years in the 1920's and 30's. At that time the Zoreni convent was often visited by Romania's royal family, and Mr. Florescu claimed to have "grown up playing with Prince Michael", the heir to the throne. When an elderly king Michael visited Zoreni in the 1990's, he was seen by the whole village walking arm in arm with Mr. Florescu on the main street. Mr. Florescu's claim to legitimacy as the person most qualified to restore the village to its former glory rested on this connection to the country's pre-communist elites.

As it is often the case with novice anthropologists and their first informants, I soon learnt just how eccentric Mr. Florescu could be. He promised to make me Vice-Chancellor of his project (the Chancellor being presumably Helmut Kohl) provided I could persuade Tony Blair to buy the Florescu's half-finished chalet, on sale owing to a bankruptcy brought on by other grandiose projects. He also demanded I keep his plans secret, since the former "Securitate" (socialist Secret Police) sought to frustrate his quest to reveal the truth by undermining his health, having already caused him to have surgery six times. Although extravagant, Mr. Florescu's ideas were not particularly idiosyncratic. In the wake of socialism, themes such as the need to rediscover historical truth, rehabilitate heroes and other wronged dead, and bring about religious revival and healing pervaded public discourse and media debates, whilst politicians constantly relied on highly-charged historical and religious symbolism to shore up their image and discredit opponents. Like the madman from the Comaroffs' *The madman and the migrant* (1987), Mr. Florescu had created a bricolage of salient themes, and his fantasies pointed to areas of anxiety and contestation in post-socialist Romania.

This paper is based on two years of field research (2000-2002) which investigated the strategic exercise of political and religious agency in the Romanian Orthodox convent of Zoreni and its environs. The methodology included participant observation carried out both inside the convent and in neighbouring settlements, structured and unstructured interviews, the collection

of life histories and media and literature surveys. The Mihăileşti river valley is inhabited by three groups that see themselves as distinct: Romanian villagers, Rudari traders and craftsmen and the nuns of Zoreni convent. During socialism, the convent remained open and was allowed to function with a reduced staff. Whilst in 1963 there were only ten nuns (the rest were ejected by a state decree) the present population numbers sixty. Owing to the hilly landscape, which made automated agriculture impractical, the area was not collectivised, and villagers were allowed to retain and work small plots of land. Most Romanians combined jobs in the local industry (which included manufacturing, mining, logging and quarrying stone) with subsistence agriculture, and were reasonably well-off at the end of socialism, whilst the Rudari, banned by the state from trading, fared less well. In the first post-socialist decade, the region was officially declared 'disadvantaged' owing to the closure of most local industry.

Symbolic Politics

The plan for the symbolic village had been inspired by an important political and religious event that took place at the Zoreni convent in 1992—the sanctification of the founder of the convent, the 17th century prince Constantin Brâncoveanu, as a martyr for the nation and faith. This event was attended by top-ranking religious and political figures, including president Iliescu, a Moscow-trained former communist who had publicly embraced Orthodoxy. He was not the only politician to seize upon the symbolic value of religious patronage, and during the 1990's the electoral strategies of rival party leaders were frequently reflected in their choices of religious settings for celebrating important holy days. Thus, in the summer of 2000, Iliescu celebrated the Assumption of the Virgin Mary at Zoreni, "quietly, and avoiding political statements" (i.e. in ascetic retreat reflecting his devotion) while the Prime Minister Isărescu spent the day dedicating a new road leading to the convent Ţigănesti, and Iliescu's political rival, Petre Roman, went to the monastery *he* habitually patronised, Nicula, in Transylvania, to worship more publicly, alongside 200000 faithful, who had been there for three days (Dumitru, 2000).

The sanctification made prince Brâncoveanu an obvious source of symbolic and political capital, and voices were soon raised demanding the reburial of his bones at the Zoreni convent, his intended final resting place, where his empty tomb stands inside the main church. Politicians and other public figures' interest in historical symbols was perhaps linked to the desire to regain a measure of control over the past, since the disintegration of the 'official line' on historical matters had exposed the subjective, corruptible and

contestable character of historical memory. "If everyone already knows that history can be manipulated, then how can the authorities produce a truth effect? Dead bodies are particularly helpful in resolving this problem" (Verdery, 1999: 113). Symbolic politics often relied on powerful analogies between the relics of saints and bones of national heroes. "Like saints, ancestors engage deep feeling when their biographies can be cast in that most common of all nationalist tropes: suffering. The revival of religion has intensified this imagery" (Verdery, 1999: 114). As the mayor of Zoreni wrote in his preface to a tome on local history, "our land is sacred through the bones of the ancestors, through the blood of heroes, through the sweat of those who have given life, colour and beauty to the clay" (in Tamaş, 1995, author's translation).

Such rhetorical habits were a legacy of the Ceausescu era when (Verdery, 1991) economic problems were tackled mainly via a tightening of control over symbolic production. Using the symbolism of Romania's struggle for national independence, Ceausescu argued that the country was besieged by expansionist empires with designs on its resources. As a result, history became a key source of metaphors for interpreting the present and the main basis for legitimising the authorities' decisions. Politicians who owed their professional formation to this period remained heavily reliant on a symbolic style of politics, despite the fact that it seemed to garner little legitimacy, and was derided by voters for whom it acted as a reminder of the glaring discrepancies between the bizarrely optimistic official discourse and the grim realities of everyday life under socialism. For instance, discussing the mayor's campaign to bring Brâncoveanu's remains back to Zoreni, one informant was reminded of a socialist era joke: Khrushchev is trying to dispose of the body of Stalin, which is now an embarrassment, but the leaders of all nations refuse to offer a resting place and only Israel volunteers, but Khrushchev replies horrified: 'No, *you* can't have him! You already had another one who rose from the dead!'

Opinions about Mr. Florescu's idea of the Holy Village were divided. Some of his neighbours thought him crazy, and one woman entreated, "don't write what that guy says, he'll make us the laughing stock of strangers!" The project was considered impractical (not least because it would be located on land on which various people had their homes) and did not proceed beyond the stage of a document adorned with an impressive array of stamps and signatures of 'experts'. Yet, surprisingly, he was not unanimously dismissed as a madman. Some even saw him as an authority on local history and traditions, insisting he was the ideal person to provide information for my study. I was surprised to discover that few villagers remembered the history of local landmarks or events prior to the 1950's. On such topics, I was referred to 'official' sources, including local intellectuals like Mr. Florescu. Thus, although history was a key source of legitimacy for various local projects, local

knowledge of the past seemed quite limited. This ignorance was linked to the accelerated social changes and dislocations of the socialist period. Women were more inclined than men to remember and recount local history and genealogies, but the village's exogamous marriage pattern and the fact that during socialism men tended to take wives from other regions of the country (met through work or education), rather than from neighbouring villages, meant that nowadays women knew relatively little of Mihăileşti.

Interestingly at the convent, which seemed steeped in history, direct knowledge of the past proved equally elusive. Since historical value was central to legitimising the convent's importance, I had expected nuns to take pride and interest in their establishment's history, but their knowledge of this subject turned out to be quite selective, and based mostly on 'official' sources. Most of the current nuns had joined after 1980 and like the village women, came from other parts of the country. Before socialism, the monastic community (*obşte*) had strong local roots, but it was disbanded by a socialist decree in the 1960s (only ten nuns were allowed to stay). Some elderly nuns had returned, but younger recruits seemed uninterested in their stories. Mother Eftimia, who had been in the convent for 80 years (having joined at the age of two, when she was given as a 'gift' to the convent by her parents) was particularly bitter:

> nobody knows anything any more. Ask them (the nuns)—they've made a historical introduction for tourists that makes me cross myself when I hear it. Nobody asks us any more, neither of the past, nor of the present. The present, we go along with it, stumbling, either it comes towards us, or it surpasses us; this is how we walk, as if we were blind, in today's life.

If earlier generations' knowledge of the local past seemed to have been largely lost in the upheaval of socialist times, it was now being re-invented. Post-socialist policies reified the past as a basis for economic and political claims, and local anxieties were frequently expressed and legitimated in terms of re-imagined pasts and restorations of a previous 'true' order.

Dracula in Mihăileşti

The idea of turning one's village into a theme park may seem odd, but in Romania, at that time, it made a certain amount of sense. The need to attract international tourism, important not just for the economy, but also as a means of persuading the civilised world to include the country in its fold, was a constant topic of discussion. How should heritage be packaged so as to make it attractive to foreigners? Whilst some favoured an emphasis on tasteful cultural heritage, others favoured the strategy of appealing to Western clichés about Romania such as the Dracula myth. Transylvanian towns were already

emphasizing supposed connections to Vlad the Impaler, and the Prime Minister had invested in an ambitious plan for a massive Dracula Park, the Balkan answer to Disneyland. Interestingly, this amusement park bore remarkable parallels to Mr. Florescu's (which pre-dated it). Innovatively, its appeal was to be widened by incorporating an extensive 'Vlad the Impaler' health spa, attracting both the thrill-seekers and the health conscious. Capitalising on historical heritage, the park was to be located near Sighişoara fortress, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and Vlad's alleged birth place. Living in the shadow of Zoreni convent, another UNESCO monument, the villagers were keenly interested in these deliberations. Their problem was how to benefit from the influx of tourists visiting the convent despite the fact that this establishment ran a guesthouse and catered to visitors' every need, preventing them from straying into the village.

In August 1999 the last full solar eclipse of the millennium reached its apex directly over this region, focusing the world's attention upon it. Mihăileşti's scenic setting and proximity to Zoreni meant eclipse watchers from as far as the U.S. and Japan congregated here, paying exorbitant prices for accommodation and giving villagers a tantalising foretaste of prosperous possibilities. A German eclipse watcher even spent the whole summer in the village, claiming to study the impact of astral events on people's behaviour, and his strange questions and long walks through the countryside gave rise to suspicions that the Germans had sent him as a spy to look for something hidden nearby, possibly mineral wealth. Many people signed up with the local tourist accommodation office, some even building guesthouses which remained empty in subsequent years. On summer days, large coaches and expensive cars drove up to the convent daily, to the frustration of villagers. The sanctification of Brâncoveanu had raised the convent's profile, but the nuns monopolised this symbolic power for their own use.

Mr. Florescu's plan to link Mihăileşti with the Brâncoveanu saints made the villagers aware of the need to stress Mihăileşti's historical assets if they wished to attract tourists. He also revived a local legend according to which Dracula had passed through Mihăileşti, inspired by a 15th century property deed issued by Vlad the Monk, a brother of Vlad the Impaler, which confirms ownership of the village to a man called Roman and acknowledges receipt of a horse, a customary property tax (Stahl, 1980). A local schoolteacher from the 1920's romanticised this story, telling pupils that Vlad the Impaler had passed through the village on his way to reclaim the Wallachian throne after his imprisonment in Transylvania, and that when his exhausted horse collapsed, Roman gave him a beautiful white horse, receiving the village as a reward (Vameşu, 1972: 56). Now, another village retiree, Mr. Vadu, conceived a plan to rebuild the ruined St. John hermitage at the northernmost end of the village, arguing that this was the site of the meeting between Dracula and

Roman. The fact that it was available for appropriation by various groups competing over the reconfiguration of the spatial order of the village made this ruin far more significant than the two functioning hermitages owned by the convent. Since none of the main actors knew much about its history, it became a blank canvas upon which different local groups projected their own stories.

Hazy Histories

Mother Eftimia had been told by her aunts, also nuns, that the hermitage was destroyed more than a century previously by a flood lasting 40 days and 40 nights. Although only the foundations remained, people felt the site was still sacred by virtue of its earlier consecration. Mother Eftimia told me how she had, on one occasion, defended herself from the devil (in the form of a pig) with a sliver of stone from these foundations, and people took such stones for good luck. Its sacred status made the hermitage a catalyst for latent tensions between the nuns, Rudari and Romanians. Controversy arose when a poor family of Rudari built their house near the hermitage. Since then, they had been afflicted by misfortune and narrowly escaped death. As Mother Eftimia told me,

> their kitchen burnt down, their car burnt down, their barn, everything they'd earned and saved up, they barely managed to rescue the little children. And more will happen… But they should have known better than to build a home there, because in that place there used to be an altar, *an altar of sacrifice*!

In her view, settling near the site was not only disrespectful, but also dangerous, and she repeatedly complained in writing to the mayor about his failure to prevent it: "You see, if the mayor did not take any action to stop it, this man Vadu 'elected' himself responsible for rebuilding the hermitage". Significantly, reinstating the hermitage according to Vadu's plan would serve to mark out the territory as belonging to the Romanians, a reminder that they had been first on the land on which the Rudari were now settled. This was the tip of an iceberg of anxieties about the rapid growth of the Rudari population, and spread of their village on land of uncertain ownership. While the Rudari worried about the convent, Romanians worried about the Rudari, noting anxiously the spread of their village and growth of its population. As one man told me:

> I have moved down here [at the lower end of the village] because the further up the road [towards Rizeşti] you live, the more people assume you are a Rudar. People who live in the town of Zoreni say that those in Lower Mihăileşti are Rudari, those from Lower Mihăileşti say the same about the inhabitants of Upper Mihăileşti, who say only those from Rizeşti are Rudari.

According to Marushiakova and Popov (2001: 84) the word 'Rudar' comes from the Slavonic word for 'mine', and the Rudari are a Roma clan who were originally gold miners in Transylvania, turning to wood crafts and trade after the gold mines were exhausted in the 19th century (Marushiakova and Popov, 2001). The Rudari of Mihăileşti do not speak Romani, are largely Orthodox (some families were recently converted by neoprotestant churches) and declare themselves Romanian on census surveys. Mr. Popescu, a schoolmaster from Upper Mihăileşti, claimed the Rudari had settled here after the Second World War, when the socialist administration needed labourers willing to take on physically-demanding work in logging and allocated land to those who settled. The Rudari also engaged in trade, buying up Romanians' surplus of fruit and walnuts and bartering it in the plains area for grain which was later sold for cash to the nuns and Romanians. The socialist administration tried to curtail such trade, confiscating the Rudari's horses, but I was told that the enforcement of this prohibition relaxed in the in the late 1970s and 1980s, when local policemen began accepting a cut of the profits to look the other way.

Moş Corbu, a shepherd who had worked closely with the Rudari elders told me that "those Rizeşti Rudari have come from the Bug [river, in the Ukraine]. Antonescu sent them there to conquer Russia all by themselves. They don't talk about it, but if you ask them 'do you remember your father was at the Bug?', some of them know. The young ones don't know it, though". Moş Corbu was referring to the deportation of the Roma and other minorities to the Ukraine by the pro-fascist wartime government of Marechal Antonescu (Crowe, 1994: 134-5). If anyone in Rizeşti had memories of this deportation, I did not find them. The Rudari's reluctance to recount the more distant past made them an enigmatic blank screen on which people could project their prejudices and fantasies.

Eager to refute the idea that the Rudari were of Roma origin, the local authorities pointed out that only three families had declared themselves Roma at the 1992 census. He claimed the Rudari were descendants of the Dacian tribes conquered by the Romans in 105 AD (viewed as the hallowed ancestors of the Romanian people). The mayor's secretary argued they were different because they were unspoiled by modernity: "they used to live in remote valleys and you can see they kept the old Dacian traditions, their costume, their accent, their crafts... It's just that they have this disorderly way of life, multiply fast and don't tend to get legally married". When asked directly, locals also insisted the Rudari were Romanians, not Roma, but at times contradicted this assertion with statements like "oh, that Rudar, no matter how he lives or what he does, the Gypsy will always show up in him!"

In line with an ideological position promoted during socialism (Pons, 1999), the mayor's secretary argued in the following exchange with Moş Corbu, that "lifestyle" rather than blood was the key factor in determining what the Rudari were:

> Secretary: Rudari are something totally different [than Roma], they don't have a language, only a different accent.
> Moş Corbu: Yes see, they don't know another language like the *laieti* [nomadic] gypsies, those ones know another language, Hungarian!
> Secretary: Well, those are Hungarian gypsies, yeah, they had to learn Hungarian… These [Rudari] never have and never do declare themselves Gypsy, not even in their documents or the census. And they aren't gypsy, I don't consider them Gypsy. […] They don't even behave like Gypsies, they don't have Gypsy traditions, to sell their daughters. And they aren't musicians, they don't sing!
> Moş Corbu*:* But those Rudari from Mihăileşti have come from the Bug. Antonescu gathered *the gypsies* and sent them there…
> Secretary: The Gypsies yes, but not the Rudari—let's not confuse them
> Moş Corbu: For example, now it seems they call them all Roma
> Secretary: The hell with the Roma, now they've eternalised themselves!
> Moş Corbu: Still, for example in the past, if he was a Gypsy, they used to say, look, this guy's a Gypsy. Even if he was 'Romanianised' [settled and behaving like a Romanian] they would still remember it.

The recent tensions between the Romanians, Rudari and nuns were linked to the post-socialist government's plan for the restitution of land to pre-communist owners. The convent was eligible to reclaim most of the Rudari's land, and that of some Romanians, who feared they would be "put out of their homes". The nuns insisted they did not want this land as they could not 'guard' it (*n-o putem păzi*) and feared conflict with the locals. They pointed to a break-in at one of their hermitages by Rudari youths, to the fact that they openly took fruit from their orchards and harassed visitors. Mother Eftimia complained:

> Today there were eleven little beggars. No use talking nicely to them. One went near the monument [dedicated to the fallen heroes of the First World War] and took a shit. I told them nicely not to do that, and they spat on me, on my clothes. I wrote to the police and said I would pay for their petrol if they came up here to deal with the problem. I am upset with the police. 'You've let things disintegrate', I wrote to them.

Once, the nuns persuaded the police to set up a roadblock at the convent's gates, and a nun chased the Rudari children cross-country in the convent's jeep. On another occasion, Rudari youth threatened a nun taking the convent's cows to pastures near their village. "[They] threw rocks at her and hit a cow on the head with a wooden stick. They were yelling that the convent is rightfully theirs, that it was built by the hands of Gypsy slaves" Eftimia told me. Such tensions are not new, and historical records show the nuns also faced considerable difficulty in keeping the Romanian villagers off their lands. At the turn of the 20th century, one determined administrator, the daughter of a general, carried a rifle loaded with salt pellets stuck in her belt, and shot intruders in the legs.

On another occasion, I heard Floarea, a Rudar woman, ask Eftimia: "by the way, were you a nun when the convent was up the valley, [at the hermitage], in our Mihăileşti, the Rudari's?". This version of history reconfigured space, assigning 'the Rudari's Mihăileşti' a central rather than marginal position. Whilst the Romanian villagers saw the St. John hermitage as marking their original claim to the land (they pointed out that the hermitage *pre-dated* the convent), the Rudari reinterpreted it as proof that the convent had first been located on *their* land. Gypsy slavery, abolished in 1856 (Crowe, 1994: 107-127), was the basis for the claim that the convent belonged rightfully to the Rudari, and the argument that their ancestors had built it. This idea had gained currency since the institution in a neighbouring village of an annual Gypsy fair, an important occasion that brought together powerful Roma families, showcased Roma culture and attracted important political guests. As the Rudari's identity was becoming politicised, they began to identify with a group that had settled in the village around 1856 - the convent's Roma slaves (*robi*). Their descendants were considered Romanian and could be distinguished only by names like Dezrobitu, literally meaning "freed slave". Yet, faint echoes of their Roma origins persisted in the name of the street on which they lived - Neagota, derived from 'negote', a term roughly similar to 'nigger' - and a reputation for involvement in black magic.

Whether thought to be Roma or not, the Rudari were unanimously considered different and assumed to be in an economically inferior position. Their main characteristics as cited by Romanian informants were poverty, lack of education, numerous children, few legal marriages. Well-off Romanian families and the nuns often hired Rudari women as day labourers, and saw this as doing them a favour. However, this situation was changing, and the Rudari were in fact quickly becoming more economically successful than the Romanians in the new market economy. During socialism, Romanian villagers had been well-off by national standards, combining wages from regular jobs in local factories with subsistence agriculture (the area was not collectivised). Economic well-being had accelerated urbanisation. Contrastingly, the Rudari

population, initially very poor, had remained almost entirely rural. The retention of this rural economic base led to anxieties, in post-socialist times, regarding the growth of the Rudari population, vis-à-vis the decline of the Romanian (most of the younger members of Romanian families had moved to towns). While the Romanians found it difficult to make ends meet without their local jobs, the Rudari were taking advantage of an intensification of trade and demand for the furniture they manufactured. This economic growth, rather than a population explosion, was arguably the reason behind the spread of their village, as successful individuals built new, bigger houses. Significantly however, until I visited Rizeşti, I did not hear anything about the well-to-do Rudari. The poor minority were spoken of as representative of the whole group. When Romanian villagers attempted to engage in trade, they felt out of their depth, and some regarded the Rudari's commercial skills and enterprise with envy, accusing them of unscrupulous economic practices. These resentments found expression in the context of local ritual life, as efforts were made to exclude, or at least limit the Rudari's participation in the rituals held by the Mihăileşteni.

Separating the dead

If villagers like Mr. Vadu wanted to rebuild the St. John hermitage for its historical value, the priest from Mihăileşti wanted it to serve as a separate chapel for the Rudari, with a cemetery for their own dead, so that they would have less excuse to attend village feasts elsewhere. As a guest at saints' day feasts in Upper and Lower Mihăileşti, I was surprised by the local priest's open display of animosity against the Rudari. "Did you notice that here the Rudari do not sit at the same table with the Romanians?" said one man, noting approvingly that the Rudari who did not find a place at their separate table were made to wait standing until one was vacated.

> This priest here knows how to handle them, in Lower Mihăileşti they take the places of the Romanians at the table! And at Father Vintilă's [in another village] it's downright *bulibaşală* [Gypsy-style], it's terrible, they take the food from your table, they assault you and crowd you out. Father Vintilă is their *bulibaşa'* [Gypsy big man], their Bishop!

Another priest replied:

> In my village [Bogdăneşti] it's nice and orderly. This year on the Saturday of the dead I made two of my men stand guard at the cemetery gates like the Archangel Michael, and bar the Rudari from entering. I made them wait in the courtyard. When we finished the blessings, each [Romanian] took their basket and went in the courtyard to hand out the food [alms which are given out in memory of the dead].

The wife of the Mihăileşti priest chimed in:

> I can't stand them, I can't… at the *parastas* [remembrance ritual for the dead], it drives me mad when they come and grab the *pomană*' [alms] from your hand just like that! They walk on the graves, and when you refuse to hand over the food, they curse you saying 'damn you with your food and your dead', they are mean, evil, evil.

Another man joined in:

> I often can't even hold *parastas* for my wife because of the Rudari, because they sin by stepping on the grave. I wanted to fence the grave off, but can't afford it.

This desire to separate the Romanian and Rudari dead seemed to me a symptom of the growing distance between the living. The exclusion of other local groups from participation in communal rituals reinforced group boundaries. Thus, guarding the living against intruders seemed to require the segregation of the dead according to 'kinds' (categories which, as we have seen, in real life were ambiguous and contested), in different cemeteries.

If Romanians wanted their dead separated from the Rudari's, the nuns sought to exclude any lay Romanians from the convent's cemetery. The undesirables were a village family who had its crypt there on account of being descended from a convent priest. The nuns asked the Bishop to annul this right, making their cemetery off-limits to villagers. When the husband of a woman from this family, who had been on friendly terms with the nuns, died after a prolonged and painful illness, the convent leaders opposed his burial at the family gravesite. With the dead man kept in the house for several days, the family and the nuns were forced to seek arbitration from the diocese, which ruled in favour of the family. Nevertheless, the nuns insisted that, at least, all the family's dead be dug up and moved to a new site at the back of the cemetery. The villagers considered this a serious affront.

During my time in Mihăileşti, I was constantly struck by how atomised the village seemed. Everyone complained that their neighbours were envious gossips. Life took place behind closed gates and drawn curtains. Espionage was rife, and villagers hardly missed anything, car or human, passing on the main road towards the convent. Formerly, people would sit on benches outside their houses at dusk, exchanging gossip with or about passers-by. Now, only two elderly people still appeared every summer evening, and their benches remained empty when they passed away. People sighed after the weekly football games held in the 1980s on a field between Lower Mihăileşti, Upper Mihăileşti and Rizeşti, and attended by all. Now, the socialist-built culture house (*căminul cultural*) was all but abandoned, and young people had to walk several kilometres to the Last Dollar Disco in the next town for a night out with friends from their own village.

Weddings and baptisms, both requiring sizeable cash gifts, were attended by fewer and fewer guests in these economically difficult times. Their success depended on the fact that, although each guest was expected to gift about one month's average salary, this investment would be recovered when their own offspring married, helping to raise a lump sum to get the young couple started. This arrangement was now breaking down, and organisers often failed to recover even their original investment in the party.

Saints' day feasts *(hramuri)* organised by each church or monastery on the day of its patron saint, were the only type of communal activity to see a remarkable growth after socialism. After mass, all who attended were treated to a communal meal prepared by the host villagers using food and money donated by themselves (donations consisted mainly of produce from local gardens). Attending these feasts, I was intrigued to find that I always met the same people. A feast circuit had developed, with dedicated followers who attended all events within a 20 km radius. Although they were both Romanians and Rudari, the Rudari were singled out and accused of living off these rituals. The resentment was partly due to the fact that, having no chapel in Rizeşti, they did not hold a feast of their own. They were thus failing to reciprocate the hospitality of the other villages. Flori, a 14 year old Romanian girl, expressed the prevailing impression thus:

> with the growing poverty, more and more come each year to be fed. In Lower Mihăileşti we had 500 people for our church's saint's day, we nearly ran out of food. The entire school of Rizeşti [the Rudari village] was let out of class early so they could come down to our feast, 200 kids all in all.

"Look at the Rudari, they're busy today", another Romanian woman remarked on a Saturday of the Dead, when each local church held remembrance services at which people handed out food on behalf of their dead.

> This morning they went down to Zoreni [town], now they're returning from uphill [from another village], they go to all the cemeteries. From Upper Mihăileşti, they come to our cemetery, because up there they don't allow them to go into the cemetery as they behave disrespectfully. But don't worry, they're richer than we are!

Even more than saints' day feasts, remembrance rituals for the dead were the occasions on which community divisions most clearly came to light. These rituals are called *parastas,* from a Greek word translated by Sarris (2000: 334) as 'representation' (see also Kain-Hart, 1992). Their focal point is a visit to the gravesite, where food, drink and candles are given away to strangers, who receive them on behalf of the dead person, saying *'bodeaproste'* (from the Slavonic 'Bog da prosti' meaning, 'may God forgive'). The handouts always include wine, boiled-wheat cake decorated with candy, walnuts, and

cocoa (*coliva*) and occasionally individual bags with other items. On the Saturdays of the dead (there are four of these every year, prior to the great fasts, but Saturday is also generally the day for commemoration of the dead), the ritual starts with a morning church service in which the priest blesses all the food brought by people and laid out on a table inside the church, with burning candles inserted into each *coliva*. After this, everyone walks to the cemetery, where the priest performs a brief blessing at each gravesite, sprinkling it with wine, and the food is handed out to those who have come to receive. The alms are called *pomana*, which derives from the verb *a pomeni*, meaning to remember and mention somebody in a public manner (one would say '*te-am pomenit'* to a friend if the friend was mentioned in her absence).

Although translated in English as commemoration (Kain-Hart, 1992), this kind of remembering does not focus on recollection, but rather on insuring the soul's safe progress in the afterlife. When I asked a woman whom she was making her *parastas* for, she replied, "well, they aren't really my dead, they're my husband's and I inherited them, but what can you do, one must do one's duty to them". *Parastasuri* are the responsibility of women, although men also organise them if no woman is available. In Mihăileşti, elderly women normally held *parastasuri* for the family dead four times a year, on the Saturdays of the Dead. In addition to these, when there is a death in the family, a series of *parastasuri* is performed for seven years, marking major moments of transition in the soul's journey in the afterlife (9 days after the funeral, 40 days, then each year on the anniversary of the death). Apart from this, *parastasuri* are also held whenever one has a disturbing dream about a dead relative—for instance if they appear in rags, clothing must be handed out on their behalf.

As one informant explained to me, *parastasuri* were necessary because "the living are required to show compassion for the dead, who are helpless. Things have to be done for them, as are in a predicament because they are powerless to help themselves, although *their soul continues to live and develop after death just like the soul of a living person*". The dead soul's task is to complete his/her process of repentance in order to gain admission to heaven. The soul's journey after death is described in the writings of various church Fathers which inform beliefs regarding what happens to the soul after death and the elaborate rules for the performance of *parastasuri*. According to St. Makarios the Alexandrine, immediately after death, the soul begins its ascent to heaven for the first of three meetings with God. Evil spirits try to impede its progress, and the soul has to pass through 24 'border customs of the heavens' (*vămile văzduhului*), each investigating the soul for a particular category of sins. Evil spirits are the customs officers who interrogate the soul. This stage of the journey is completed on the third day, when the funeral service is performed to secure safe passage and the resurrection of the soul. After this, the soul is taken by angels to visit Heaven for six days, and on the ninth day it

prostrates itself before God for the first time. On this day, a *parastas* is performed. Then, for the next 30 days, the soul is taken by angels to visit hell, and on the 40th day, it is brought back to prostrate itself before God again, and receive God's judgment regarding where the soul will reside. This is the most decisive day until the second resurrection, when God makes his final decision. The *parastas* on this day is crucial because the prayers of the living help the dead soul, who is now powerless to do anything further to help him/herself.

The living must attend to the dead also because of the fear that souls that remain tied to this world, possibly due to an unfulfilled desire, an unresolved conflict or a curse, can seriously harm or even kill the living—particularly kin members, with small children being most vulnerable. One man claimed he had had surgery five times, each time after dreaming of his dead grandfather, and on all occasions no disease was found—the symptoms having been psychosomatic. Malevolent or unhappy ghosts often make their needs, or at least their turmoil known through dreams, and must be pacified with rituals.

Like Bloch and Parry in their introduction to *Death and the Regeneration of Life* (1982), Verdery (1999) observes that public burials not only reaffirm the community organizing them, but also narrow and bound it by marking out who is 'ours' and who is to be excluded from the community of mourners. This is true of *parastasuri*. The Romanian community sought to exclude the Rudari, who had been formerly included, from these rituals, arguing that they failed to show proper respect for the dead (e.g. by stepping on graves), jeopardizing the outcome of the *parastasuri*. Graves are seen as an extension of the house, and stepping on one was a mark of disrespect to both the dead and the living—the entire kin group. Although Romanians joke about almost everything, I have never heard anybody joke about the dead. Such reserve is not superficial, but discloses deeply felt notions of propriety.

Feelings against the Rudari were not just caused by the occasional impropriety (as it was claimed), but also rooted in perceptions of their essential otherness. I have heard a man tell of an intense dream in which he appeared to be puzzling out the differences between Romanians and different kinds of Gypsies in terms of burial customs:

> In my dream, it was shown how people should be buried properly: the Rudari were to be buried lying at an angle (diagonally) and sideways, facing West, in order to see where they came from. The Gypsies are to be buried facing downwards, on their stomach. The bear-handling Gypsies were to be buried standing up at the head of the Romanian. The Romanian is buried in the middle of the others, on his back.

When I discussed this with others, they were less surprised than I expected, pointing out that it was common knowledge that Gypsies were buried either standing up or face down. To Romanians, who are only buried face up, these

other positions would seem quite disturbing. The horizontal face-downwards position attributed to 'the Gypsies' in the dream is an exact reversal of the proper way to bury Romanians. If any Romanian were to be buried face down or standing up, this would be considered a blasphemy. The dream's prescription for the burial of the Rudari, diagonally, is more peculiar, and I could not trace it to any existing customs. One interpretation, which seemed plausible to the dreamer, was that the Rudari were halfway between Romanian and Gypsy, as they were positioned exactly half way between each of the other three categories (not fully erect or horizontal but diagonal, not face up or down but sideways).

As Bloch and Parry (1982) have observed, it is not uncommon for the decay of the body to be read as an index of the soul's state. An article by Deema Kaneff (2002) entitled "Why don't people die naturally anymore?" describes how Bulgarian villagers viewed the demise of the socialist state, experience by them as a guarantor of the natural order. Its demise, she argues, was experienced as a crumbling of the 'natural' order under attack from threatening occult forces. In the case discussed here, a question encapsulating similar feelings would be "why don't people decay naturally anymore?". As one Romanian woman told me,

> From the earth we came, in the earth bodies are meant to decay, not in these cement crypts, these luxuries… There the body suffers and struggles to decompose. People don't realise what they are doing. In the earth, the body decays best. It must decay in seven years. In these crypts, after seven years you take him out the same as when you put him in, not even a bit rotted. Some are a bit dried up, that's all.

In her musings, this woman pinpoints the corrupting effects of excessive consumption and conspicuous wealth brought by the transition to some (i.e. the Rudari and the nuns), but not to others (the Romanians). The improper use of wealth evident in the building of overly-elaborate cement crypts and 'luxuries' has deleterious effects on the progress of the soul in afterlife. As Humphrey (2002) points out, practices relating to objects in the context of funerary rites allow insight into ideas of personhood and property. The Romanians' condemnation of immoderate displays of wealth singled out Gypsies in particular—for instance bemusement mingled with horror was expressed regarding the rumour that one Roma 'big man', dubbed the king of the Gypsies, had been buried in a three-story crypt with rooms filled with computers, television sets, and other valuables.

This mode of burial contrasted strongly with the way in which objects were dealt with in Romanian funeral customs, where the ideological emphasis was on sharing. When a person dies, all their private possessions (including clothes) are given away to others—the objects that are most strongly reminiscent of the person to close family and neighbours, and less important objects to

strangers. Valuable objects such as sets of china, and even furniture, are given away in the name of a dead person—and I have heard of cases in which people gave away a full set of household items on their own behalf, as they did not trust their descendants to do it properly after their death. Thus for Romanians the proper way of conveying objects to the dead involves 'recycling' them rather than keeping or burying them. This was ideologically opposed to the conspicuous consumption (made possible especially by success in the new, post-socialist order) which selfishly clings to valuable objects for personal use only. Romanians often accused each other of selfishness, while at the same time trying to limit the claims of others on their time and resources. Nevertheless, they were also united in accusing the nuns and the Rudari of being selfish. The nuns were resented for failing to share the benefits of their wealth and connections with the local community, and the Rudari were accused of trying to take advantage of the Romanians' sharing practices for personal gain.

Conclusion

Like Mr. Florescu's amusement village, though in a less obvious way, each of the local groups was engaged in spatially and temporally reconfiguring the space in which all lived, and these practices disclosed how they envisioned their own and others' positions in relation to a 'natural' moral order. I have argued that after socialism these three communities thrown together by geographical proximity have become increasingly detached from one another. This distancing was precipitated by the uneven ways in which post-socialist reforms and an insecure economic environment have affected their welfare and altered existing power arrangements. The emerging rifts are expressed in an entire range of social practices including religious ones.

Having lost its formerly privileged position, the Romanian community was adapting to the new economic conditions less well than the nuns and the Rudari, and sought to reassert control by increasingly excluding those considered outsiders from its ritual life. These outsiders, both nuns and the Rudari, were portrayed as predatory and as trespassing against the natural order. For instance, a drought in 2002 was blamed on the nuns' alleged promiscuity. The nuns' strategy for coping with the insecure economic environment of the 'transition' was to cultivate relations with elite political patrons and wealthy visitors, whilst limiting contacts with the local community. Thus, far from acting as a mediator between political elites and local people, the convent was using the social capital of political contacts in its own interests. Dissatisfaction with the nuns extended to their politician-guests, whose patronage of the convent was not viewed in a positive light. Perceptions of the political domain remained organised around an us *versus* them dichotomy, with politicians and

nuns included in the 'them' category. Ironically, the villagers' exclusion by the nuns, mirrored the (attempted) exclusion of the Rudari from village events. Visions such as that of Mr. Florescu or the mayor's attempt to recover Brâncoveanu's bones were treated with cynicism, but this did not prevent people from putting forward alternative plans for the symbolic reconfiguration of the locality.

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RESTITUTION OF PROPERTY, RELIGIOUS COMPETITION AND SENSE OF JUSTICE: CLAIMS OVER THE ROMANIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH PATRIMONY

STÉPHANIE MAHIEU[1]

ABSTRACT. The article focuses on disputes over the Romanian Greek Catholic patrimony after 1990. Based on extended ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Transylvania, in three local situations (Bixad, Cluj and Ieud), it analyses the strategies and the arguments put forward by the persons and institutions involved in the disputes, and in particular the two main actors: the Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. The first claims ownership over the buildings used by the latter. While the Greek Catholic Church notably used a juridical argument, based on owner's rights, the Orthodox Church used a demographic argument, based on the number of believers attending each church. Many other arguments are presented. A particular emphasis is put on the interrelation between juridical and non-juridical forms of (dis-)agreement in situations of potential conflict. The article stresses the gap between legal decisions and their implementation in practice, and shows that such decisions do not systematically prevent violence. Almost twenty years after the beginning of the claims, and despite the failure to agree on a global frame to resolve the Greek Catholic patrimony problem, most conflicts were nevertheless resolved peacefully. One explanation for this general calm is the building of new churches, both by the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox Churches. Another possible answer has to do with the relative failure of the Greek Catholic renewal process in Romania. Finally, as a result of massive migrations from Romania in the last years, it seems that the struggle over property has also calmed down by lack (or at least weakening) of contenders.

Keywords: Romania, Greek Catholic Church, Orthodox Church, Property Restitution, Inter-religious relations

This article[2] focuses on disputes over Romanian Greek Catholic patrimony after 1990, when the Greek Catholic Church (also called Unite Church, or Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite) went back to legality. This patrimony represents

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almost two thousand of churches handed over to the Romanian state after the Greek Catholic Church (*Biserica Română Unită cu Roma*, *Greco-Catolică)* was disbanded by the communist government in 1948. I analyze the strategies implemented in Romania both by the Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in order to get back and/or keep what they both consider to be theirs by right. A particular emphasis is put on the interrelation between juridical and non-juridical forms of (dis-)agreement in situations of potential conflict, since juridical arguments are not the only ones to be used when trying to define the *sense of justice* (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 364). In addition, the Romanian Greek Catholic patrimony case, as other property questions in postsocialist countries, is an illustration of the "decommunization process" (Borneman, 1997), of a "reordering of ideas about morality and accountability" (Verdery, 1999: 72), which characterizes the campaign for retribution and/ or compensation launched after the fall of socialism.

I will focus on three local situations located in Transylvania (Bixad, Cluj and Ieud), where I have conducted long-term ethnographic research between 1998 and 2000 and shorter stays in 2004 and 2007. The methodology used is a classical ethnographic one: it is based on participant observation in liturgies, pilgrimages and the everyday religious life, and on in-depths interviews with more than two hundred persons (Greek Catholic and Orthodox believers, priests and representatives). I also use legal documents, as well as newspapers (national, regional and religious ones). The first case is Bixad, a village located in the Oaş region. Its Monastery, even though it was given back to the Greek Catholic Church by a Government Decision, is still occupied by the Orthodox Church. This "only on paper" return illustrates the gap between judicial and/or government decisions and their application, but also how priests' personalities can influence the restitution process on the local level, since the situation remained peaceful. The second case presented is located in Cluj, the major city of Transylvania. The right of the Greek Catholic Church over the *Schimbarea La Faţa* Cathedral has been recognized by the Bucharest Appeals Chamber in February 1998 and on 13 March, a group of Greek Catholic believers "took" possession of it. Until then, the cathedral had been used by the Orthodox Church. This event was widely reported by the mass media throughout the country; it was presented both by the media and some Orthodox believers as a violent clash between the two Churches. Finally, I present Ieud, a village situated in the Maramureş area, where two cases (the *Şes* Church and the Presbytery) are analyzed: the first building is a case of recovery before legal recognition, while the second building had to be given back by the Greek Catholic priest after the Court ruled in favour of the school, which had been using it so far. In these three places, the disputes and contested restitution of the Greek Catholic Church patrimony appears as a *critical moment* (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 359), where a discontent is expressed. The 'scene' one can witness during these critical moments can

potentially turn into violence (be it verbal or even physical). More often, the scene turns into a discussion "in which criticisms, blames and grievances are exchanged. The scene develops into a dispute. The word "scene" suggests domestic quarrels, and the word "dispute" judicial litigation. The first are seen as informal, whereas the second are managed by the judiciary system. But there are plenty of intermediate cases" (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999:360). The Greek Catholic patrimony case appears as an intermediate case, both informal and judiciary. It is also of peculiar interest because it could potentially have turned into physical violence but remained at the level of disputes. For Boltanski and Thévenot, people involved in disputes are subjected to an imperative of justification and they will therefore develop different kinds of arguments (also see Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). In the local situations I analyse, I will focus on the arguments put forward by the persons and institutions involved in the disputes over restitution of Greek Catholic Church patrimony.

Competing arguments

The two main actors involved in the disputes are the Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. The first claims ownership over the buildings used by the latter. Yet, there are other categories of actors involved in the disputes which concern not only social relations between individuals (Hann, 1998c), but also institutions competing at the national and international level: the Romanian State, the Roman Catholic Church, Romanian and International NGOs, etc (Iordachi, 1999; Verdery 1999; Zerilli 2007). The main question which appeared in the beginning of the 1990's, after the Greek Catholic Church went back to legality, was: who has the right on the confiscated property? The Greek Catholic Church, because it is the former owner, or the Orthodox Church, because it has been using the churches for decades and is much more important in terms of faithful (20 millions versus 200 000)? (Verdery, 1999:67). Shortly said, while the Greek Catholic Church used a juridical argument, based on owner's rights, the Orthodox Church used a demographic argument, based on the number of believers attending each church.

Yet, a closer look indicates that there are several levels of arguments put forward in the disputes over property. The Greek Catholic argument is twofold: first, property restitution should be made to repair the injustice visited on the Greek Catholic Churches by the communist regime. It was even argued that Romania would "become a true *état de droit* only when such core democratic principles as property inviolability [would be] strictly observed" (Stan and Turcescu, 2000:1483). But most of all, the claim over Greek Catholic property was crucial for its future existence. Any revitalization would be almost inconceivable without places of worship (Iordachi, 1999; Verdery, 1999;

Stan and Turcescu, 2009): therefore, the dispute over property is also a dispute over souls. Another important argument is that in Romania, the Greek Catholic Church has a great political and moral capital. It played an important role in the nation-building process. In the eighteenth century, Bishop Inochentie Micu Klein regarded the union with Rome as a means to attain the status of *natio* for the *Vlachs* (Romanians), which would guarantee equal rights with the Hungarians and the Saxons (Hitchins, 1999; Verdery 1999). His followers, a group of Greek Catholic intellectuals called the 'Transylvanian School', were the first to stress the Latin origins of the Romanian language. The moral capital also comes from the fact that as an institution, the Greek Catholic Church suffered much more under the communist regime than the Orthodox Church. Even though, as I have argued elsewhere (Mahieu, 2004), it cannot be characterized as a collective dissident, it nevertheless has been subject to specific and systematic political repression between 1948 and 1989 (Vasile, 2003).

The second contender of this dispute, the Romanian Orthodox Church (*Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, BOR)**,** has a very different position on the public scene. As many other Orthodox Churches, it always had close relations with the political powers, following 'a policy of accommodation with the rulers of the day and silent submission to them' (Stan and Turcescu, 2000:1467; Meyendorff 1996). Yet, it should be underlined that in the meantime, Eastern Churches were always more interested in 'the mystery of the Church than on its earthly forms' (Taft, 1999: 32). Under communism, even though the BOR was not openly encouraged, it nevertheless reached a sort of *modus vivendi* with the communist authorities; it was heavily criticized for this attitude after 1989 (Gillet, 1997; Stan and Turcescu, 2000; 2005). But even though the BOR could not argue any moral damage from the communist period (or precisely because of this), it nevertheless adopted an uncompromising position towards the restitution of the Greek Catholic patrimony. As we have seen, the strongest argument was a demographic one. Another strong related argument, was that the former Greek Catholic believers who joined the Orthodox Church after 1948 were satisfied and showed no will of 'returning' to their ancestral faith. The return to legality of the Greek Catholic Church has also been seen by all the Orthodox Churches, not only the Romanian one, as a threat not only to ecumenical dialogue, but as an attempt to create division among them. They always had considered Uniatism as "a sign of the hostile intentions of the Catholic Church towards them" (Roberson 1995: 173), but it became more acute in the early 1990's (see Mahieu and Naumescu, 2009). In addition to these arguments, it was argued by the Orthodox side that the 1697 Union with Rome was a forced one and that it should get back the property it lost then. Claims for restitution were made in this sense: "if restitution was to be carried out, then the Orthodox Church felt entitled to ask for its property turned over to the Greek Catholics by the Habsburg regime" (Stan and Turcescu, 2000:1483).

In many cases, such as this, conflicts over property belonged indeed to the "politics of the past" (Hann, 1998a). Before becoming Greek Catholic, sometimes in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, many of the contested churches were Orthodox or Roman Catholic. Therefore, the current occupiers provided "anteriority" arguments. This is most obvious in the affair of the Greek Catholic Cathedral in Przemyśl (southeast Poland), studied in-depth by Chris Hann (Hann, 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2005). Hann analyzed the conflict that arose over the building, which was transferred to the Roman Catholic Carmelite order by the communist regime in 1946 and claimed by the Greek Catholics in the early 1990s. Both contenders (Roman and Greek Catholics) claimed former use of the church, built in 1630. In 1991 the Cathedral was eventually left in the hands of the Carmelites, while the Greek Catholics received the nearby former Jesuit church. Hann describes how both churches were architecturally "purified" (Hann, 2005). I have seen similar changes in Romania, where many Latin elements were added to the churches returned to the Greek Catholic Church in an effort to erase the Orthodox past, and in Hungarian Greek Catholic churches were, conversely, all Latin elements were removed in order to "re-orientalize" the churches (Mahieu, 2009).

The battles over property therefore represent a crucial stake for the recently legalized Greek Catholic Churches, both in their local and national competition with the dominant church. In her book on the reburial of Greek Catholic Bishop Inochentie Micu Klein, Katherine Verdery argues that the metaphor of the "religious market place"[3] helps to describe the competition between the Orthodox and the Greek Catholic Churches in Romania not only over properties, but also over souls (Verdery, 1999: 80). In all the socialist countries, the dominant Marxist-Leninist ideology considered religion as "the opiate of the people" and churches, therefore, suffered more or less active repression. With the exception of Hungary, all Greek Catholic Churches were confronted with yet another type of repression: forcible reintegration into Orthodox Churches. Therefore, the changes that occurred in the early 1990s had a double significance: general liberalization towards religion; and a return

[3] The notion appeared in the 1980's and initially described the North American religious scene, where the problem was a marked decline in church attendance. Outside the USA, the metaphor of the 'religious marketplace' was widely used in the context of postsocialism to describe the new religious situation emerging in former people's democracies. It was often connected with the general switch from centrally planned to market economies and from Marxism to neo-liberalism. Nevertheless, the metaphor of the "religious marketplace" has been criticized both theoretically and empirically (Bruce, 1999; 2006). One crucial critique lies in its explanatory limits that underrate the existing constraints on religious choice. Most of all, the metaphor misses the diachronic dimension of religious belonging; i.e. in most societies, religious belonging is not a matter of individual choice but is related to strong inherited cultural constraints (Bruce, 2006: 45) or "customary group practices" (Verdery, 1999: 80).

to legality of the Greek Catholic Church, which escaped from the "catacombs". Because of this return to legality, the Greek Catholic Church became a new actor in the liberalized 'religious marketplace'. They now competed with both other traditional religious groups and with the new religious groups such as the Evangelical or Pentecostal churches (Wanner, 2003). The new religious market now confronted the Greek Catholic Church both with a supply problem (to provide a distinct religious offer) and a demand problem (to convince its former believers to return), in which property restitution is a crucial stake.

Before presenting the general restitution process and my ethnographic cases, I would like to stress that the disputes over property do not clearly oppose competing religious identities. This thesis has met considerable success in the 1990's, following Samuel Huntington's hypothesis that the regions where Greek Catholics were once in significant numbers (Galicia, Transylvania) belonged to the western world (Huntington 1996). First, the Greek Catholic Churches cannot be so easily put on one side or the other of the border between western and eastern Christianity (Mahieu and Naumescu, 2009). But most of all, religious belonging in contemporary Transylvania is a thorny issue. People who 'returned' to the Greek Catholic Churches often mentioned a return to the faith of their ancestors. They gave up the churches they had attended for decades: usually Orthodox, but sometimes Roman-Catholic. However, should this "return" to Greek Catholicism after decades of Orthodox (or sometimes Roman Catholic) attendance be considered a conversion? Even though the narratives of some of the faithful, especially among young people, treat "return" to the Romanian Greek Catholic Church as an important change, this process can scarcely be called a conversion. "Returning" to Greek Catholicism does not require any formal conversion ritual. Most of all, many people stressed the similarities between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches and, as in Romania, they continued to attend their former churches even after they "came back" to Greek Catholicism (Mahieu, 2006). A close look at the local level shows that an analysis in terms of identities (even fluid or multiple ones) misses not only the fact that the current Greek Catholics are former Orthodox worshippers, and conversely, many Orthodox in Northern Transylvania are former Greek Catholics, but also that identities are not the driving force behind property conflicts. The notion of identity in social science has so many uses and definitions that it generally has lost its analytical purchase (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000); in the particular case of the Greek Catholic contested patrimony, it does not really help getting a deeper understanding of what is at stake in the disputes. Rather, a close look at the arguments developed by local actors from both sides helps following them in their doubts and questions about what is just and fair, but also about what means being a Christian today. My assumption (also see Mahieu 2009) here is that the struggle for property, besides

the search for justice, also poses the question of the conditions and intensity of encounters with God. Churches are not just another type of private property, since the church (as a building) is the place where "religious transports" take place (Latour, 1991) and also provides access to the sacred (Piette, 1999; 2003), where believers meet the Christian God. This is why church restitution processes present distinct features than the general compensation processes that have taken place after the end of socialism.

Property and restitution

Since WW II, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced several waves of expropriation: nationalization by specific legislation (industry, mining, distribution, etc.) "spontaneous nationalisations" by the local communist parties, "penal" confiscation of property, unlawful (even for the communist legal system) expropriation, and finally expropriation of property owned by the churches and religious orders (Kozminski, 1997:96). After the fall of socialism, property restitution claims was a crucial element in the "decommunization process" (Borneman, 1997) in postsocialist countries (Hann, 1998; Verdery, 1994 and 2003; Stan, 2006; Zerilli, 2002). The property question (with an emphasis on decollectivization) is part of a reordering characteristic of postsocialist transformations. What is at stake is the break between the socialist and the postsocialist states and the quest for "historical justice" (Hann, 2005), not only to repair "socialism's breach of property rights" (Verdery, 1999: 72), but also to recognize, through retributive justice, the accountability of wrongdoers and to restore dignity to the victims (Borneman, 1997). Yet the claim over religious property presents features distinctive from other kinds of property restitution. General church restitution or compensations processes have taken place in many postsocialist countries. Among them, the Greek Catholic case is of significant interest.

The Romanian Greek Catholic Church was established in 1697 in Transylvania, in the context of the Counter-Reformation, after the Habsburg conquest (Union of Alba Iulia). In an effort to hinder the path of the Reformation, it was proposed that, under certain conditions, Orthodox dioceses unite with Rome, centuries after the Great Schism[4] of 1054 between western and eastern Christianity. Recognition of the Pope's authority was the main condition for acceptance into communion. In exchange for the union with the Vatican, the Greek Catholics obtained certain political rights from which they had previously been excluded. What was initially a political creation, extending social and political

[4] In 1054, the symbolic rupture between Rome and Constantinople occurred, but the mutual excommunication of Pope Leo IX and Patriarch Michael Cerularius had no immediate effect on church practices. From the eastern viewpoint, the rupture became irreversible in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade and the sacking of Constantinople by the west. See Roberson (1995).

rights, became transformed into a lively church that not only gained loyalty from its communities, but also developed an original synthesis with distinctive religious characteristics, between Latin and Byzantine Christianity (Magocsi, 2009). The Romanian Greek Catholic Church numbered 1,559,857 believers (7.9 % of Romania's population) and 2,498 churches in 1948[5]. The Romanian Constitution of 1923 recognised the Greek Catholic Church as a Romanian national church and in 1929 the Concordat between the Romanian state and the Vatican assured the same status to the Orthodox and the Greek Catholic cults (Gherman, 1967: 190).

On the 21st of October 1948, a forced ecclesiastical "reunification" synod of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church took place. The majority of the Greek Catholic priests and all the bishops refused to comply with this 'union', and many were sentenced to prison (see Gillet, 1997; Gherman, 1958; Mahieu, 2004b; Prunduş, 1994; Vasile, 2003). On the 1st of December 1948, Decree No. 358 concerning the legal situation of the former Greek Catholic Cult (*Decretul 358/1948 pentru stabilirea situaţia de drept a fostului cult greco-catolic)* disbanded the Greek Catholic Church and handed over its properties to the Romanian state.

Decree No. 358 stipulates that the Greek Catholic Church was disbanded as a result of 'reunification' with the BOR. Article 2 indicates that all its properties and goods become the property of the Romanian state (Gherman 1967). This is important to highlight; legally, the BOR did not receive the Greek Catholic properties. After 1948, the majority of the properties were used by the BOR, but some of the buildings were abandoned, while others became schools, orphanages, convalescent homes, etc. The situation is therefore more complex than the other contested ownership problems in post-socialist countries (Hann, 1998b). There is a juridical distinction concerning property within the Catholic and the Orthodox Church: Catholic canon law indicates that the property of a Catholic parish is the prerogative of the bishop, while in the Orthodox Church the buildings belong to the local Orthodox community (Metz, 1997: 142). In addition, the fact that the official owner during the communist period (the Romanian state) was not the user makes things very complex on a juridical level.

The Council of the National Salvation Front (*Consiliul Frontului Salvării Naţionale*) abrogated Decree 358/1948 by Decree-Law No. 9 on the 31st of December 1989. In April 1990, Decree-Law No. 126 stipulated amongst other things[6] that "the assets, except for the estates, that became state property by Decree No. 358 and are now part of the state heritage are to be returned, in their present-day state, to the Romanian Greek Catholic Church". As to the assets taken by the Romanian Orthodox Church, article 3 of Decree-Law No. 126/1990 stipulates that:

[5] Rance 1994; http://countrystudies.us/romania/36.htm (accessed on 04.11.2009).
[6] See http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act?ida=161 (accessed on 07.11.2009).

> To establish the legal situation of the religious dwellings and of the parochial houses that used to belong to the Romanian Uniate (Greek-Catholic) Church and were taken over by the Romanian Orthodox Church, a joint commission will be formed, consisting of clerical representatives of the two religious cults, that will take into account the will of the believers of the two communities sharing these goods (Article 3, Decree-Law No. 126/1990).

The Joint Commission for Orthodox-Greek Catholic Dialogue[7] (*Comisia mixtă de Dialog Ortodoxo-Greco-Catolică*), even though it had eight meetings between 1998 and 2003, did not really lead to any pragmatic decision (Stan and Turcescu, 2009:104). On the grounds of article 2 of this Decree-Law, eighty buildings and urban domains were formally transferred from the property of the state into that of the Greek Catholic Church by the Government Decision No. 466/1992. The Bixad Monastery was one of the buildings that had to be given back. It must be stressed here that the Romanian state, who was the official owner of Greek Catholic property, refused to legislate its restitution. It therefore sent the message that "the state viewed restitution as a strictly religious problem it could or would interfere with neither as a mediator nor as an active participant" (Stan and Turcescu, 2009). This position of the Romanian state certainly did not help finding amicable agreement among the two main contenders.

I have defined three major, yet not exactly sequential stages in the restitution process: demands, conflicts and resolution. Immediately after the Revolution, in 1990, the newly created Romanian Greek Catholic Church was in a very uncertain situation: it had been banned for more than forty years, it had almost no hierarchy anymore, all of its churches and other goods had been nationalised by the socialist regime and generally used by the Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the number of its believers was less than 15% of what it had been previously. In 1948, the official number of Greek Catholic believers in Romania was 1,559,857[8]. According to the 1992 census, they numbered 223,327. The 2002 census indicates an even smaller number: 195,481.

Following its return to legality, the Greek Catholic Church had to react at several levels: a material level exemplified by property restitution demands, an organisation level, i.e. to define its hierarchy, and a dogmatic and ritual level, i.e. to define its liturgy. I argue that the Greek Catholic Church gave priority to the first, for what might seem obvious reasons. What was at stake in this property issue was the very existence of the Greek Catholic Church; without buildings there would be no chance of renewal. One of the major consequences of this choice was the relatively large freedom left to believers and priests in liturgical matters, (Mahieu, 2004b; 2006; 2009). Some of the

[7] See: http://www.greek-catolic.ro.
[8] The official Internet site of the Romanian Census: http://www.recensamant.ro.

people I interviewed were nostalgic for the 'catacomb' church period and the first years after the Revolution. As a believer told me: "You should have seen how beautiful it was, this open air church. Sometimes, I feel nostalgia for that period; it was so beautiful, the pigeons taking our prayers to the sky". Even though their Church experienced political repression, or perhaps more precisely because of this repression, the believers had a very intense religious life within small, non-hierarchical communities during the socialist period and immediately after 1989. For some of them, it has been difficult in recent years to define their role as laymen inside the re-established institution.

In the years 1990-1991, the Greek Catholic Church demanded *Restitutio in Integrum*, that is, an immediate and unconditional restitution of more than 1800 buildings appropriated in 1948. Where the number of Greek Catholic believers was too small, compared to the number of Orthodox believers, or in cases where a village had only one church, they demanded the *Simulteaneum*, this is, the shared use of the single church. The *Restitutio in Integrum* demand was immediately rejected by the Orthodox Church, and the *Simulteaneum* was considered unfair by many Orthodox believers. As two Orthodox believers (A and B) in Ieud told me:

> A: There, where your daughter lives [near Timișoara] they share the same church, the Orthodox and the Greek Catholics.
> B: Yes, but there, there are almost no Greek Catholics, this is why they agree, but here, we are the majority. And they want us to miss the mass on Sundays? It is as if a stranger would enter my kitchen and would start to cook in it. I wouldn't accept that!
> A: Yes, but, still, there, they agree!
> B: Of course, but this is because there, the number of Greek Catholics is very small.

The argument given here is that the *Simultaneum* has a greater chance of being applied in places where the number of Greek Catholics believers is small. In its official claims, the Greek Catholic Church tended to present the opposite argument: if the number of Greek Catholics believers is large enough, then the Orthodox Church has to accept sharing the churches. The *Simultaneum* was eventually applied only in a very small number of cases, and mostly, as suggested in the quotation, in the south-western region of Banat, where as early as 1990 there was an agreement between the Orthodox Metropolitan and the Greek Catholic Bishop (Stan and Turcescu, 2008). But at the national level, no amicable agreement was found between the two Churches.

Following this failure, the Greek Catholic Church changed its strategy; it demanded restitution of certain churches through civil justice. This phenomenon has been observed in many countries after the fall of the communist regimes. According to Zerilli, in Romania, more than 80% of civil law cases in recent years directly concerned property rights, and particularly property restitution (Zerilli,

2002; 2003, also see Stan, 2006). In the Greek Catholic case, this strategy was not successful, except for the cathedral in Cluj (see below) and, more recently, in Oradea and Satu Mare. In many cases, such as Ieud, the decision was in favour of the Orthodox Church, and when the sentences were in favour of the Greek Catholics, they were usually not applied. The Greek Catholic Church even addressed the European Court of Human Rights in 2001, claiming infringement of certain rights guaranteed in the European Human Rights Convention for the Saint Vasile Polona Church in Bucharest (Zerilli, 2007).[10]

At the legislative level, following the election of Emil Constantinescu in 1996, there was an attempt to find a global juridical frame for the Greek Catholic property problem. The Boila[11] retrocession bill (*Proiectul de Lege privind utilizarea unor lăcaşuri de cult de către Bisercica Română Unită cu Roma Greco-Catolică*) was proposed in 1997. This was violently attacked by the Orthodox Church. For Patriarch Teoctist, the draft law, if passed, might have had "unexpected consequences for the peace of Transylvania" (Iordachi, 1999: 163). Approved by the Senate, the bill was rejected by the Chamber of Deputies in 2001. In June 2002, the Senate adopted a governmental ordinance on the return of church assets confiscated during the communist period, but it referred to all buildings but churches. A Special Commission for Restitution was established in 2003 to help implementing the ordinance, but progress has been extremely slow (Stan and Turcescu, 2008). More recently, the Buda[12] bill about the juridical status of properties belonging to the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches (*Proiectul legislativ 368/2007 privind regimul juridic al bunurilor imobile aparţinând cultelor greco-catolic si ortodox din România*)[13] has caused heated reactions, this time from the Greek Catholic side[14]. The bill was based on the majority argument, clearly favourable to the Orthodox side. It was first presented in 2007, rejected by the Senate and then proposed again in 2009. The Greek Catholic authorities have strongly reacted, accusing the bill to be an attempt of "eradicating" and "burying" the Greek Catholic Church[15], and underlying that the Romanian state has a moral and legal responsibility towards the Greek Catholic Church. This last legislative mishap shows that the debate is still extremely heated among Church authorities. Twenty years after

[10] See: Human Rights Without Frontiers website: http://www.hrwf.net. Also see Zerilli (2004).

[11] Matei Boila is a Greek Catholic priest and MP, member of the National-Peasant Party.

[12] The bill was presented by three MPs, member of the PD-L (Partidul Democratic Liberal): Daniel Buda, Ioan Oltean and Augustin Zegrean.

[13] See http://www.greco-catolica.org/_documents/2008-02-22%20-%20PL368-2007%20%-20Raportul%20Comisiei%20pentru%20drepturile%20omului,%20culte%20si%20Comisia%20Juridica.pdf (accessed 04.11.2009).

[14] See for instance http://www.revista22.ro/greco-catolicii-in-dialog-dificil-cu-statul-5631.html (accessed 04.11. 2009).

[15] See for instance http://www.bru.ro/semnalari/reactia-romanian-greek-catholic-association-la-proiectul-legislativ-3682007 (accessed 04.11.2009).

the return to legality of the Greek Catholic Church, no general solution has been found to solve the restitution problem, neither through the Orthodox- Greek Catholic institutionalized dialogue nor through legislation (also see EDRC, 2004).

However, the situation clearly has calmed down in the last years. I argue that what has radically calmed the situation is the building of new churches, both by the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox. Many people said that their restitution demand was more motivated by the fact that they did not want to pray outdoors or in private buildings, and not merely by the claim of a rightful owner. Another more recent phenomenon which has lead to a more peaceful situation is the massive emigration of Romanian citizens abroad. The regions where I conducted fieldwork are the ones where the ratio of migrants per habitant is one of the highest (Najman and Prelipceanu, 2007). This appeared clearly during my last fieldwork in 2007. Both Orthodox and Greek Catholic priests were commenting on the fact that the struggle for properties seemed now to belong to the past. Because of migrations, the numbers of worshippers had so significantly dropped in both Churches that they were now "in the same boat", as a Greek Catholic priest commented on me, trying to keep worshippers attending churches at all rather than competing with each other.

I want to stress here the large variety of situations I saw in Transylvania concerning Greek Catholic property issues. On the local level, the forms of agreement or disagreement depend on factors such as the priest's personality (both on the Greek Catholic and Orthodox side), the number of churches in the locality, the number of Greek Catholic faithful etc. The example of the Peter and Paul Monastery in Bixad shows how priests' personalities can influence the restitution process.

"Only on Paper" Return: the case of Bixad

This first example illustrates the gap between judicial and/or government decisions and their application. Bixad is a large village situated in the Oaş region near Satu Mare. I conducted my main field research there in 1998, and went back in the region in 2007. The Peter and Paul Monastery is situated outside the village on a small hill. It was founded in the 15th century and became Greek Catholic with the Union in 1700 (Rus, 1995). It was and still is a major annual pilgrimage destination on the feast of the Assumption (August 15). During the inter-war years it was an important Greek Catholic intellectual centre. After 1948, the monks were arrested or went away. Orthodox monks arrived and stayed until 1954, when monastic activity stopped. After that, the state used the Monastery first as a convalescent home for coal miners and afterwards as an orphanage. Between 1981 and 1988, the Monastery was restored by the Orthodox Church and it was consecrated in March 1989. Monastic (Orthodox) activity resumed in 1991.

In 1992, Government Decision 466 ruled that the Bixad Monastery and eighty other properties had to be given back to their original owner, the Greek Catholic Church. But in 1998 (as it still is as of 2008), it was still being used by the Orthodox Church. However, the Greek Catholic Church did not attempt to take it by force. The Monastery became once again a major pilgrimage destination, and in 1998, more than 15,000 Orthodox pilgrims came to Bixad. I too went up the hill and chatted with some Orthodox pilgrims and monks. The answer a young monk gave me to explain why the state had recognised the right of the Orthodox and not that of the Greek Catholic Church was that "first of all, from the 15th to the 18th century, the Monastery was Orthodox and was taken by force by the Greek Catholics". He added that, of course, everyone in the Maramureş and the Oaş area, including his own family, was Greek Catholic before 1948, but that before 1699 everyone was Orthodox. This argument resembles the "precedence principle", which has been activated in many postsocialist countries (Mahieu 2000).

The Greek Catholic Church organised a counter-pilgrimage on the same day, down in front of the new Greek Catholic church, which still was under construction at that time; 5,000 pilgrims attended their liturgy. The Orthodox pilgrims, on their way to the Monastery, had to pass through the Greek Catholic crowd. I was surprised that the atmosphere was peaceful. During the liturgy, the Greek Catholic priest of Bixad thanked the pilgrims for attending in such large numbers. He finished his sermon by saying: "This year, once again, we celebrate the Assumption down here, in the village, but it would be nice if, some day, we could walk together to celebrate it in the Monastery". This was said in an ardent manner; he made clear to the Greek Catholics believers that the official owner was not the Orthodox Church.

A few hours later, I tried to interview the ardent Greek Catholic priest, because I wanted him to explain to me why, even though the right of the Greek Catholic church over the Monastery had been recognised, he had not tried to get it back. He said that he agreed to be interviewed, but that he would have to leave me at a certain moment, because he had to go to a funeral. I quickly understood that the Orthodox priest would also celebrate that funeral, because the deceased's family was partly Orthodox and partly Greek Catholic, and each "side" had asked for its own priest. I realised afterwards that "joint funerals" were common in Bixad and other places. After the interview (and before the funeral), he drove me to Tîrşolţ, a neighbouring village, where violence had occurred between Greek Catholic and Orthodox villagers. He strongly denounced all kinds of violent action and underlined the fact that the situation was now peaceful, thanks to the building of a new Greek Catholic church in Tîrşolţ.

How is one to analyse this contrast between the two utterances (I use the linguistic term deliberately): in the morning, there was a public speech against the Orthodox monks and yet in the evening, during the interview, he denounced violent action and a common practice of co-operation was maintained. The two situations are very different and can be elucidated using the categories proposed by Piette concerning Catholic utterances about the way people, objects and narratives travel between situations (Piette 1999). In the morning, the priest was in a socio-political situation where he, as a member of the Greek Catholic hierarchy, was claiming the right of his Church to regain the Monastery. In the evening, his private speech (during and after the interview) can be analysed as an exemplification of another role of the priest, i.e. his duty to respect ritual, which on that precise day happened to be a joint Orthodox and Greek Catholic funeral. In the two cases, the term "Orthodox" refers to different contexts: in the first case, it is a political category, the Orthodox institution, with which the Greek Catholic Church is in a situation of competition and judicial conflict. In the second case, the term "Orthodox" refers to his "colleague", with whom the priest is in a situation of co-operation.

What is the interrelation between the global or national level (Decision 466/1992, nationwide Orthodox versus Greek Catholic competition, the fact that pilgrims came from all over Romania) and the local level (co-operation between the priests, mixed families) in this kind of situation? Why did the Greek Catholics in Bixad not attempt to get the Monastery back, even by force? I can hazard some hypotheses: first, in Bixad, during the socialist period, many former Greek Catholic believers attended Roman Catholic services, first in Huta Certeze, a neighbouring Hungarian-speaking village, and later in Boinești, a Bixad hamlet, where a chapel was built during the 1960s. Bixad represents, then, a major difference vis-á-vis the vast majority of the places in Transylvania where the Greek Catholic believers attended the Orthodox services after 1948. In 1998, the Roman Catholic believers were building a new church near the railway station, which is now completed. The presence of a significant number of Romanian Roman Catholic believers certainly played a role in the absence of violence at the local level in Bixad. There is indeed no frontal confrontation between the majority church in Romania (The Orthodox Church) and the minority church (the Greek Catholic Church), but rather a situation of religious pluralism and consensus. In Bixad, none of the three churches (Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic) is in a position of clear domination, and co-operation between the three priests is embedded in everyday interactions.

A second explanation is that the Greek Catholic believers managed to raise funds to build a very large church in the centre of the village. The Oaș region is indeed extremely wealthy, especially since many villagers went abroad after 1989. Getting back the Monastery did not seem then to be of such

crucial importance, since the Greek Catholic believers could all attend the liturgies inside the large building. This became even clearer during the last years, as I could witness it during my stay in Bixad during summer 2007. The new Greek Catholic Church is now fully decorated, but it is empty most of the time, because everyone between 18 and 50 works abroad. I was also struck by the fact that the pilgrimage in the Orthodox monastery seemed to gather much less people that previously. Many of my informants underlined that the situation is now peaceful by lack of contenders who all work abroad. I will now address a somehow more violent situation by looking at the Cluj Cathedral case.

Legal Recognition, Violent Recovery: the case of Cluj

In Bixad, even though property rights of the Greek Catholic Church over the Monastery had been recognised, the decision was not applied. In Cluj, however, it was. On March 13, 1998, the Cathedral *Schimbarea la Fața* (the Transfiguration) in the centre of Cluj was taken "by force" by a group of Greek Catholic believers. Until then, the cathedral had been used by the Orthodox Church. This event[16] was widely reported by the mass media throughout the country; it was perceived and presented both by the media and some Orthodox believers as an extremely violent clash between the two Churches. I stayed in Cluj in April and May 1998, and in Spring and Summer1999. In Bixad, I had carried out direct observation. The data I used to analyse the "*Schimbare la Fața*" event were different: newspapers and narratives of some of the participants, formulated more than one year afterwards.

The Cathedral was built in the 19th Century by the Franciscans and was first given to the Holy See by the Franciscans in 1918. In 1924, it was given by Pope Pious XI to the Greek Catholic Bishop Iuliu Hossu. After 1948, it was used by the Orthodox Church. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Greek Catholic Church tried to get it back and commenced legal action. The case was taken to court. In 1996, the Cluj Tribunal ruled that the Cathedral had to be returned to the Greek Catholic Church (civil decision 9392/1996). On February 20, 1998, the Bucharest Appeal Chamber also recognised the right of the Greek Catholic Church, and, additionally, ruled that the Cathedral should be evacuated by the Orthodox Church.

On Friday, March 13, 1998, a small group of Greek Catholic believers appeared at the Cathedral's door with a bailiff, in order to enter it and to take it officially. What happened next is controversial. The Orthodox authorities qualified that day as a "black Friday" and the action of the Greek Catholics as a profanation. In the official review of the Cluj Orthodox Archiepiscopacy, *Renașterea*, they declared that the presence of the Orthodox believers in the Cathedral was

[16] On the concept of event in anthropology, see: Bensa and Fassin (2002).

legal, canonical and peaceful, that the action of the Greek Catholics was aggressive, and therefore a statutory offence, and that the action had been prepared and had taken place with the complicity of the Cluj police, allegedly manipulated by the Greek Catholic prefect of the Cluj county and brother-in-law of Matei Boila. They described the whole event in a military style: "some Greek Catholics had wormed their way into the church earlier and occupied strategic positions",[17] in order to physically attack the Orthodox seminarists.

On the other side, the Greek Catholic authorities denounced the manipulation of the facts in the media. They indicated that

> The information given by local radio stations and other media distorted in a monstrous way the events which took place in our Cathedral. Everything that was written about violence and profanation is untrue. We invite the population and the media to visit our holy Cathedral, which was given back to us by a decision made by the supreme authority of Romanian justice. They will be able to see that everything remained untouched and that our believers, who are in the church, are just praying peacefully. These believers will remain in the church until the bailiff officially gives us the keys, in conformity with the decision[18].

In the two points of view concerning the same event, there is an obvious opposition between the "sentimental" argument presented by the Orthodox side, who took care of the building for almost fifty years, and the legal argument presented by the Greek Catholic Church. As Iordachi (1999) suggests, the two Churches adopted two very different strategies in the contested property process. The Cathedral's Orthodox priest, quoted by Iordachi, said: "we will not obey the law, since the Romanian system of justice does not obey the law itself, in a situation in which tens of thousands believers are thrown out of a religious edifice simply because the Court took into account only the right to property" (Iordachi, 1999: 161). This quotation illustrates the more general problem in property restitution issues of a too narrow interpretation of the property principle, usually in favour of the former owners. But in fact in the case of the Greek Catholic properties, the user's rights (i.e. the Orthodox Church) prevailed over the owner's right in most of the cases.

It is interesting to note what happened in the months after this event and to present how it was seen by some of the actors:

> It wasn't as shown on television. No one entered the sacred place behind the Iconostasis. (...) The decision was clear: we had to get the Cathedral back. But there was all this mess. And I wrote a personal letter to the Orthodox Archibishop,

[17] Press release Nr. 553/17.03.1998, Vad, Feleac and Cluj Orthodox Romanian Archidiocese PR office, in *Renașterea*, no. 3, 8th year, March 1998, p.2.

[18] See: L'ÉGLISE EN DÉTRESSE DANS LE MONDE, N° 101, Janvier-Février-Mars 1999, «Cluj: information et désinformation», pp. 19-25. Also see Nicula 2003: 382.

> and I told him: "Your Highness, if, during your stay in the USA, you had learned what *fair play* means, if, instead of all this show, you had left the Cathedral with dignity, in a eucharistic procession, if you had embraced the Greek Catholic priest, while giving him the keys, then you would have won. But now, because of that, many Orthodox believers came back to us".

There is here a juridical argument: "the sentence was clear". But, unlike the Bixad Monastery, the Cluj Cathedral became an important national issue for both sides. The transformation of a potential conflict into (in this case physical) violence almost always involves several categories of people and institutions (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999). In the *Schimbarea la Faţa* event, one can suggest that the Greek Catholic Church as an institution needed at least one symbolic victory in its restitution campaign. But the presence that day in Cluj of MP Matei Boila, a Greek Catholic priest, author of the bill proposing a global juridical frame for the Greek Catholic properties and a major Cluj personality, is certainly also a piece in the puzzle, illustrating the interrelation between local and national issues. There are more recent examples of contentious restitution processes. In 2006, after 16 years of lawsuits, the Church *Sfinţii Arhangheli Mihail şi Gavriil* (The Archangels Michael and Gabriel) in Satu Mare[19] was taken back by the Greek Catholic Church; the event provoked similar reactions in the local media[20] and similar heated discussions[21] than in Cluj. However, recent visit to both churches in Cluj and Satu Mare and discussions with priests and believers showed a real appeasement from both sides. This can also be explained by the fact that it is now clear that the revitalization process of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church has proved unfavourable; it is unlikely that it will number more believers than its current 200,000 followers.

Recovery Before Legal Recognition: the case of Ieud

The situation in Ieud (in the Valea Izei, Maramureş area) as it appeared during my ethnographic research, is again very different. In Bixad, a government decision in favour of the Greek Catholic Church was not applied, without conflict. In Cluj, the law was applied, but in a rather violent way. In Ieud, one judicial decision went against the Greek Catholic Church (concerning the presbytery), while one went in favour of it (the Şes Church).

[19] See http://greco-catolica.org/categorieview.aspx?id=2 (accessed 03.10.2009).
[20] http://www.gazetanord-vest.ro/arhiva/2005/ianuarie/17ian/index_files/page0003.html (accessed 27.02.2008).
[21] www.greco-catolica.org

The Şes Church

Ieud's *Şes* (Plain) church was built in typical Maramureş style in 1700, even though the local Orthodox priest claims that it was actually built in 1697, before the Union of the Greek Catholic Church with Rome. After 1948, it became Orthodox and it was the village's main church until a new church was built in 1984. The new church was apparently built by all the villagers, and some Greek Catholic believers demanded financial compensation after 1990, since in 1984, they had contributed both physically and financially to a building that now had nothing to do with them. Some of them even pretended that it had been secretly consecrated according to the Greek Catholic rite. The case of the new church is interesting since few churches were built in Romania during the Communist era. Though some Greek Catholic believers claimed it, no action was undertaken to recover it. The Greek Catholics wanted the Şes church

Having tried in vain to regain the Şes Church in 1990, a group of Greek Catholics broke a padlock on the 6th of December 1990 and occupied the building. Decision 466/1992 included the Şes Church on the list of 80 buildings which had to be given back, but by then the Church had already been taken, unlike the Monastery of Bixad. Many believers mentioned this event, in terms such as this:

> There were many people out there. First, they asked politely, they asked them to allow us to enter, but they didn't want to, so, then, we broke the padlock, and we entered the church, and that's it!
> Q.: Was there a priest with you?
> Yes, there was one of my brothers-in-law, he's a Greek Catholic priest, he came and we did a wonderful liturgy. We always had a priest since 1989. At the beginning, during a long winter, we did the liturgy outside, in the snow, everyone would stand outside, with the children, and they would leave us like that! But how could we stay like that? If we are free, we go where we want. Should I be forced to go to the Orthodox church? There are three churches in the village and they wouldn't let us even use one of them. Our churches, and they wouldn't give them to us! Should we have begged them, until they agreed? This is how we entered the church, that's it!

Four arguments are presented here to justify the breaking of the padlock: 1. The Greek Catholics did not have any place to pray, they were forced to stand outside in the snow and so they had to take the church. 2. If there is freedom of religion, people should go where they want. 3. There are many churches in Ieud; the Orthodox do not need them all. 4. These are Catholic churches, since before 1948 the whole village was Greek Catholic. However, one could object that the arguments presented here are valid in other villages, but were not accepted by the Orthodox side. I argue that in this case the outcome was not one of violent confrontation, since the Şes Church was not used as the village's main church.

The Presbytery

The presbytery, however, was claimed by both sides. This building, situated near the Şes Church, was nationalised in 1948, and used by the local school afterwards. In 1991, when Father D., a Greek Catholic priest, arrived from another Maramureş village with his family, he settled in the house. But the school took the case to Court, and the Court ruled in favour of the school. After the judgement, some people (i.e. Orthodox) wanted to displace the D. family by force; here is Father D.'s account:

> Here, before 1948, it was a confessional school, there was the main building, the yard, and the Greek Catholic school, I have the documents, I can show you. (...) Before I came here, people [Greek Catholics] entered by force, because they wanted to get their goods back, and they wanted the building to be the Greek Catholic presbytery. When I came, the trial had already started, and they [the school] won it, and they came here and told me: "Go away!" And I almost decided to go, but finally I said: "I won't leave this place, even dead, if you want me to go, you will have to kill me first". But finally I decided to go, they gave me this CAP house (communist collective). Finally, we accepted that, but it was hard".

In Ieud, as in Cluj, a juridical solution did not prevent violence. In this example, as in many others, an acceptable solution for both sides was found outside the court. The religious situation I observed in Ieud during my last fieldwork in 2007 was a relatively peaceful one. Both the Orthodox and the Greek Catholic priest and their congregations were putting their energy into building a new Orthodox Monastery and a Greek Catholic Church respectively. Even though, unlike in Bixad, the priests could not reach any agreement on joint funerals[22], physical violence related to restitution issues has been avoided since 1991. The Ieud presbytery case is the most violent action I have recorded in the Greek Catholic patrimony cases. In this case, it seems that the stakes were all entirely local. In Bixad and Cluj, even though national actions and decisions have affected the restitution process, solutions were always decisively shaped by local actors and configurations.

Conclusion

Property restitution has been and remains a major issue in the former communist countries: it is part of a moral and social reordering, an attempt to repair socialism's breach of property. After its re-legalisation in 1989, the Romanian Greek Catholic launched a campaign to reclaim its properties. This

[22] Since Ieud's two cemeteries are mixed, funeral celebrations are organised according to the *Simultaneum* rule.

process is similar to other property restitution processes in Romania and in neighbouring countries, but it also has some specificity: the official owner (the Romanian state) was not the user (the Orthodox Church), and the number of believers within the Greek Catholic Church was not high enough to support the case for a systematic restitution of its properties.

In this paper I have drawn on three case studies to explore the juridical and non-juridical arguments pursued both by the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox in the course of the conflicts. At the national level, the question was: who has the right on the confiscated property? The Greek Catholic Church, because it is the former owner, or the Orthodox Church, because it has been using the churches for decades and is much more important in terms of faithful (20 millions versus 200,000)? In addition, for the Greek Catholic Church, property restitution was also not only a way to repair the faults committed by the Communist regime, but also a precondition for its revitalization process. For the Orthodox Church, such claims were considered as a threat to ecumenical dialogue. Both contenders also made reference to the "precedence principle": the Greek Catholic part claiming that part of the Orthodox patrimony was Greek Catholic before 1948, the Orthodox answering that the 1697 Union with Rome was a forced one and that it should get back the property it lost then. At the local level, in Bixad and Cluj, I have showed the opposition between the "sentimental" argument presented by the Orthodox side, which took care of the building for almost fifty years, and the legal argument presented by the Greek Catholic Church. In Ieud, one of the arguments presented by the Greek Catholics was that there were many churches in the village, they would not harm anyone by using one of them. On the contrary the Orthodox part presented a legal argument. By focusing on the arguments and on the critical activity presented by both sides at critical moments, I have emphasised the gap between legal decisions and their implementation in practice, and show that such decisions neither systematically prevent, nor systematically fuel violence. I have also underlined the fact that violence is rarely an exclusive spontaneous phenomenon; this is especially clear in the Cluj Cathedral case, where local and national stakes intermingled.

Compared to Western Ukraine, where the Greek Catholic Church has regained its dominant position (Naumescu, 2008, 2009), the situation in Transylvania has proved unfavourable to the restitution campaign. I can hazard some guesses about why the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was much more successful than the Romanian one after 1990. First, in Ukraine, the decision to join the Greek Catholic was collective: if a priest would decide to become Greek Catholic, the whole village would follow him and there was therefore no restitution problem. In Romania, the decision to join the Greek Catholic Church appears to be much more individual. A second possible

reason for the success of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is the internal conflict within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: one side acts as it depends on Kiev, while the other one claims that the only real patriarchate is in Moscow (see Naumescu, 2008). This situation probably left more space to the renewal process of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine than in Romania, where the Orthodox Church is united and acts as a dominant Church.

Despite the failure to agree on a global frame to resolve the Greek Catholic patrimony problem, most conflicts were resolved peacefully. One explanation for this general calm is the building of new churches, both by the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox Churches. Another possible answer has to do with the relative failure of the Greek Catholic renewal process in Romania. According to the last census of 2002, the number of Greek Catholics has actually fallen since 1992: from 223,327 to 195,481 (even though Greek Catholic officials quote figures as high as 800,000). The Orthodox Church has used the demographic argument in order to justify holding on to its properties, as it appeared recently with the Buda bill. Finally, the recent transformations of the social landscape in Romania have certainly affected religious interrelations in Transylvania. An estimated three million people are leaving abroad, going back home only occasionally; the whole religious life is being profoundly changed. New parishes have been founded, mostly in Italy and Spain. As several priests commented on me during my last stay in the region in 2007, it seems that the struggle over property has also calmed down by lack (or at least weakening) of contenders.

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THE SACRALIZATION OF ROMANIAN SOCIETY. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROFANE FUNCTIONS OF THREE ROMANIAN CHURCHES

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ABSTRACT. This article analyzes the social presence of churches in post-communist Romania. Its main question is how the social role of churches has been shaped in different spheres of the Romanian society. To answer this question, church-based organizations from one region in Transylvania are analyzed. The article proposes a theoretical model according to which the increasing social presence of churches is driven by two different strategies that these organizations employ. The first strategy can be called "the sacralization of public institutions", and it has the goal of ensuring the presence of the church in public institutions. The second strategy can be labeled as "building its own institutions": churches become public actors using the elbowroom available in civil society. The essay comparatively presents these two strategies, and argues that both can operate against the functional differentiation of the Romanian society.

Keywords: church, counter secularization, secularization, profane social functions, functional differentiation

Churches and society in Central and Eastern Europe

Regarding the religious situation of East-Central European societies[2], it is a frequent statement that in these, the development of the relationship between the churches and society has taken a different direction from that seen in Western Europe. The different development of this relationship was brought about by the instauration of the communist regime with its political program aimed at displacing the churches from the public sphere, continuing in the post-communist period with the churches' vigorous reappearance in public life.

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[2] The article is a shorter and revised version of the unpublished paper *Profane Functions of the Churches in Romania*, written within the framework of the European Commission's FP6 Project *Religion and Values in Central and Eastern Europe*.

As one cause to the hasty reappearance of the churches in public and political life we can mention that, in the atomized post-communist societies, the churches were the only institutions which legitimately represented the large masses – and such representatives were heavily needed in the process of reformulation of the social-political order. Furthermore, the legitimacy of some church leaders was strengthened by the fact that, during the decades of communism, the churches (or some of their members) had been considered the most important anti-communist factors (Tomka, 2007).

The stronger church-society connections in these countries proved to be more than a mere characteristic of the first period of post-communist transition. The relationship remained strong during the following periods, too. In addition to remaining significant opinion-shaping factors, the churches also became important actors in a series of social spheres where they previously weren't present. This vigorous presence of the churches in the profane spheres of East-European societies seems to be a development not met in modern western societies[3] (Tomka, 2007).

The analyses dealing with the phenomenon are not very abundant. An analysis of the situation in Poland points out that the Polish Catholic Church, which represents the overwhelming majority of the country's population, assumes roles in serving the general wellbeing of the nation in various fields of everyday political life, social work and education, in the analysis and evaluation of the events of public life, as well as in the judicial representation of powerless social groups (Litak, 2007). One Hungarian article stresses the role of the churches as actors of civil society (Tomka, 2007).

Another Polish study points out that while the social institutions of the majority church are strongly intertwined with state institutions, the mostly informal institutional frameworks with the same functions belonging to the smaller churches have much less connection with the state. Furthermore, the churches' profane activities are not ethnically neutral. While the target group of the older, "historical" church's social institutions consists of some of the ethnic communities, the newer protestant churches define their target groups in a much more universalistic way, rising above ethnic group boundaries (Dyczewska and Litak, 2007).

As with the whole East-Central European context, the articles dealing with the profane functions of the churches in the Romanian context are not numerous either. One article analyzes the discourse of the Romanian Orthodox Church (Stănescu, 1996), while two others examine the social care activities of the

[3] "The participation of the churches in profane affairs and their public acting was in most countries of the region unprecedented in foregoing decades. (...) Their resurrection in the public arena, and their massive involvement in social, cultural, and political domains came unexpected. This fact underlines the judgment that Eastern European reconstruction does not proceed in full correspondence with western developments" (Tomka, 2007:107).

churches (Szilágyi, 1995; Lampen, 2005). Questions about the presence and role of the churches in public institutions, primarily in education, were raised by a few other articles (Stan and Turcescu, 2005; Moise, 2004; Andreescu et al. 2008). Finally, the book of Stan and Turcescu (2007) deals with the relations between the churches and politics.

These articles clearly support the basic idea of this essay, namely that in Romania, just as in other East-Central European countries, the churches have acquired an important social role, gaining presence in several previously laicized social spheres. A rearrangement of the relationship between churches and profane social fields has taken place, the churches becoming active participants of political life, education, social work, health care, and a series of other fields. How this presence is accomplished, and the ways in which this presence influences the functioning of these fields constitute the subject of our analysis.

The question of the profane social engagement of the churches in the sociology of religion

The sociology of religion literature offers a possible theoretical framework for the relationship between religious institutions and profane social spheres, as well as for rearrangements in this relationship, in the form of theories of secularization. Following Dobellaere's attempt to systematize the complex phenomenon of secularization, three dimensions (or levels) of this process can be distinguished (Dobellaere, 2002). The first level is *individual secularization*, denoting a decline of individuals' involvement in churches and denominations. Basically, it is a lack in normative integration, an expansion of the distance between the norms of religious communities on the one side, and the knowledge, attitudes and conduct of their members on the other. The second level of secularization is *organizational secularization*. By this, the author understands an internal transformation of the churches and denominations, resulting in the replacement of religious values with secular ones. And finally, the third level of secularization, *societal secularization*, is a consequence of the functional differentiation of modern societies, chiefly meaning that some sectors (or subsystems) of modern societies gain increasingly higher degrees of autonomy as a result of their ongoing professionalization. One part of this process is the growing independence from religion attained by the profane sectors. Religion is demoted to being only one subsystem among many others, and due to different other factors, it shifts from the public sphere of society to the private one (Dobellaere, 2002:29-40). The main cause leading to the differentiation of the various subsystems is the growth of rationality, which results in the actors of the subsystems becoming guided by their own instrumental control instead of relying on moral rules. The differentiation of a given subsystem can be an unwanted consequence of

professionalization, but it can just as well be the result of a conscious laicization attempt. The author calls this latter case manifest societal secularization, while the former one is labeled latent secularization.

The process which constitutes the subject of our analysis seems to be the opposite of what Dobellaere calls manifest societal secularization: it is the penetration of religion (or at least of the churches) into some social spheres which previously had been differentiated from religion and from other spheres, as a result of a conscious strategy of some social actors. This process could be called "sacralization", an expression used by Stark and Iannacone for the process of strengthening of the public presence of a church, as a result of the church's attaining a monopole position on the religious market[4] (Stark and Iannacone, 1994).

Of course, the examples they use do not necessarily denote the complete opposite of functional differentiation. The presence of a crucifix in a classroom can be merely symbolic. The presence of the church in a certain profane social sphere can be interpreted as the opposite of functional differentiation only if it is affecting the special instrumental rationality of the respective subsystem. Practically, the instrumental rationalization of a subsystem comes into being through the ongoing emergence of a specific "universal binary code" or "value pair" in the functioning of the given subsystem. This creates a special "logic", which determines the constituent communications of the subsystem. Therefore, a given subsystem can be differentiated to an extent determined by the degree of prevalence of its specific values and logic. In the subsystem of science, the dominant value pair is that of false/true, in the judicial one these values are legal/illegal, while in the economic subsystem they are profitable/nonprofitable, etc. (Luhmann, 1994). At the organizational level, the communications following the given value pairs are gradually differentiated into "professional institutions" dominated by the specific communicational logic and instrumental rationality (Pokol, 1999). In other words, institutions belonging to the state, private and non-profit sectors, or to the churches, are part of the same subsystem if they are linked together by the specific rationality of the given subsystem. In this case, an employee of a state-institution, for example, belongs to the subsystem as a professional of the respective field, and not as a politician (i.e. actor of the political subsystem).[5]

[4] "Sacralisation is a familiar phenomenon, that evokes images of annual ceremonies when priests bless the fishing fleet, of classrooms dominated by a crucifix, and especially of religious ceremonies intrinsic to the public, political spheres of life" (Stark and Iannacone, 1994: 234).

[5] This conceptual framework offers broader interpretational possibilities for the churches' social presence, than those which restrict the issue to the relationship between the state and the churches, only considering the other social spheres as different dimensions of this relationship. See Stan and Turcescu (2007).

According to the above, if the presence of the churches in the different profane spheres is affecting the specific values of these spheres and the way they are functioning, then this can indeed be interpreted as the opposite of societal secularization. To distinguish between the above mentioned two types of sacralization, we will be using in the following the term "symbolic sacralization" for the mere symbolic presence of the churches in the profane spheres, and the term "functional sacralization" for the other case. The first one denotes the presence of the churches in the different profane spheres without any effects upon the specific rationality of these spheres or upon the way these are functioning. Functional sacralization, on the other hand, denotes the situation where the instrumental rationality of a subsystem (more precisely, the functioning of a specialized profane institution) is also influenced by the theological rationality of the churches.

The growing social presence of the churches can, however, be interpreted in other ways, too. A successful alternative interpretation is given by Casanova, who claims that in modern societies we are frequently witnessing the "deprivatization" of religion. In other words, he interprets the growing social importance of religion as a shift of religion from the private sphere into the public one (Casanova, 1994). He starts the conceptual grounding of this thesis by giving his own, three-dimensional definition of secularization. Unlike Dobellaere, this author distinguishes between three meanings of the general secularization thesis. First, secularization means the differentiation of the secular spheres from religious norms and beliefs. This is exactly what above was called functional differentiation. Second, secularization means the decline of religious beliefs and practices, and third, the marginalization of religion and its shift to the private sphere.

In his opinion, the functional differentiation of modern societies is an unquestionable fact, constituting the core of modernity. However, the decline of religious beliefs and practices can not be considered to be a structural trend of modern societies, even if in numerous (mainly western) countries it seems to be a clear historical trend. These two dimensions of the secularization process are interrelated: the more a church resists to functional differentiation, the stronger the degree of personal religiousness will decline in the long term.

Regarding the privatization of religion, Casanova argues that this, again, is not a structural trend, just an option of different churches and religious groups. But they can just as well decide to move from the private sphere into the public one. For the conceptual presentation of this process, he uses a threefold model in which society as a political community consists of the state, political society and civil society. Religions can become public on each of these three levels, but the author's conclusion is that public religion is compatible with modern societies (due to their differentiated structure) only at the civil society's level.

The shift of religion toward civil society can occur from different directions, as a withdrawal from the state or as a movement emerging from the private sphere of the citizens (Casanova, 1994).

There is no doubting that the adoption of public profane roles by the churches of post-communist Central and Eastern European societies is closely related to their search for a new place in these societies. This is a process of reshaping of the relationship between the religious and secularized spheres within these societies, a process which can take many different forms. What this process looks like in Romania, and in what way its theoretical interpretation is possible, will be the questions discussed in the following.

Methodology and empirical data

In our analyses, we have followed two separate goals. On the one hand, we tried to offer a comprehensive description of the different social fields in which the churches are present in Romania. On the other hand, we tried to assess the effects exerted by church presence upon the functioning of these social fields.

In order to be able to give a hopefully comprehensive overview of the churches' profane activities, we had to narrow down the subject of our research regarding a few aspects. First, we have limited our analysis to only three of the Romanian churches. The churches analyzed here are the ones with the highest membership numbers: the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Transylvanian Calvinist Church. Second, we have limited the analysis to a medium-sized territorial unit for each of the three discussed churches. These territorial units are an archbishopric in the case of the Orthodox Church, respectively a diocese in the case of both the Catholic and the Calvinist Church.[6] These three territorial units are located in the same region, meaning that the analyzed institutions are found in the same general cultural milieu, having been created and functioning under the same socio-economic conditions, while they also serve approximately the same number of believers. These latter common contextual factors allow us to draw a comparison between the three institution systems.

Third, we have limited our analysis to the organizational level. In other words, we focused on the organizational frameworks of the activities of churches, and not on the practical activities carried out within these institutional frameworks. Our aim was to make an inventory of those institutions created by the analyzed churches which are oriented toward profane tasks. This was carried

[6] The analyzed territorial units are: the Romanian Orthodox Archbishopric of Vad, Feleac and Cluj, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Alba Iulia, and the Transylvanian Diocese of the Reformed Church in Romania.

out based on the churches' materials made available on the Internet.[7] We have taken into consideration as church-based institutions those institutions which were either represented on the web pages of the churches, or could be accessed through these pages, using a technique similar to the so-called "snowball" method. For each of the accessed web pages, we tried to assess the activities of the represented institution.

However, this method only allows for a partial evaluation of the social presence of the churches, since they are frequently also present in other institutions of secular social spheres in addition to the institutions they have created themselves. In our attempt to take into account this interpenetration of secular institutions and churches, we rely upon the existing literature on this subject.

We analyzed the effect exerted by church presence upon the specific social fields through interviews made with the staff of a non-profit social care institute, and we have also made use of the descriptions of some other inquiries.

The profane social activities of the churches

Analyzing the church-based institutional system, we can establish that the two main fields of activity of the churches, those in which the most numerous institutions are created, are social work (social care) and education. In addition to these, there are, in smaller numbers, institutions related to cultural and economic activities, too. In the organizational sphere, the politically oriented activities are reflected to the least extent.

The churches in the field of social work and health care

Activities related to social work are the most frequent in each of the three cases. There is a great extent of similarity regarding the types of social work activities and institutions: in each of the analyzed cases, the most frequent such institutions are retirement homes, family-system orphanages and different health care services for the elderly.

In the case of the Orthodox Church, these programs are integrated mainly by one central nonprofit organization, the Christiana Association. The social programs outside this framework are limited to institutions with a smaller radius of operation, usually running a single program.

[7] Taking into account the character of the information used, our inquiry should be considered a kind of discourse analysis. We consider the web materials that we used to be the self-representations of the churches, also admitting that these self-representations can, to a certain extent, distort the "reality" they reflect. However, there are no reasons to assume that this possible distorting effect might be different in the three separate cases of the studied churches.

In the social work sphere, the Roman Catholic Church seems to have the most developed institutional system. Its main characteristic lies in the strong presence of international Catholic charity organizations. The majority of the Catholic social programs are coordinated by two institutions. One of these is Caritas, the institution with the biggest organizational apparatus of all those encountered, and the other is the Saint Francis Foundation of Deva, a locally created social institution network. Smaller than the two mentioned above, but still functioning as networks are the Maltese Charity Service, the Faith and Light Community, the Csibész Foundation and the Kolping Families.

Typical for the Calvinist social care institutions system are its many individual institutions. These locally founded institutions are usually created by single parishes and experience little central coordination, while offering a varied range of programs. The administration of retirement homes, different programs for children, alcoholism treatment services, Roma integration, home nursing, medical prevention, and aid programs for large families are their most important activities.

In addition to their own institutions, the analyzed churches are present in state-supported social care institutions, too. In state-run elderly homes and orphanages, the churches are present through sermons kept at these locations by a specialized group of their personnel.

The most massive presence of the churches seems to be attained in state-supported health care institutions, through a large number of hospital priests and ministers. Hospital chapels are also frequently built or set up in existing spaces, and the presence of religious symbols (icons, crucifixes, etc.) in hallways and hospital rooms is widespread. In private hospitals, on the other hand, there is no church presence at all, neither do we find religious symbols in these institutions.

The churches in education

In the educational sphere, each of the churches is present in the public education system, all of them also having their own educational institutions. In the latter respect, there seems to be a similarity between the three churches. They each have a theological seminary, a theological faculty (mainly for the instruction of religion teachers), post-secondary institutions (for social workers, nurses and choir leaders), and high schools. Some of them even have elementary and nursery schools. Each of the churches has schools and boarding schools for socially disadvantaged children. The Orthodox Church seems to have fewer middle and primary level educational institutions than the other two. Training centers for adults are typical for the Catholic and Calvinist churches.

In theory, the churches' presence in public educational institutions amounts to a general Christian religion class in the state-run schools, however, in practice this role is filled by denominational religion classes. The presence of the churches is achieved through the physical presence of the religion

teachers, these positions often being filled by priests. In this regard, all three analyzed churches exploit the possibilities offered by the Romanian education law. The presence in the public schools is also frequently established through the creation of specific spaces, special classrooms for the religion classes ("cabinets"), inside the public institution. An even stronger institutional and physical presence is accomplished by setting up or building school chapels, or campus chapels in the case of universities. The participation of church representatives on major events in the school's life (opening and closing ceremonies of the academic year, inaugurations of new buildings, etc.) is general practice.

Cultural activities

Cultural activities do appear among the activities of each analyzed church, but to a lesser extent than those related to social care or education. Cultural aspects appear in the central church organizations rather than in separate institutions. This field of activity is connected first of all with the administration of the churches' artistic patrimonies. In the case of the Orthodox Church, the cultural activity includes the management of the church media outlets (radio station and publishing of a periodical). In the Catholic diocese, activities related to church art and church music also appear, and the publishing of a church periodical seems to be regarded as equally important. In the protestant case, the cultural orientation, too, seems to be more decentralized, the number of church periodicals edited by local parishes being much higher than in the other two cases.

Taking care of the church's artistic testimony is not a new task – this could be the reason why the related institutions appear in the internal church structures rather than in the newly emerged church-based nonprofit sector (in each of the cases, there are permanent committees dedicated to this purpose within the church's organizational structure). In contrast, the publishing of periodicals, an activity interrupted for decades during socialist times, is reorganized in a much greater measure in the nonprofit (and partially in the market) sector. In this regard, the Calvinist church's specific feature is the publishing of a larger number of local periodicals. Another reason for the scarce appearance of the cultural institutions on the web is that many cultural activity forms have attained only a low level of formalization. For instance, the very frequent church choirs don't show up at all in our organization-level analysis.

The churches in the economic and political sphere

The economic orientation can be found in the organizational structure of each of the studied churches. Unfortunately, this type of activity doesn't appear in any web materials. Consequently, we didn't manage to analyze this field. The only exception to this is the Caritas organization, in connection to which we have found three economic enterprises.

However, from other sources of information (not used in this analysis) we also know about a significant number of church-related economic enterprises. These are usually connected with local parishes, their presentation on the Internet probably not being feasible.[8]

Again, in the case of the church institutions presented on the Internet, their political orientation appears neither in the churches' organizational structure nor in the specific non-profit sector. This, again, doesn't mean the lack of such an orientation. What we can conclude in this regard is only that the method we used is not suitable for the analysis of economic and political activities. On the other hand, the presence of the priests at political events is almost indispensable. Local priests frequently are involved in political campaigns by shaping the public opinion. The Orthodox Church has a permanent representative in the parliament, and the State Secretary for the Churches serves church interests in the government.[9]

The churches in the institutions of coercion: penitentiaries and the army

Naturally, penitentiaries and the army are state institutions. Nevertheless, the churches are present in these institutions also. A wide network of penitentiary and army priests and mass services was established, and many penitentiary and army chapels were set up in existing facilities or purpose built.

Strategies for increasing social presence

In the theoretical part of our paper, we have sketched three different possible ways in which the social presence of the churches can grow. Accordingly, symbolic sacralization covers the appearance of religion and of the churches in different profane institutions without any effects on the specific instrumental rationality or functioning of the latter. Functional sacralization denotes the case when the presence of a church in a certain profane institution becomes more than symbolic, influencing the functioning of the latter by enforcing in the profane sphere its own specific religious values and perspective. The notion of deprivatization (Casanova 1994) covers the process wherein churches gain social importance by using mobilization and organization methods specific to civil movements.

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[8] It is obvious that the detailed web presence of social and educational institutions also serves marketing purposes.

[9] Regarding the interweaving of state-structures and churches we can find a description in an article by Stănescu, who formulates that "…in their official stances, the representatives of the Romanian state do not differentiate between their faith and their official status" (Stănescu, 1996:84). Referring to the same institution Stan-Turcescu sets out that its highest officials, the state secretaries had one and all theological qualification (Stan and Turcesu, 2007:28).

As we could see in the above, the analyzed churches seek to strengthen their presence in different social spheres in two basic ways, on the one hand by creating an "own" system of institutions oriented towards profane tasks, and on the other hand through penetrating with their presence the public institutions run by the state. In the following, we argue that these two strategies, while following different goals (public appearance through civil actions, respectively a symbolic presence in the public institutions), can both lead to the functional sacralization of the social fields they penetrate. To support this statement, we have to take a look at the way the churches act in the different types of institutions.

Building own institutions – acting in civil society

As we have seen, there are two main fields in which the churches create and maintain their own institutions: education and social care. In our attempt to show how the churches behave as actors of civil society, respectively how the religious and secular fields of action interweave in these cases, we will restrict the inquiry to the field of social assistance.[10]

Church-related social care institutions typically function as civil organizations, being classified legally as non-profit organizations.[11] In the first stage of their formation, these institutions were created as improvised, ad-hoc solutions to specific urgent social needs. Their appearance can be interpreted as the result of problem-oriented civil actions. In this sense, they represent more or less improvised solutions to some problems that were previously in the care of the state, which emerged because the related activities were carried out deficiently or even completely ignored at the beginning of the post-communist period.

In order to be able to fill in these gaps in the state-provided social assistance system, the church-related civil actions had to undergo an institutionalization process, and organize themselves for the permanent fulfillment of their functions. During all these years, the control of the state over their activity was very low, and especially in the first period of post-communism, they practically enjoyed complete independence. Later on, the state began to once again broaden

[10] The confessional education institutions are in their status somewhere between state- and private-institutions, in many respects functioning similarly to the public schools. Even though theoretically they are private schools, they are financed mainly by the state. Accordingly, they are under strong state-control: both the employment of the personnel and the overseeing of their pedagogical activity are controlled by the related institutions of the Ministry of Education. Thus, the actual presence of the churches within their own schools is very similar to the one within the public schools, the difference between the two being merely one of degree.

[11] Our inquiry regarding the formation and actual functioning of social assistance organizations is based on interviews with founders and personnel of institutions of this kind.

its control over the social care activities. Practically, this meant a growing rigorousness of the rules prescribing the functioning of social institutions, and the growth of expectations regarding their professional work. In other words, the related subsystem started again to strengthen its presence in this field of activities.

The strengthening of the social care subsystem drove the church-based social institutions into a dilemma: they could either start on the way of professionalization, or hand over their social care activities, together with their clients, to the state-run social care institutions. The most frequently chosen path proved to be the former one.

The involvement of the churches in the alleviation of social problems, and their participation in drawing the state's and society's attention to unsolved social issues, are actions typical for the actors of civil society. But this kind of role of civil society's actors usually ends with the stage of signaling and an eventual temporary solution to the problems. The choice of assuming responsibility for fulfilling special, professional duties in a permanent way, representing a turn toward the path of professionalization, signals the determination on their part to become long term members of the social care subsystem.

This professionalization can be achieved in two different ways: by employing an adequate number of trained social assistants, or by training the own personnel. The latter solution leads to the appearance of a class of staff with double qualification, whose primary qualification is in most cases of a theological nature, in addition to which they also attained a second qualification as social workers. To facilitate the access to this double qualification, theology and social worker double specialization programs were started within the theology faculties. Both the employment of "external" professionals and the training of "inner" persons are widely used strategies of the church-based social institutions. The combination of these two strategies seems to work well, too: a smaller number of "inner" employees in higher positions and a larger number of external trained personnel in the less important positions, sometimes with frequent rotation of the latter category.

Thus, solely based on the specific professional knowledge of their personnel, it is hard to decide whether these institutions are part of the social care subsystem or of the religious subsystem. What can be stated with certainty is that a significant number of personnel with double qualification is working within these institutions. The presence of this group of professionals increases the probability of admixture between the specific rationalities of the two subsystems, as the separation of the two rationalities has to be attained between the roles of the same person.

Sacralizing public institutions

As we have seen, church presence in public institutions can be found in almost all social spheres: in the social assistance and educational spheres, in the health care system, as well as in the institutions of coercion. The presence of the churches in these public institutions has first of all a missionary character, rather than a secular one. Its goal is primarily to offer access to the transcendent and to salvation for those in trouble, through the presence of the church, this practice targeting first of all state-run hospitals, prisons, and nursing homes. A less pronounced form of this presence is accomplished by using religious symbols (icons, crucifixes) on the walls of public institutions, coupled with regular visitations in these institutions by priests, and through regular masses. A higher degree of church presence is attained through the creation of sacred spaces (chapels) near or inside the public institutions.[12]

In theory, this kind of church presence can take place in a manner completely parallel to the institute's specific activities. However, some analyses suggest that massive presence of the churches in these institutions does affect the specialized, profane functioning of the latter. An analysis carried out in public hospitals (Andreescu, 2008) shows that the timing of the masses is not always in alignment with the hospital's schedule regarding resting times. Furthermore, as the masses are being transmitted through loudspeakers outside the chapel, the patients of the neighboring hospital are forced to passively participate. Quite frequently, the hospitals too are equipped with loudspeaker systems, through which the masses are relayed to the hallways and hospital rooms. In this way, an even larger number of patients become passive participants of the religious event. If the timing of the rest hours is to be considered a medically prescribed part of the healing process, then it is also clear that the religious activities displace these rules through their own rationality and programs.

Church presence in other public institutions, such as retirement homes, prisons or special schools, is very similar. The highest degree of presence seems to be attained in prisons, where attending religious services practically becomes compulsory (Andreescu 2008). In this case, religious activity becomes part of the strategy for the "reeducation" of the prisoners, religious services being included into the prison's educational function. This way the reeducation strategy of the institution, previously independent of religion, is replaced with a new one, which also includes the perspective of salvation. The same can be said about the special schools too, in which religious education becomes part of the applied pedagogical methods (e.g. through holding out the prospect of godly punishment in case of bad behavior).

[12] According to a register of the Orthodox church, in 2003 there were 318 chapels in the country's public institutions: 112 in hospitals, 75 in the army, 37 in prisons, 42 in schools and 52 in social care institutions (Andreescu, 2008).

The most numerous debates were caused by attempts to sacralize the public schools. In this case too, the presence is similar to the cases presented above. The presence of the church is attained most of the time by the use of religious symbols, but school chapels are frequent, too. Ritual places in the sociological sense are probably much more numerous than the registered 42 consecrated school chapels. Beside the erection of chapels, another frequent practice is the creation of special classrooms for the teaching of religion, which often function as chapels. With the addition of the quasi-compulsory character of the religion class, the situation becomes very similar to the one described in the case of prisons. Especially if a certain religion is dominant in a given settlement, its confessional religion class becomes compulsory for all children.

The same analysis shows that in some cases, the presence of the church has led to the assimilation of the religious perspective into both the educational and the training strategies of the schools, in the latter case by emphasizing religious aspects in judging the children's behavior. In the realm of education, the novelty consists in the teaching of the religious worldview as equal in importance to the one proposed by the natural sciences, a view upheld first of all against the evolutionary paradigm taught in biology classes, but also present to a lesser extent in opposition to the world view of the social sciences.

Church-specific differences in the use of the strategies

As we have pointed out in the methodological part of this essay, we have the possibility to compare the extent of the churches' presence in the different analyzed social fields. Based on this comparison, we can assert that all the three churches included in the analysis seek to be present in the same social spheres. But if we consider the number of different organizations created by each of the churches, as well as their presence in state-run institutions, a significant difference can be seen.

The strategy of creating own institutions seems to be more characteristic of the two minority churches: in all the analyzed social fields they created a greater number of such institutions than the majority church. There are some clear differences between the two minority churches too. The Catholic church-based organizational sphere is marked by the presence of different international Catholic organizations, from which the operational know-how was probably also imported. The models of these organizations seem to be reflected in locally created organizations too, at least in their network character. In contrast, in the case of the Calvinist church the decentralized character of this organizational sphere is preeminent.

The strategy of penetrating public institutions seems to be more characteristic of the majority church. This is understandable, as for this strategy a good relationship with the political power is needed, and as several articles point out, there are strong connections between the Orthodox Church and the state. The historical characteristics of the three churches seem to converge with the differences discussed here: the model of "Byzantine symphony" regarding church-state relationship seems to strengthen the "sacralizing" strategy of the orthodox church, while the transnational character of the Catholic Church, as well as the good relations of the Calvinist Church with different western European protestant churches probably have an effect of strengthening the affinity of these churches toward the strategy of creating their own institutions.

And finally, the discussed difference in affinity toward the different strategies could be interpreted as a consequence of the differences in the relationship with the state, the minority churches compensating through their institution-building strategy for their deficiency in access to political power. This interpretation is supported by data from several regions where the minority churches form the local majority, thereby having better access to higher levels of political power. In these cases, the minority churches, too, often employ the "sacralizing" strategy, frequently appearing and acting in public institutions. These cases show that historical patterns of church-strategies can be upstaged, or at least influenced by the actual relationship with the political power.

Conclusions

The main goal of this writing was to analyze the social presence of the churches in Romanian society. For this purpose, we reviewed the different forms of the institutional presence of the churches. Based on this empirical data we distinguished between two main strategies employed by the churches in their attempt to increase their social presence. In the first case, they create and maintain their own institutions operating as non-profit organizations, the churches thus becoming important actors of civil society. In the other case, the churches acquire a constant presence in the different state-supported public institutions.

Based on the analysis of the functioning of these institutions our main conclusion is that – although the churches intend only to become actors of civil society, respectively to coexist unperturbed inside the public institutions – both strategies create the possibility of operating against the functional differentiation of society, against the professional functioning of the secular institutions. While in regard to the church-related institutions we have merely indicated the possibility and probability of this effect, regarding public institutions the tendency is described much more clearly.

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THE SOCIO-CULTURAL SPACE OF PENTECOSTALISM IN PRESENT-DAY TRANSYLVANIA: DYNAMICS OF RELIGIOUS PLURALIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA

SIMION POP[1]

ABSTRACT. The present paper approaches from a particular angle the dynamics of religious pluralization in post-communist Romania. It explores the remarkable case of Pentecostalism and its implications for a more complex understanding of the processes of religious pluralization taking place in Romania after 1989. The major arguments of the paper are articulated through ethnographical insights into the socio-religious processes that made possible the successful anchoring of a particular Pentecostal congregation in a Northern Transylvanian town. The ethnography is organized around the investigation of three main processes that, I argue, create and maintain the specific socio-cultural space of Pentecostalism in Transylvania: 1) the individualization of faith, 2) the articulation of the Pentecostal authority regime and 3) the emergence of the Pentecostal form of congregational life. This classification is rather analytical because, on the ground, all of these processes are intrinsically related and mutually enhanced. Its relevance comes from the fact that on one hand it expresses more systematically the major articulations around which the socio-cultural space of Pentecostalism is configured against the background of "traditional" churches. On the other, it reveals some of the crucial concerns of Pentecostals themselves, when it comes to defining their way of being "true Christians".

Keywords: Pentecostalism, pluralization, Romania

Stating the context: Romanian religious pluralism

In the present paper[2] I would like to approach from a particular angle the dynamics of religious pluralization in post-communist Romania. In order to achieve that I will explore more specifically the remarkable case of Pentecostalism and its implications for a more complex understanding of the processes of religious pluralization taking place in Romania after 1989. The main arguments of the paper are articulated by ethnographically exploring the socio-religious processes behind the successful anchoring of a particular Pentecostal congregation in a Northern Transylvanian town.

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[2] The present paper is based on my MA research (2007) at the Sociology and Social Anthropology Department of Central European University.

As the statistical data and sociological surveys dealing with the post-communist situation in Eastern Europe show us, in the Romanian case one can speak about an undeniable religious revival concerning the spreading of religious convictions, practices and rituals (Tomka 2001, 2006). Given that Romania is traditionally considered to be an "Orthodox country" this remarkable revival is most of the time monolithically interpreted as being a sign of the capacity of the Romanian Orthodox Church as the "national" church to finally overcome the difficult times of communism and to legitimately express itself, under the new conditions, as the indisputable carrier of the national religious aspirations (Turcescu and Stan 2007, Martin 1998). This powerful narrative, articulated in the public sphere by various actors (members of the Orthodox clergy, public intellectuals, religious associations etc.) and often supported by the state policies (Turcescu and Stan, 2007), is strongly contested especially in Transylvania, the North-Western region of Romania, vividly marked by an historically established ethno-religious plurality (Craciun and Ghitta, 1995).

The historical processes configured Transylvanian religious field mostly along the lines of constituted ethnic groups. Every group (Romanian, Hungarian, German etc.) inhabiting Transylvania for centuries has its own definite religious affiliation and, consequently, its particular way of assuming this affiliation (Craciun and Ghitta, 1995). Moreover, in the course of time, the national aspirations of Romanian Transylvanians were claimed by two churches: the Greek Catholic and the Orthodox. For that matter, besides the Orthodox which maintains a religious quasi-monopoly there are many other active Christian denominations, Protestant (Lutheran and Reformed), Roman and Greek Catholic, which supply the Transylvanian religious field with prominent religious ways of living (supported by particular forms of institutionalization)[3]. Interestingly enough, Transylvanian religious plurality is characterized by the cohabitation of various forms of Christianity each of them defining (often polemically) what the "true Christian religion" and how the appropriate way of practicing it ought to be. Transylvanian religious field is a graphic instance of the way in which the core religious repertoire of Christianity is accessed and embodied in various manners.

[3] 2002 Official Census offers the following percentages for religious affiliation in the regions that approximately cover the historical region of Transylvania :
North-Western part of Romania: Orthodox: 68.37 % Roman-Catholic: 6.86 % Reformed: 12.69 % Pentecostals: 3.90 % Greek-Catholic: 4.19 % Baptist: 1.62 %
Western part of Romania: Orthodox: 80,04 % Roman-Catholic: 8,36 % Reformed: 1.96 % Pentecostals: 4,22 % Greek-Catholic: 1,09% Baptist: 2,49%
Central part of Romania: Orthodox: 63,91 % Roman-Catholic: 15,17 % Reformed: 12.28 % Pentecostals: 1,21 % Greek-Catholic: 1,63% Baptist: 0,46%, Unitarian 2,23%

After fifty years of communist regime that forcefully privatized religion and once the post-communist socio-political pluralism was instituted, every denomination inhabiting the Transylvanian religious field has had to reinvigorate its religious identity and to re-establish its forms of social embeddedness while moving from the private sphere towards a public presence. Protestant, Roman and Greek Catholic Churches claim their rights to articulate properly their traditions within a nation-state that accepts the pluralist principles of a liberal democracy (Turcescu and Stan 2007; Martin 1998).

The public dispute emerging around these post-communist processes and the claimed role of the Romanian Orthodox Church as the "national church" have important consequences for the way one tends to understand the conditions of religious encounters in Romania and consequently the role of law and state in regulating nationally *de facto* religious plurality. The term "religious pluralism" is most often deployed in the Romanian public sphere for characterizing both a normative claim and a factual reality (Turcescu and Stan, 2007).

Based on this summary presentation of the Romanian religious situation I want to suggest that religious pluralism in Romania, although a hitherto ideologically embattled reality, is often understood, in the wake of various politics of identity, as being the political and legal framework pursued from above by state policies which allows the peaceful coexistence of various religious traditions within the boundaries of a nation-state. Moreover, the call for religious pluralism is most of the time a powerful language in which various communities articulates their sense of identity, be it strictly religious or ethnic. The identity politics emerging in this manner are framed by the historical disputes around the tensional relationships between ethnicity, nation, church and the state.

Pentecostalism and the religious pluralization from below

Without diminishing the importance of this type of approach my paper tries to understand at the grassroots the processes of religious pluralization that I contend, in the long run, will influence the public articulation of religious pluralism, and more specifically of Christian pluralism, in post-communist Romania. My argument is that the investigation of the exceptional spreading of Pentecostalism (and more generally of evangelical Christianity) in post-communist Romania is a strategic case for understanding how a process of religious pluralization takes place other that in terms of identity politics and for pushing social scientists to think more dynamically the actual configuration of religious pluralism both as ideological and empirical reality. The religious pluralization from below, of which, I argue, Pentecostalism is an instance, entails the emergence of new definitions of the relationships between the individual, community and authority that are capable of competing effectively the already

existing definitions. Moreover, religious pluralization involves the creation of new socio-cultural spaces that are able to produce and reproduce new modes of incorporating Christian beliefs and practices within individual biographies and communities' life. By effectively reorganizing the religious life of various individuals and communities caught in the disturbing social processes of post-communist transition and without being a fully articulated public religion Pentecostalism[4] is capable of creating a new socio-cultural space for religious action that dislocates the historically established links between religion, community and identity that characterize the "traditional" forms of Christianity inhabiting Transylvanian religious field.

As many social scientists have already observed, Pentecostalism represents a movement towards a "lay, popular and enthusiastic Christianity" (Martin 2005:27) that detaches religion from state power and nationalist movements and from its anchorage in ethnic and territorial communities. That does not imply the absence of any political impulse but rather the creation of a new framework capable of nurturing voluntary social bodies and autonomous religious sub-cultures that mediates between the state and the mass of the people. Various experiments of organizational self-governance, lay initiative, popular preaching and participation are the soil of a dynamic process of pluralization initiated by Pentecostalism in various regions of the world (Martin 2005, 2001). In the case of Romania the historically established relationships between religion and the state, territory, and ethnicity that define the actual socio-cultural embeddedness of "traditional" Christianity (be it Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant) and the historic integrity of the constituted national culture within the limits of a nation-state are thus challenged by the capacity of crossing ethnic, territorial and political boundaries (Martin 1998). As many social scientists have noted, this specific profile of Pentecostalism is essentially determined by its capacity of traveling along global socio-cultural and economic processes and of becoming a veritable global faith (Martin 2005, 2001, Robbins 2003, 2004, Casanova 2001, Corten 2001).

[4] Even though Pentecostal churches are rather relatively autonomous religious bodies they are organized at the national level as the Pentecostal Union of Romania. Under this title Pentecostalism is recognized as an official denomination by the Romanian state. This organization represents the interests of Pentecostals churches in relation to the Romanian state. However, this national form of organization is not capable of substituting the role played by "traditional" churches as public actors having public claims on a national scale in relation to the state. More pragmatically, local Pentecostal churches are oriented toward local politics. One can find Pentecostals as mayors or members of local councils. In this sense one could say that Pentecostalism is not a fully articulated public religion because their public claims are rarely articulated in the public sphere beyond the local. The relations between Pentecostalism and politics are a very interesting topic for studying. The framework of Pentecostal politics is not defined essentially by the encounters between the state and a powerful historical religious body (such as a national church).

The ethnographic approach I propose in this paper provides the heuristic means for understanding at the grassroots the socio-religious processes that make Pentecostalism a strong competitor for local historical churches (Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant) and for that matter engender religious pluralization in Transylvania. My ethnography is organized around the investigation of three main processes that, I argue, create and maintain the specific socio-cultural space of Pentecostalism in Transylvania: 1) the individualization of faith, 2) the articulation of the Pentecostal authority regime and 3) the emergence of the Pentecostal form of congregational life. This classification is of course rather analytical because on the ground all these processes are intricately related and mutually enhanced. However, its relevance comes from the fact that on one hand it expresses more systematically the major articulations around which the socio-cultural space of Pentecostalism is configured against the background of "traditional" churches and on the other it reveals crucial concerns of Pentecostals themselves when it comes to defining their way of being "true Christians". These processes are also instances where the Pentecostals' *credo* is emphatically assumed in sometimes fragile social forms and with unintended consequences. Even so the Pentecostalism is capable of proposing what for many represents a robust reinterpretation of Christianity by putting the finger on the major failures of the already existing relationships between the individual, community and authority characterizing "traditional" churches.

Moreover, by ethnographically investigating the above mentioned themes I assume that the understanding of the ways in which Pentecostalism produces religious pluralization from below presupposes a comprehensive examination of the particular Pentecostal religious logic, and concomitantly, of some of the socio-cultural processes shaping and being shaped by it. Pentecostalism as a global religious movement (Corten 2001, Robbins 2004) is often prematurely analyzed by referring to too general and abstract global processes without considering the religious substance as articulated within the life of the faithful. Pentecostal religious logic is capable of reaching the individual in his daily social settings and activities and of redefining their form and content by using religious categories. It makes possible for the moral aspirations of particular groups or individuals going along the disturbing socio-economic transition to be still consistently expressed in religious categories and to limit secularization. More than that, I am concerned with understanding the possibility that "the local" becomes receptive and vulnerable to globalization processes sometimes without even being aware that such processes are going on.

Given the conspicuous lack of information, it is hard to assess statistically the actual size of the growth of Pentecostalism (and for that matter of other forms of evangelical Christianity e.g. Bapstists or Seven Day Adventists) especially in the post-communist period. Even though one can find established

Pentecostal congregations in all major parts of Romania, Transylvania is the region where the growth of the evangelical population is most visible. The 2002 national census indicates many Transylvanian localities (villages and towns) where evangelical Christians represent between 5% and 10% of the population. In some of them the number goes beyond 15%. The most visible sign of the size of the phenomenon is the presence of at least one evangelical chapel if not of a big church building in almost every village or town of Transylvania.

My own ethnographic work deals with a Pentecostal congregation situated in a Northern Transylvanian town where there are six more Pentecostal congregations representing 5% of the entire town population. The investigated Pentecostal church has around 1000 congregants (according to congregation's statistics), that is, persons who were baptized. Pentecostals like any other evangelical denomination practice adult baptism as opposed to the practice of infant baptism that is characteristic of the "traditional" churches. Family members who were not baptized are not counted as official church members, even though they are actively involved in the activities of the congregation being for that matter susceptible of becoming future members. Anyway, the fluctuation of membership is high because of the transnational labor migration process that affects the town. The congregation has flourished especially after the fall of communist by breaking away from the small Pentecostal congregation that was established in the town during communism. It is now relatively prosperous having a big and comfortable church building that is the place of various religious or social activities. The congregation was founded by several Pentecostal families having roots in communist times (and even before) and presently the congregational constituency is very diverse including members having various social, ethnic and religious backgrounds.

The Pentecostal individualization of faith

Generally, the term "individualization of faith" is used for describing the situation in which the individual discovers "religion" as a personal experience while its collective, institutional, sacramental, and intellectual expressions are derivative. It usually refers to the increased importance of the individual's search for authenticity and personal experience that most of the times erode institutional religions on the one hand and communal religious experience on the other. As social scientists point out, this phenomenon is different from the old religious individualism of mystics because it incorporates a this-worldly and expressivist conception of salvation conceived as a form of individual self-perfection and self-fulfillment (Hervieu-Leger 2001). Moreover, it also presupposes a valorization of the spiritual experience in accordance to everyone's dispositions and interests and a rejection of the received "truth" from others and from "tradition". The term "individualization of faith", as social scientists have it,

describes well the way in which various processes of modernization (political, social, and cultural) redefines the religious attitude of certain populations (Taylor 2003, Hervieu Leger 2001, Martin 2005).

My argument in this section is that in Pentecostalism, at least from what I discovered during my fieldwork, there is a significant connection between a powerful personal religious experience and an active congregational participation. Paradoxically, in Pentecostalism the "individualization of faith" does not produce a radical religious individualism and fragmentation but rather a strong communitarian spirit that enhances a new form of congregational life different from that of "traditional" churches. The "traditional" churches are locally organized around territorial parishes that presuppose a rather nominal membership. The participation of the individual in the religious communal life is totally framed by the institutional constrains that organize the parish life. Among the Pentecostals coming from a "traditional" background the perception is that the fact mentioned above rather stimulates the separation of the religious life from the everyday life and the body of faithful from the clergy. Moreover, the highly ritualized religious life inhibits personal experience and communal participation. What is important here is that for many believers this particular judgment is rooted in an experience of conversion. Most of the Pentecostals describe their new religious life in relation to that of "traditional" churches even though some of them were having a rather "secular" life without participating in their former church life. Almost all of them were nevertheless baptized as children in the church. At one moment in their life they discovered that their former religious life is unsatisfactory, having "no personal dimension and no concrete effects in the everyday-life" as one of the converts, a woman in her forties, told me

Most of my informants claim that conversion is not about becoming a member of a particular religion but mostly about acquiring a "personal faith", "a relationship with God", as many of them affirms. In this manner they are liberated from the yoke of religious formalism and barren ritualism that often characterize their former religious life that is, going to church without having a sense that you have to change your life and without the feeling that church attendance and your fellow Christians can ever do that. The converts confess that: "I don't want a religion but a relationship with God", "I wish for an open conversation with God", "I wish a free prayer beyond the boundaries of ritual" and so on. Most of the Pentecostals I talked to narrate their conversion not necessarily as a singular definite event (even though it can be based on that) but rather as a temporal process (involving many twists and turns) of appropriation of a "personal faith". Most of the conversion stories are retrospectively framed by the evangelical theological claim that "being born-again", the evangelical term for the experience of being converted, is essential for becoming a

veritable Christian and it is also something that should define the life of the evangelical believer at all times. As appears from narratives the conversion is presumably a strong personal experience because of its inwardness and its dependence on choice. Once you enter in contact with Pentecostalism (before and after the "baptism in water" - the official acceptance in the congregation) through attending communal religious services or small "prayer groups" or through a new understanding of the Bible, the experience of individualization of faith becomes more accentuated and it is profoundly integrated in the Pentecostal symbolic system. The personal experience of conversion that heightens the sense of individuality as the self is released from constrains of the former religious life is stabilized and molded by new and specific collective disciplines.

What is very significant in the case of Pentecostalism, *vis- a -vis* other evangelical denominations such as the Baptist one, is the fact that the experiences of becoming "born again" and baptized in water are only the first, fundamental indeed, experiences in the life of a believer. Following these, it is the striving to obtain the baptism in the Holy Spirit ("the baptism of fire") which represents a powerful experience of the presence of the Holy Spirit in one's life. This experience is often certified by visible phenomena and it is open to everybody. The most notorious sign is the "speaking in tongues". Besides the baptism in the Holy Spirit there is also the possibility that everybody obtains other spiritual gifts such as healing powers, prophecy or visionary capacities, and the discernment of the spirits. All these religious experiences are promised in the Bible for every "born-again Christian". To be sure, not every member of the Pentecostal congregation underwent these experiences but there is this notion that everyone can experience this spiritual baptism and can receive spiritual gifts by being perseverant and a good Christian.

I have suggested that for all who enter the Pentecostal symbolic universe the process of individualization of faith is permanently marked by a powerful experience of gifts and blessings of the Holy Spirit. All these personal, strongly emotional, experiences being freed from any institutional boundaries and being equally widespread among congregants, produce in the life of the believer a sense of enhancement of the individualization of religious experience. As one can see in the following section, a complex authority regime tries to control all these personal experiences within the confined limits of the Scripture.

This idea precisely that everyone has an open path toward experiencing the miraculous works of the Holy Spirit is a powerful tool of individualization. This mainly means that the believer's initiative to search for spiritual experiences is practically widened beyond the boundaries of the formal ritual life provided by the congregation. One congregant, a young man who 3 years ago became a Pentecostal said to me that now his entire life is guided by his personal initiative and religious assiduity and that the empowerments of the

Holy Spirit respond to his personal perseverance. Pentecostalism opens the path for religious experiences unbounded by a particular tradition or institutional setting. It is true that some of the most intense moments in the religious life of a Pentecostal community are perceived to be those in which members of the congregation experience the spiritual fellowship. But this does not invalidate the experience of individualization given the various opportunities and contexts of experiencing spiritual fellowship. Besides the main religious services provided twice a week by the congregation there are many other contexts of worship during a week. One example is the small "prayer group".

The prayer groups are organized in numerous private houses belonging to certain congregants. They are often established around a prophet or a visionary believer, that is, a congregant who receives the gifts of the Holy Spirit and can tell something about the spiritual state of his fellows. The individual can choose any group he wants based on his preferences and spiritual interests. Many times one chooses groups that are formed by members of another congregation.

Besides these prayer groups there are other groups oriented toward biblical study, for example. In this case the individual can also choose the affiliation according to one's preferences. These gatherings take place in the weekdays when the church doesn't provide a religious service. Or, the individual has the option of staying home with his family praying, singing and reading the Bible together. Practically, throughout the entire week a believer has the possibility of finding a place of worship according to one's preference and mood. However, as I could observe, the individual experience is meant to be placed inside congregational fellowship and through congregational network.

Given this powerful individualizing religious experience described above, the further question is why the Pentecostal religious logic does not produce a kind of narcissistic religious individualism that would avoid any form communal control. More precisely how is the faithful personal experience integrated in the congregational life? What are the motives behind the fact that the faithful seeks actively the participation in the congregational life?

Based on my ethnography, I argue that one cannot understand the notion of Pentecostal personal experience unless examining its intricate relation to Pentecostal notion of repentance. Faith is personal because it opens the channels for a supposedly direct and individual experience of the presence of God in one's life but, at the same time, it opens the channels for discovering oneself as a "sinful" being, that is, a strong conviction that one's behavior is not the right behavior, that is, in accordance with the Bible and the Word of God. This discovery of oneself as being "sinful" is taking place only because God intervenes directly in one's life. Pentecostals say that God or the Holy Spirit "scrutinizes you". This is an idea that I very often met in the Pentecostal discourse. A young congregant told me:

> When the Holy Spirit is scrutinizing you, how can I say this..., He is not necessarily probing into you, He just leaves you in a condition in which you can make introspections, you can see yourself for what you really are, and you can remember and say: yes, today I lied, I talked to someone in this manner, I looked at a girl..., I wasn't supposed to do these things, I did them anyway. Just like an X-ray, He shows you all these, and, then, as man of God for whom the sin is an accident, not something habitual, you feel sorry...the repentance begins, you start crying; because if God were not bestowing this search on you, you would not be able to see yourself, you would think you are doing OK, you are not like the others. But when God scrutinizes you, you reach the condition in which you see yourself as a garbage, as a person of no value, you are not capable of doing anything and that you truly need Christ; because this is what salvation means, to see that you cannot save yourself, because if you could, you would not need Christ.

Another congregant adds a nuance:

> From the moment you have repented, and God made a transformation of you, you don't help someone else because you think that is how repentance is done, but because you really feel like doing that, you want to that. This is not connected to a disciplinary system: you either do it or go to hell... No, this is what you really feel inside, you feel you should do this...

I think this particular experience of repentance is very important for understanding why Pentecostal individualization of faith has the capacity to overcome a radical mundane religious individualism and a self-indulgent psychological well-being. In Pentecostalism the idea of conversion is strongly related to a specific idea of repentance. Now, this sense that the Holy Spirit does not produce only "blessings" but it reveals that one is a "sinful" human being is very important in Pentecostalism. This means that after conversion not everything is about discovering God and experiencing the faith in a new manner but also about renouncing to the habitability of living in sin. Most of my informants emphasize that repentance is an inward gain available for everyone and not a disciplinary result. Nonetheless, my investigation discovers a more complex situation regarding the Pentecostal notion of repentance. In the Pentecostal congregation there is a powerful expectation that the faithful should prove his condition as a "true repenter" through accountable acts.

In the investigated congregation, before the "baptism in water", for example, the candidates have to go through a very long procedure which will determine their new status as "born-again" Christians. I remember a young man telling me that he was so eager to be baptized after his presumable conversion that he was very displeased with the pastor of the congregation telling him that he had to "prove" his new condition. There are many different modalities through which the authenticity of the experience of conversion is

certificated. One has to discuss the intentions of being baptized with the pastor of the congregation. Then, one has to write down a testimony of one's conversion indicating the exact conditions in which this experience has happened and what changed in his life. Some of one's closest friends or relative have to endorse by their personal witnesses that one's behavior has changed after your "born-again" experience. One also has to attend a catechetical preparation during which one reads the Bible systematically and learns the fundamentals of Pentecostalism.

For Pentecostals, the idea of sin is related to the idea of changing the old habits. And this should be something visible to everybody. So one cannot be a "born again" Christian without understanding that one walked out on sin and one does not want to sin anymore. Sin becomes "accidental" not "habitual". The need to permanently certify through visible signs your inward experience as a repenter dominates the life of a Pentecostal believer in the congregation. To be a "repenter" means that one has to constantly prove it through visible acts (abstinence from drinking and smoking, active participation in congregational services, good relationships with the spouse and the children and the fellow congregants and so on) to the eyes of the fellow congregants as well as to the outside world. One's state of "being born-again" or a "repenter" is certified by one's active participation in the congregational life. Given that the sacrament of confession to a priest-confessor is missing from Pentecostalism, the congregation is the space where the experience of repentance is assumed and understood.

This idea of conversion as a radical rupture from what is considered by the convert to be a sinful past was highlighted by many social scientists (Robbins 2003, 2004, Martin 2001, 2005). I am interested here in one of its particular aspects: the power of this experience to produce rupture in social and cultural continuity and to create new strong loyalties based on new social contexts. A convert said to me: "Sins are like a web. You cannot get rid of them one by one but you have to take the decision to walk away from your entire sinful life". And this firstly means killing one's old habits and breaking old relationships that kept you in the chains of sin. In this sense, conversion is also a radical social transition producing a feeling of autonomy and liberation.

By undergoing conversion the individual finds his independence from old social relationships and old companionships. But also, and this is essential, he has to find a proper place in the activities of the congregation. Besides the personal experience of conversion and repentance, the active support of his fellow congregants offers the new repenter the possibility of radically breaking with the old social relationships that were keeping him trapped in a sinful life. Most of the Pentecostals I talked to consider that the supportive presence of congregation is a very significant moment in the process of repentance and also a perpetual dimension of one's religious life after the "baptism in water".

This offers a sense of autonomy but also a feeling of commitment. From now on the convert is truly capable of articulating his own biography in accordance with his religious choice. At the same time, he assumes congregational participation and its social context as an essential part of becoming a veritable Christian. The discourse of Pentecostals creates a powerful dualism between a "world" reigned by sin and the "church" as a community of repenters seeking other-worldly salvation. The personal past and old social relationships (e.g. drinking or family problems) are interpreted within this dual framework. They are seen as works of demons. The new social context provided by the congregational network of "repenters" is the space where the convert find his truly sense of participation and service.

The dialectic between the personal experience and the strong presence of “the significant other” that certifies one's experience gives birth to ambiguous phenomena. One is a kind of *charismatic mimetism* that urges the individual to assume experiences that prove one's religious condition and progress even though they are not inwardly covered. On the other hand when the collective control is powerful a kind of *moral legalism* appears. That is to say, an excessive adherence to the details of faithful’s outward behavior that apparently breaks the established moral consensus. As I could see during my fieldwork these phenomena are intimately related to the works of authority and control within the congregation and many times produce (or legitimate) reactions of dissidence that makes the Pentecostal congregation very fragile and exposed to fissions. This proves that the Pentecostal experience is definitely enmeshed in constrains which are most of the time hidden by a notion of purifying personal faith professed by many faithful and Pentecostal leaders.

However, this complex dialectic defining the Pentecostal religious logic between the experiences of empowerments of the Holy Spirit on the one hand and repentance on the other supports the Pentecostal individualization of faith and prevents the emergence of a radical individualism. A new sense of personal experience and, concomitantly, a new sense of participation are effectively nurtured by the Pentecostal religious logic. Moreover, the important observation that comes out of this analysis is that the functioning of the Pentecostal logic depends essentially on the way in which the surrounding religious and social conditions are taken in and assumed as part of one's coming into being as a "true Christian". These conditions are not set aside but rather engaged in.

The Pentecostal religious authority regime

In what follows I would like to explore the sources of authority rendering effective a Pentecostal religious logic and the dialectic individual/community. The most salient process, already suggested, when I talk about individualization is the construction of a framework in which authority, at least ideally, functions

in order to allow the access of any believer to the Pentecostal faith repository. Paradoxically this sense of equal participation and worthiness is not at all something that comes naturally in a Pentecostal congregation but it should be permanently produced and reproduced against any kind of formal, hierarchical consolidation. The laity is stimulated to be active involved in the life of the congregation. There are, of course, in any congregation at certain moments, authoritarian impulses coming from Pentecostal clergy or particular groups but they produce reactions. In some cases a particular congregation could be torn apart by these reactions. The leaders of a congregation have thus to be able to carefully exert their momentary position by favoring the laity participation. Everybody has to find a place into the life of the congregation. The investigated congregation, for example, is leaded by a Committee which is elected in a democratic manner once every four years. The senior pastor of the congregation is also elected from the other pastors of the congregation.

The way in which a Pentecostal congregation is configured by authority is always referred back to the religious sources of authority. For example, in the investigated congregation, there is a practice that regularly, somebody from the congregation, an ordinary believer, has to say a word in front of the congregation, commenting a verse from the Bible or narrating his experience of conversion or some significant event of her personal spiritual warfare. The pastor has no monopoly on the preached word. The Pentecostal authority regime is capable of maintaining a balanced relation within congregation between individualism and communitarian values by stimulating the lay religious activity in the church. Every one can preach. Everyone can testify in front of the other for the works of the Holy Spirit in his life and so on. The process of Pentecostal individualization of faith is intricately related to a complex functioning of this authority regime.

During my investigation I could identify several sources of authority in the Pentecostal congregation: the authority of the Bible as the inspired Word, the authority of the office, that is, of the pastor, the charismatic authority of believers who received the gifts of the Holy Spirit, a prophet for example, the authority of the Holy Spirit's direct communications. As Pentecostals believe, the Holy Spirit works through all these sources of authority.

The Bible, The Word of God is the essential measure of all religious acts in the congregation. The Bible is primordial. But in the concrete life of the congregation the aforementioned sources of authority sometimes compete with each other. For example, for some believers the biblical arrangements are broken by elevating, for example, the charismatic authority of the prophets over Scriptural authority. Or, as I mentioned sometime before, the authority of the pastor is exaggerated. Especially when expecting guidance in some concrete life situations, some of the believers ask for and rely on the words of a prophet or

the pastor. And this is seen as something appropriate by most of my informants. Anyway, many times, this could become a practice that occults the really important source of authority which is the Bible. Most of the congregants are aware of these dangers considering that this happens only when the faith of somebody is still immature. They consider that God is working in many ways in their lives. And a prophet, for example, is one of these channels of communication. But at the same time, one cannot develop a consistent spiritual life based only on prophetic utterances. A young congregant said to me:

> There is a great difference once you get to know Him a little, not through a prophet ... at least as far I am concerned. It is important to have a personal relation with God. For example, if there were no prophets, I wouldn't be afraid of not knowing how to go, it depends on your personal guidance, if you pray to the Lord, God, look, I want to go somewhere....

One of my informants, a young minister, describes in a remarkable way the proper functioning of authority in the Pentecostal church. Of course, every believer assumes various relations to the authority based on their personal self-awareness:

> The Bible says that the spirit of a prophet is subjected to that prophet, meaning that the spirit of the prophecy can be controlled. Because sometimes God speaks to you but you don't immediately disclose it. I can tell after a period of time what God told me. When a prophet sees that the pastor is going astray, he does not have to make it public while the pastor is preaching from the pulpit. He can bring the subject up, on a different occasion, after the pastor finished preaching, and he can say, look, God gave me a message, and whether you want to receive it or not, I have the duty of passing it to you, as a message from God. And he says it in the presence of the community, and leaves it up to the church to judge it and decide if it was from God or from the prophet. Having the Bible in front of their eyes the people search and say, well it wasn't a wrong prophecy, on the contrary, he says things that we also know (those that they had observed and knew). It means that the pastor has a problem. If this is the case, the church can bring the pastor to book for it, and vote for or against him, and even suspend him.

For the Pentecostal congregation the Bible is the higher source of authority because it is the Word of God. The works of the Holy Spirit are legitimated by the Scripture because the Scripture is the Word originally inspired by the Holy Spirit. Grant Wacker argues that for Pentecostals "the Bible contained all the information one needed to know in order to navigate life's though decisions. We might call this idea the principle of plenary relevance (...) It needed only to be read, believed, and obeyed" (Wacker 2003:70). As I could notice, from discussing with the congregants, listening to many sermons and participating in the biblical study groups, the Bible is the powerful instrument that

rationalizes the personal life of the believer. One congregant told me: "I read the Bible and I understand all I have to do in that concrete situation. Everything is in the Bible. You just have to read it and to meditate on what you have read". Scholars refer to the process of interpretation of the Bible within an evangelical congregation as being literalism, meaning that the Bible self-discloses itself to everyone. The Bible in itself is not an allegorical code. It is self-evident. One of the congregant said to me that "any unintelligent people can understand the Bible". But that doesn't mean there are not specific conditions of receptivity (Coleman 2006a, 2006b). And this is decisive for understanding Pentecostal literalism. The literalism of the Bible is not something that comes naturally.

Congregants say that the Bible begins disclosing itself when you are experiencing conversion. At that moment one understands that the Bible is something that speaks about you and your personal experience. This perspective is acquired because the Holy Spirit "scrutinized" you and gave you the power to see yourself in the light of the Bible. Of course, there are many hard-to-understand passages in the Bible that should be discussed with others in biblical study groups, that should be clarified by the pastor and the preachers but most importantly is to understand the Bible as fitted to your personal biography, as an instrument of improving your moral life in accordance with God's will. In a sense, Pentecostals do not interpret the Bible, because they do not have doubts about its literal truth, but they rather elaborate proper strategies of receiving it (Coleman 2006a, 2006b) as a transmitter of God's will and putting it in practice in everyday life.

The means through which someone understands how the Bible should be applied to personal and congregational life are various, involving study, meditation, prayer, direct communication with the Holy Spirit, the preacher's sermons and so on. Interestingly enough, it is precisely this literal understanding of the Bible that opens the symbolic universe of the Pentecostalism towards the miraculous life of the early Christianity when the Holy Spirit acted through "sign and wonders" in the life of the first Christian congregations. Pentecostals consider that the Bible undoubtedly describes the cosmic order in which the Holy Spirit acts effectively in the world. They just have to apply all these to the social and personal context of the present age. In this context Pentecostals assume that "traditional" churches replace the Bible with human traditions that occult the primordial sense of the Bible. The authority of the Bible is replaced by the authority of the institution. Whether this is true is of no importance here. The important fact is that they have this perception that the churchly life of “traditional” churches based on the notion of hierarchic institutional authority occults the free life of the Holy Spirit and that a veritable Christian should assume the pure model of the early Christianity.

I observed that most of the Pentecostals are not so reflective concerning the idea that perhaps all this strategies of receptivity form themselves a powerful tradition that sometimes occults the "true" interpretation of the Bible. The Pentecostal moral code which Pentecostals consider to be originated directly from the Bible is in fact the result of a long communitarian consensus that sometimes is put into question by some groups or fractions of the congregation. Should women be wearing headscarves in church or shouldn't they? What are the limits of pastor or prophet authority? What kind of methods of evangelization should the church use?

On many occasions, the answers presuppose different interpretations of the Scripture. Paul Gifford aptly argues that what makes a text a Scripture with a plenary authority is the text's relationships with the community. The authority of the Scripture is not the attribute of the text itself but of an ongoing "human activity" (Gifford 2005). For that matter, beyond this discourse on the infallible authority of the Bible one has to read the complex and flexible works of all the other sources of authority articulated in the Pentecostal community. Sometimes the consensus is broken and the fragmentation of the congregation is inevitable.

The Pentecostal form of congregational life

Having discussed the themes of religious individualization and authority, one could better understand the form of congregational life that Pentecostalism was capable of implementing in Transylvania and which properly sustains and further reproduces the Pentecostal religious logic. Many of the Pentecostal congregational characteristics were already suggested. They can be reformulated in different terms and seen from a different perspective in the light of several personal testimonies.

Within the Pentecostal congregation the personal experience entails collective responsibilities. The striving to acquire gifts of the Holy Spirit by every believer, the fundamental dimension of the Pentecostal individualization of faith, is not something that is only for the personal use. There is this notion that every individual charisma should be assumed within the congregation. A congregant told me:

> Not to mention the gifts, this is something that I like here [in Pentecostal congregation], and I am currently persevering so that God should give me a gift [Why?] I would like to help others. The gifts are for your strengthening also. It's a way of gaining strength that is how I think about it. If I were to have the gift of prophecy, and you come to me, and I have a revelation for you, that you had had an accident and your foot is not healed, for example, you would

> say, that's exactly my situation, and you became happy and gain strength, you fortify yourself. There is another reason for asking for a gift because your fellowship with God is strengthened.

Regarding the sources of the involvement of lay people in the life of the congregation I would cite a very significant response of a young aspiring minister who came to the investigated congregation from another congregation in town. I asked him whether this kind of behavior is not a sign of individualism and personal preference: if you do not like a place, you can decide, according to your preference, to go away. He told me: "I didn't leave because of the church not serving me well, but because it did not allow me to serve the young people in the church as I thought it proper" And he continued:

> When God is converting someone, He does not leave that person as he would be a useless part of the body, separated from the body. When God calls somebody to salvation, He calls him to ministration also. It is really very logical, if you are part of the body you must function in some way. To be called to a service. If you do not feel the call for the service, it means you are not a part of that body; to do something for the church, for the universal church, for the spreading of the kingdom of God, you must feel that you should do something for the salvation of the person, for building the body you must serve to some purpose. God is giving you an impulse from inside.

As I came to realize, the notion of "fellowship" is very important in Pentecostal life. It does not only imply only the physical presence of others but also a sense of intimacy, having a causal conversation, getting to know each other's experiences, praying for each other. This feeling of participation is enhanced continuously by the particular profile of religious activities. One faithful said to me:

> I like to be here, everybody is singing, nobody is "unemployed", here anyone can call to praying, anyone can preach; if someone preaches we all understand exactly what it means, no need for you to make an effort to catch up and understand. (...)This is the way I like things. I like very much what I'm doing, I like how we work, I also like coming here, I don't know... I feel extremely good at the gathering [religious service]. I feel good praying, I feel good calling to praying, I feel good preaching, singing, I really feel I am doing something. I feel joy...

Around these notions of participation and fellowship which are permanently enacted during religious services and other religious activities, the congregation is capable of mobilizing its members both religiously and socially. Assuming social responsibilities is a religious obligation that should guide the life of the faithful coming out from the Bible. One of the most remarkable features of the investigated congregation is the significant continuity between religious and social activities within the congregation. Besides being a religious institution,

providing a very strong social network for its members, this congregation is also a very dynamic social service center. There are a lot of people in the town, especially marginal categories (orphans, elders, convicts, poor and persons with physical disabilities) benefiting from the congregation's social services and financial aids. The paradox of the actual functioning of the Pentecostal congregation that pretends to be constituted by purely religious principles ("a community of repenters") is that on many occasions the boundaries between the social and the religious activities are blurred.

Concluding remarks

As many social scientists had previously observed, the Pentecostal congregation is basically a voluntary religious association which is capable of emerging in the interstitial space between the ecclesiastical control of the local historical churches and the state (Martin 1998, 2001, 2005, Casanova 2006, Berger 2005, 2007). Important to my argument is the way in which the voluntary principle considered as important means of religious pluralization in Transylvania is permanently nurtured by the work of Pentecostal religious logic. The voluntary principle that supports the Pentecostal congregation states that the individual freely decides to become a member of the congregation while his former religious membership in a "traditional" church was based on the fact that he was born in a particular community. As one could see that decision is actually religiously framed and shaped within processes of individualization of faith that simultaneously creates new contexts of communal interaction.

In my paper I have intended, based on ethnographic data, to show how a particular religious logic, the Pentecostal, assumed by many individuals in Romania today produces a kind of grassroots religious pluralization by enhancing personal religious experience within a new communal context. I have emphasized how this religious logic while is capable of retaining the search for personal experience that defines modern religiosity it is not affected by modern fragmentation and de-moralization (Martin 2005, Hervieu-Leger 2001, Taylor 2003). Moreover, it is capable of creating new social bodies and networks and of nurturing new types of loyalties. The Pentecostal congregation shaping and being shaped by that religious logic are collective formations, constituted by the voluntary principle, that nurture effectively new manners of incorporating Christianity within the individual biographies and communities. The novelty of the situation is related to the capacity of Pentecostalism to create new possibilities of embodying Christianity beyond the historical framework provided by the connections of the historical churches to the state and to various instances of identity politics. The religious pluralization in Transylvania is thus enhanced by this new definition from below of the Christian experience and

of its social embeddedness. Based on the present analysis one could claim that the recourse to religious pluralism in Romania should now include a more detailed examination of the socio-religious resources on the ground apart from the reference to the models of legal and political coexistence pursued from above by the nation-state.

Even "traditional" churches continue to remain captive to the reference to the state involvement in defining a religious pluralism from above without trying to assess their own socio-religious resources in assuming new plural definitions of their own traditions. Even though I have not pursued an explicit comparison between Pentecostalism and other "traditional" churches, my suggestion is that the three socio-religious processes explored in my paper are the relevant directions of investigation of a more complex understanding of the ways in which the historical established relationships between the individual, community and authority as they appear within "traditional" churches are dislocated and re-formed: the role of personal experience, the works of authority in relation to the individual and community, and the voluntary type of congregational life. I suggest that in order to compete with a religious movement like Pentecostalism, the historical churches have to re-evaluate their own socio-religious resources in all these areas.

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NEO-PROTESTANT CONFESSIONAL EDUCATION AND THE PROCESS OF COUNTER-SECULARIZATION IN POSTSOCIALIST ROMANIA

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ABSTRACT. Romania is currently experiencing two apparently opposite phenomena: a secularization process, through the reconfiguration of traditional religious values and practices and a concomitant process of religious revival, through the institutionalization of various counter-secularizing strategies enacted by religious organizations. The contact with new religious ideas and their influence on individuals' life choices after the fall of communism made religious organizations rethink their strategies and engage in more militant approaches. Neo-Protestant organizations have become important social agents on the contemporary public scene, and they intensively operate in order to diminish the effects of secularization. The institutionalization of Neo-Protestant confessional education has turned into a primary driving force in this respect. The present study analyses the differences in the configuration of religious, moral and social values among students socialized after 1989, comparing high-school students from a Neo-Protestant school with their peers from a public school. Confessional education constitutes an environment which incorporates formal education within a specific moral and religious education, according to the worldview of the faith community. The evaluation of the impact of the confessional education on students' adherence to traditional Christian precepts and the internalization of norms aiming to guide their adult lives suggest that confessional education serves as a major pillar for Neo-Protestant counter-secularization in Romania.

Keywords: counter-secularization, confessional education, Neo-Protestantism, attitudes of high-school students

Neo-Protestantism and confessional education

The fall of communism gave way to the revival of cultural, social and political pluralism[2] in the post-socialist states. Processes such as modernization,

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[2] In this article, pluralism will be defined as the co-existence of various groups, ideas and organizations after the fall of the Communistregime. Although the concept is often used to simulaneously define diversity, degrees of public acceptance and as a value (Beckford, 2003), the purpose of this article is too narrow for the author to go into such debates. The term pluralism will be used solely as a means to compare the current state of affairs to the one characterizing the socialist era.

democratization and globalization extended this pluralism onto the religious world. New religious groups appear in the public life, all of them competing with each other in order to attract prospective members (Robertson, 1993; Dobbelaere, 2002; Miller, 2002; Possamai, 2003; Muller, 2008). For a long time now, it has been firmly stated that religion loses its grip and influence it once had on society and its various subsystems (Luckmann, 1967; Berger, 1990; Wilson, 1999) given the fact that religious organizations have to compete with secular institutions in defining and organizing worldviews among members of contemporary society. However, empirical research has shown that, in postsocialist Romania, a great number of religious institutions pave their way on the market (Froesse, 2004; Muller, 2008). The fall of the communist regime, one that limited actions and initiatives of religious organizations, gave way to a new array of activities and domains on which these organizations would focus their interest (Froesse, 2004; Muller, 2008). This is all the more obvious if we look at activities of Neo-Protestant religious organizations. Under the term Neo-Protestantism I include religious groups that are most commonly known for their rejection of ritualistic activities in the worship practice, the emphasis put on Bible supremacy in organizing religious life, mature baptism and missionary activities: Baptists, Pentecostals, Seventh Day Adventists, Evangelical Christians. Although some of these characteristics can be found in other religious movements as well, Neo-Protestant religious organization imply all of the above. The latter groups made their presence more noticeable after 1989, with the fall of a communist regime that tried to ban religious expression of any sort and forcibly secularize society (Froesse, 2003).

The institutionalization of confessional education is one of the primary mediums through which Neo-Protestant religious organizations try to diminish and counterattack the perceived process of secularization among its members and among members of the society at large. The number of such institutions grew exponentially after 1989. Today, one can count, by looking at the information provided by Romania's Culture and Cult Ministry, 29 such institutions of religious education, from primary to university level. Moreover, one can find dozens of Neo-Protestant religious foundations, mostly composed of cult members, out of which many have educational departments, kindergartens or orphanages. The generalization of religious freedom of expression made way for intense activity on behalf of such groups, varying from evangelism programs, religious television and radio stations broadcasting at a local, national and international level, publishing houses and the establishment of other numerous religious institutions. The primary goal of all these activities was to reinstate religion on the public scene and make manifest in the public eye the presence of Neo-Protestant religious groups. Financing for these particular activities is assured through donations by church members but also, in the case of religious education, through state funding.

In this article I analyze the ways in which religious values of teenagers are affected by processes such as modernization, democratization and religious pluralism and the way in which Neo-Protestant organizations respond to these processes. I focused on religious education and its impact on the day to day life of the laity, applying 210 questionnaires in two high-schools, a public high-school and a Neo-Protestant confessional high-school, from one of the largest cities in Romania, Cluj-Napoca. Identifying attitudes and opinions of public high-school students regarding religious statements is one of the ways in which the effects of modernizing processes can be assessed and the existence of a secularization process can be questioned. On the other hand, the confessional educational system provides the optimal context in which traditional Christian religious ideas can be transmitted to those who wish to attend such an institution. Here, secularizing influences are intentionally limited by the schools' management and staff in order to protect students from the impact of secular values. The purpose of such institutions is that of educating students in the spirit of the sponsor denomination, offering them an alternative through which they can live in modern society without losing their religious ideas and ideals. Interviews with pastoral and confessional high-school staff, with students and former students of such institutions gave me an insight into the reasons for establishing, sponsoring and attending confessional schools as well as a discursive portrayal of religious processes of secularization, desecularization and counter-secularization, as perceived by clerics and laity. The questionnaires were applied in February 2009, while the interviews were conducted during the 2008-2009 academic year.

All these institutions and activities of religious organizations seem to contradict the idea that secularization is present and manifest wherever processes of modernization and democratization are present (Arthur, 2006; Berger, 1990; Luckmann, 1967, Durkheim, 1995). There are multiple ways of defining secularization. Most secularization theories underline the impact of modernization, globalization and technologization on the configuration of religious values, with focus on the diminishing influence religion has in present society (Berger, 1990; Davie, 2008; Dobbelaere, 2002; Giddens, 1991; Luckmann, 1967; Wilson, 2000). The concept of secularization is closely tied to the ideas put forward by the Enlightenment on the separation of Church and State, being synthetically defined as a denial of the "old" social order, based on norms legitimated primarily through religious principles. However, secularization is not to be perceived as a unidimensional process, but one must take into account its various forms of manifestation.

Dobbelaere (2002) identifies three levels of secularization: the individual, the organizational and the societal level. My theoretical approach follows this conceptual differentiation. The three levels are interconnected, which partially explains the difficulty with which one can distinguish between them: individual

secularization deals with peoples' diminishing attachment to and involvement in different denominations and religious organizations; organizational secularization centres on the ways in which religious organizations adapt to modern times and incorporate non-traditional religious values into their activities; societal secularization is seen as the diminishing relevance played by Church and religious values in legitimating day to day life. In my analysis, this classification has great relevance for identifying the changes in the religious values of students from public high-schools (individual secularization) and the degree to which confessional education is designed to provide the primary pillar for counter-secularization, religious organizations adopting various rationally competitive strategies (organizational secularization) in order to answer to the diminishing social role they are given in modern society (societal secularization). Secularization therefore is not a mechanic, irreversible process; major roles are played by different individuals, groups and organizations who intentionally or unintentionally secularize and de-secularize society.

The factors leading to the emergence and development of religious institutions and the degree to which the latter contribute to the diminishing of the effects of secularization on people's religious worldviews is a theme not sufficiently explored in post-socialist Romania. Are we talking about secularization or a religious revival in the Romanian society? Trying to contribute at finding an answer to this question, I analyse two educational environments, a public and a confessional one, and the ways in which religious values among the two categories of high-school students resemble or differ. The concept of secularization will be defined here as the process of reconfiguration in traditional Christian religious values by way of de-Christianization, religious deinstitutionalization and demoralization[3].

As it was briefly pointed out above, one of the traits that distinguishes Neo-Protestants from other religious groups is the emphasis put on voluntarism (Wilson, 1999). That is to say individuals decide themselves if they want to become members of that group through what is often called „water baptism" and

[3] The three processes mentioned above circumscribe, in the author's view, to the three dimensions of secularization already presented: individual, organizational and societal: (1) de-Christianization corresponds to individual secularization and is to be regarded as an abandonment of classical Christian precepts such as belief in Heaven, Hell, Divine Trinity and as an incorporation of beliefs in non-Christian ideas such as telepathy, Yoga, horoscope reading, etc. (2) Deinstitutionalization of religion corresponds to organizational secularization and is to be viewed as the detachment of religious organizations from state affairs. At the same time, these organizations compete with one another and adapt to current conditions as to attract new members and maintain the ones they already have. (3) Demoralization corresponds to societal secularization and is to be conceived as a decoupling of religion from morality. It is not to say that nowadays people are any "less moral" but that morality is considered separately and distinct from religion and religious precepts. In other words, religion loses its integrative function (Durkheim, 2005).

are asked to show their commitment through a personal conduct that lives up to the principles of the cult. The main goal is the maintenance of what are considered high moral standards among the member of the religious group, as well as requiring a complete and utter devotion from the latter. Most often these groups are constituted as protest groups to the secular society, prescribing a specific conduct and way of life to its followers (Berger 1998; Mehl, 1970; Wislon, 1999).

The context in which confessional education develops is one in which new religious ideas and worldviews intensified, once contact with western cultures was re-established after the fall of the communist regime. The emphasis on spirituality rather than religiosity grew, especially among the younger generations (Pollack, 2008). The new worldviews brought about by contact with non-Christian societies had an impact on the configuration of religious ideas and values held by members of postsocialist countries (Inglehart, 2000). Analyzing the data on statements concerning belief in God provided by the *European Value Survey* from 1991, 1993 and 1999, one can observe a growing tendency towards abandoning classic Christian precepts at the national level. This process is often described as a de-Christianization of societal values (Berger, 1990). There is an erosion of what are regarded as classic Christian precepts: belief in a Christian Trinitarian God (35.4 % of the population still hold this belief) is abandoned in favour of a belief in spirits or life forces (43.3%). Moreover, only 60.1% of Romanians believe in Heaven, 56.7% in Hell, 51.7% in the After Life. All of these beliefs constitute the pillars of Christian doctrine. At the same time, new religious ideas appear, as a result of a contact with non-Christian world views. One can observe a growing tendency to adopt the belief in Reincarnation (16.5%), telepathy (43.9%), horoscope and astrology (20%). These beliefs were either unknown or undeclared during the communist regime, as a result of the restrictions put on freedom of expression in the political, cultural, social and religious fields. The increase in number of religious institutions after 1989 can be seen thus as a result of the new religious freedom, and also as attempts from religious organizations to put a stop to processes of de-Christianization, demoralization and deinstitutionalization of religion (Davie, 2000).

Confessional education can be clearly distinguished from public education. Firstly, public education is primarily state funded, while confessional education is also the recipient of ecclesiastical sponsorship. In Romania, confessional education is still primarily state funded, but donations from cult members and churches provide a secondary source of income. It has a base curriculum, general and identical to the curriculum proposed for public education. However, adjacent to this academically oriented curriculum, there is a confessional one, serving the interests of the religious organization that supports the institution, with a focus on religious themes and denomination related programs. Even though

confessional education is denominational, access to educational programs in these institutions is, by law, open to anyone who chooses them and complies with the admission criteria, regardless of their religious background.

What makes the analysis of Neo-Protestant confessional high-schools very interesting is the fact that they constitute 24% of the total number of confessional education institutions (19 Neo-Protestant confessional high-schools out of the 78 total confessional high-schools), while Neo-Protestants cumulate only 3% from the total population. Furthermore, the purpose of Neo-Protestant confessional education is not a theological one, of preparing individuals for clerical positions in the life of the church, but a spiritual one, of instilling specific religious values in the children that study in these institutions. The primary goal in the establishment of Neo-Protestant educational institutions is that of giving individuals the choice to opt for an alternative to public education (Kay and Francis, 1997; Nord and Haynes, 1998). This kind of education is conceived as a process of "intentional socialization, formation or enculturation within the faith community" (Astley and Francis, 1994: 4), leading to the incorporation of a whole set of specific attitudes, values, behaviour patterns and world views. What emerges in the context of present day Romanian society, through the institutionalization of confessional education, as well as through all the other counter-secularizing activities of Neo-Protestant organizations, is an independent, autonomous social space. Neo-Protestant organizations are therefore, through the mediation of law and specific religious institutions recognized by law, free to configure their worldviews and values in the spirit of traditional Christian moral values. In this sense, Law 489/2006 on the Freedom of Religion and the General Status of Denominations, published in the Official Journal, Part I, issue No. 11/08 Jan. 2007 stipulates that:

> **Art. 39** – (1) Recognized denominations have the right to establish and manage denomination education facilities of all levels, profiles and specialties, under the law.
> (2) Diplomas for the graduates of private education facilities of a denomination shall be issued according to applicable law.
> (3) The State shall provide financial support for denomination education, under the law.
> (4) Denomination education facilities shall have organizational and functional autonomy, according to their standards and canons, and in observance of the legal provisions applicable to the national education system.
> (5) Pupils or students can enrol in denominative education, irrespective of religion or persuasion, and they are guaranteed freedom of religious education according to their own religion of persuasion.

Freedom of religion is not only a declarative desiderate, but it is legally sustained. Organizational and functional autonomy represents and reinstates the freedom of exerting and imposing conduct rules and norms within the walls of confessional education institutions. The public educational system, on the other hand, provides a context in which modernizing influences are most poignant, through the contact with multiple and often contrasting ways of conceptualizing existence, as well as of relating to religion and spirituality.

The results of the survey undertaken in the two high-schools from Cluj-Napoca in February 2009 show that 76% of students from public high-school declare themselves to be religious persons, as compared to 88% of their peers from the Neo-Protestant confessional high-school (Table 1). At first sight, the difference of 12% might not seem surprinsingly high. However, it must be kept in mind that the interpretation of what a religious person is, in the two cases, might not be equivalent. The strict definition of religiosity in the case of confessional high-school students does not correspond to the idea of religiosity as it appears in the minds of public high-school students. Evident differences appear when looking at the rates of declared church attendance. While 99.1% of students from the Neo-Protestant high-school say they attend religious services at least once a week, only 20.2% of students from in the public high-school adopt this behavior, whereas 32.7% declare that they go to Church only at Christmas and Easter, 8.7% once a year, and 3.8% once every few years (Table 2). Confessional high-schools policies imply the existence of a campus chapel, where students can attend religious services several times a week. This aspect raises the percentage of those that declare a high rate of church attendance, as the latter is institutionalized in these kinds of schools. The numbers presented in Table 2 indicate a clear separation of Church and religiosity in the case of public high-school students. In other words, what one can observe among the young people studying in the public educational system is a deinstitutionalization of religion, a decoupling of religiosity from the Church.

Table 1.

Self-declared religiosity among high-school students

Whether or not you go to church, would you consider yourself a:	Public high-school (%)	Confessional high-school (%)
Religious person	76.0	87.6
Not a religious person	18.3	5.7
A convinced atheist	1	0
Do not know	4.8	4.8
Will not respond	0	1.9

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data from February 2008, Cluj-Napoca.

Table 2.

Attendance to religious services among high-school students

Besides weddings, baptisms and funerals, how often do you attend religious meetings:	Public high-school (%)	Confessional high-school (%)
Several times a week	4.8	84.8
Once a week	15.4	14.3
Once a month	18.3	0
Only at Christmas, Easter and other major holidays	32.7	1
Once a year	8.7	0
Once every few years	3.8	0
Never	2.9	0
Do not know	10.6	0
Will not respond	2.9	0

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data from February 2008, Cluj-Napoca.

In what regards the process of de-Christianization, in the case of the Neo-Protestant high-school students there is a widespread acceptance of the belief in a personal, Christian god (98.1%), in comparison to students of public high-school where the belief in a Spirit or Life Force cumulates the largest percentage (49 %), and that in a Trinitarian god only 32.7 (Table 3). Obvious differences can also be observed when we look at beliefs in non-Christian religious statements and behaviour. 54.8% of public high-school students believe in telepathy, 26% in reincarnation, 65.4 % agree with reading horoscopes and 50% with yoga practices, while 79% of the Neo-Protestant high-school reject the belief in telepathy, 91.4% that in reincarnation and over 95% dismiss horoscope readings, yoga practices and fortune telling in cards (Table 4).

Table 3.

The declared object of religious belief among high-school students

Which of the following statements best correspond to your religious beliefs?	Public high-school (%)	Confessional high-school (%)
I believe in a personal and Trinitarian God	32.7	98.1
I believe in a Spirit or Life Force	49.0	0
I don't know what to believe	9.6	1
I don't believe God, a Spirit or Life Force exists	1.9	0
Will not respond	6.7	1

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data from February 2008, Cluj-Napoca.

Table 4.

Approval of non-Christian practices among high-school students

Do you approve:	Public high-school (%)					Confessional high-school (%)				
	Yes	**No**	**DK**	**NR**	***TOTAL***	**Yes**	**No**	**DK**	**NR**	***TOTAL***
Yoga practices	50	44.2	3.8	1	*100*	4.8	93.3	1.9	0	*100*
Fortune telling in cards	23.1	71.2	3.8	1.9	*100*	0	100	0	0	*100*
Reading the Horoscope	65.4	31.7	2.9	0	*100*	3.8	95.2	1	0	*100*
Witchcraft	15.4	79.8	2.9	1.9	*100*	0	100	0	0	*100*

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data from February 2008, Cluj-Napoca.

By analyzing the data, one can easily say that the confessional education environment contributes substantially to the transmission and reproduction of traditional moral Christian values among teenagers that attend these high-schools. Romanian society, as a result of globalization and the contact with alternative forms of spirituality, has lately experienced major reconfigurations of religious values and ideas. These processes can be observed most clearly when we look at the younger generations, socialized after the fall of the communist regime. Public high-schools constitute environments market by cultural, ideological and religious pluralism, while Neo-Protestant high-schools try to keep these processes at bay. The declared purpose of the latter is therefore twofold: the formation and socialization of young individuals in the spirit of traditional Christian values, and the construction of a "re-christianization" vehicle for society. The following fragment from the interview with the principal of the Baptist theological high-school in Cluj-Napoca illustrates this well:

> The school's vision is the formation of individuals. Of course, we realize we are not the only ones to do that. There is also the family, the church but we, because we are a school, try to move a step forward. We promote Christian education as an alternative in what constitute different views on society, on humanity. This is our main purpose: to form graduates marked with the vision promoted by Christian education. (*The principal of the Baptist Theological High-school in Cluj-Napoca, male, 45*)

The formation and promotion of Christian moral values is accompanied by a manifest desire shared by religious organizations to make their activity visible in public life. Through the activities they organize, the events they promote, confessional high-schools try to make themselves recognised and accepted as viable educational alternatives to public schools, offering both a formal education and a religious one. There is also a great focus on the institution of the family and

the gender roles within it, reproducing in this way beliefs and ideas which legitimize Church intervention in all sectors of individuals' lives, both private and public. Table 5 shows the distribution of agreement on Church involvement in various spheres of life by the type of high-school attended by students.

Table 5.

Agreement with Church involvment in different spheres of social life

Do you think Church should be involved in:	Public high-school (%)					Confessional high-school (%)				
	Yes	**No**	**DK**	**NR**	**Total**	**Yes**	**No**	**DK**	**NR**	**Total**
Individual moral problems and needs	64.4	27.9	7.7	0	100	77.1	15.2	7.6	0	100
Family life problems	45.2	43.3	11.5	0	100	73.3	22.9	3.8	0	100
People's spiritual needs	95.2	3.8	1	0	100	96.2	2.9	1	0	100
Social problems	16.3	73	9.7	1	100	46.7	45.7	6.7	1	100

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data from February 2008, Cluj-Napoca.

The deinstitutionalization of religion and its retrenchment from the public sphere can be analyzed by looking at the opinions on the legitimacy of Church involvement in social life. Numerous researches(Luckmann, 1967, Berger 1990; Davie, 2000; Wilson, 2000; Dobbelaere, 2002) have emphasised the diminishing impact religion and religious institutions have on public policy making and state politics. Religion is pushed in the private sector, while Church intervention in some spheres of life is no longer seen as legitimate. Church involvement is no longer accepted by students from public high-school on matters other than those regarding personal and spiritual issues. In the case of students from public high-schools, 95.2% accept the involvement of Church in spiritual issues, 64.4% in individual moral problems and needs, 45.2% in family life problems and only 16.3 % in social problems. One can clearly see a desire for Church-State separation in the case of public high-school students. Confessional high-school students, on the other hand, widely agree with Church involvement in all four spheres of life. The confessional school seems to be successful in promoting specific traditional values regarding the role of religion and Church in the day to day lives of Christians.

The following fragment from the interview with a history teacher from the Seventh Day Adventist Theological high-school, Cluj-Napoca is illustrative with respect to these:

> We try to promote behaviour that respects the family institution in a responsible manner. We emphasise what it means to be a man, what it means to be a woman in a marriage, what it means to be a proper and responsible child. We promote proactive attitudes because we are aware that schools are the working bench for a continual formation in character and morality. High-schools are what gets individuals start their lives, like a launching pad. Here you can incorporate habits and behaviours that will guide these young children throughout their lives. If you compare what happens in public high-schools and in the secular world to what happens here, you will see that Christian schools continue to be the true forces and pillars of counter-secularization. (*History teacher from the Seventh Day Adventist Theological high-school, Cluj-Napoca, male, 33*)

Emphasis is placed both on the transmission of religious moral values and on making Neo-Protestant groups more visible to the public eye. One of the strategies is to develop stable organizational cultures within the educational institutions, based on adjacent sets of values to those found among public education students. The adoption of free market strategies, like that of creating a brand for confessional high-schools in order to compete with public education, is the objectivation of a desire to promote the importance of church institutions in individuals' lives (Miller, 2002). Institutions of confessional education are, in the opinion of church leaders, one of the most important ways through which the presence of Neo-Protestant religious organizations can be made known and felt in the secularized public sphere. Institutions preserve and reproduce a specific social order (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). In the same way, religious institutions preserve and reproduce a specific religious order. Without the existence of such institutions the continuity and stability of a particular religious worldview would be a lot more difficult to secure. Confessional schools confer a sense of legitimacy to religious groups by the fact that they are legally recognized and protected. Institutionalization, in the case of Neo-Protestant religious organizations, is one of the principal modes of ensuring continuity and express legitimacy. At the same time, rational market strategies and market terminology are being adopted and used by religious leaders, pointing at the organizational level of secularization.

> We want to obtain great academic performances from our students, not just a reproduction of theology. Because this will bring us a better recognition, better resources, a better brand. It will make us more visible on the public scene. Our purpose is to become the number 1 high-school in Cluj-Napoca. Of course, this will be a very difficult enterprise because a good organizational culture is built in time. You need a history, a tradition. We do not have that yet because we, as an institution, exist only from the year 1991. But we are aware of the fact that, in an era of secularization, defensive strategies are almost useless. Without being actively involved in the public scene you cannot survive. Churches begin to understand the importance of offensive, manifest actions and not just of defensive strategies to face secularization. (*The principal of the Baptist Theological High-school in Cluj-Napoca, male, 45*)

The importance placed on institutions is exponential in the discourses of church leaders. Institutions with confessional affiliation allow the reproduction of Christian values in a solidified form. Values do not exist in abstract only, but find their institutional objectivation in confessional schools that overtly contribute to their transmission from one generation to another. By the institutionalized form they take, confessional schools benefit from the legal status conferred to them by the Romanian state. Now, religious organizations enter into direct competition with secular and public organizations in order to attract new members while maintaining the attachment of present members.

In the present context, defensive Church strategies no longer appear as being sufficient. Religious organizations and their leaders desire all the more to plan manifest actions, wanting to make their activity known in all sectors of social life (Miller, 2002). If the old socializing agents, among which the family and the Church, have a limited temporal access to young people these days, confessional high-schools are better positioned in this respect. Teenagers spend about 8 hours per day in school, which cumulates to about 30 hours per week. The transmission and reproduction of religious values becomes more efficient in an institutionalized educational setting than it would be by simple attendance of religious services or religious education at home.

> Parents are only one of the important teachers in a child's life. Moreover, if the church manages to have a formative discourse, this too is limited because church no longer has access to all sectors in an individual's life[...] However, school has at its disposal 30 hours per week to form the young adult [...]All these bring about and promote a specific Christian view on the world and thus confessional schools contribute to the interiorization of religious values and their exteriorization in the day to day lives of our students. *(Pastor of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, male, 56).*

This aspect is identified by leaders of the Neo-Protestant churches and used for their advantage. They consider confessional education as one of the most important mediums of counterattacking the current process of secularization, given the fact that these institutions form the realm of religious values in a child's life to a greater degree than do family religious education or church services.

Community and religious practices in Neo-Protestant confessional high-schools

However important confessional education might appear in the eyes of church leaders, in dealing with the current process of secularization, these institutions could not function for a long period of time without having the support of the faith community. In other words, in the absence of a sufficient support from individuals willing to sponsor and to send their children to confessional educational institutions, the latter could not last and develop as

they do. Through financially sponsoring these institutions and through a manifest desire to attend them, religious communities allow the development and rise in popularity of confessional education. The existence of a faith community supporting confessional education can be inferred from the constant yearly increase in the number of Neo-Protestant high-schools, kindergartens and universities. According to the staff of these institutions, the capacity to realize a symbiosis between formal and religious education is one of the major factors contributing to the attractiveness of confessional schools.

On the other hand, one must emphasise that there are differences between confessional schools. If Orthodox and Romano-Catholic theological schools place a great importance on Dogmatics, access to these institutions being granted on basis of a theological inclination on behalf of the student and/or of his parents, Neo-Protestant confessional high-schools place a greater importance on activities that are accessible to all those interested in undergoing a religious education. Another difference between confessional schools consists of the ways in which different religious organizations conceptualize an individual's relation with God. Neo-Protestant schools, unlike Orthodox or Romano-Catholic theological schools, promote the idea that access to divinity should be unmediated, influenced solely by the believer's desire and personal effort, and eliminate any ritualistic element from this equation. Choosing a Neo-Protestant school circumscribes to an adherence to the Neo-Protestant worldview, according to which access to divinity is granted solely and exclusively through one's personal desires and actions. At the same time, Neo-Protestant values concerning unmediated relationship with the divinity are amplified and solidified through studying in a confessional high-school. Salvation and a relationship to God is presented as being non-mediated in any way by rituals or third persons. According to one of the leaders of a Neo-Protestant Church:

> The advantage of Neo-Protestant schools, in comparison to Orthodox or Catholic schools, is that they simplify the confessional discourse, they simplify the authority structures that legitimise this discourse. In traditional religions, there are many sources of authority: priests, saints, the Church, which makes things more relative. The only source of authority in Neo-Protestant high-schools are the Sacred Scriptures. They are the central element here. And this brings students in a direct relation to the text. A bonus if you like. Things are no longer relative but obvious. Only one authority dictates what should or should not be done, what should or should not be. *(Pastor of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, male, 56)*

Given the fact that voluntary association is a basic characteristic of all protestant movements and organizations, the choice to study in a Neo-Protestant high-school is seen as a free and willing adherence to Neo-Protestant views and values. Allegedly, people choose to study in these educational institutions

because here they find religious and moral concepts that match their own views on life and religiosity. The establishment of confessional schools is both a consequence of parents' desire that their children benefit from a religious education in the midst of a secularized society and a rational strategy adopted by religious organizations in order to cope with the current rise in popularity of alternative forms of spirituality (Miller, 2002).

The religious self and identity are deeply embedded in religious practices (Hermans, 2008). An individual who immerses himself/herself in religious practices often obeys a specific set of rules, put forward by the community of faith, and constantly keeps in mind a collective intentionality of those norms. Through all this, religious practices, the religious self and the community of faith are intrinsically related. To a greater extent than in the case of other religious groups, in that of the Neo-Protestant confessional schools religious socialization links the religious self and the concept of religiosity to religious practices. This conceptualization of religiosity penetrates all aspects of the individuals' lives, their behaviour, values and attitudes towards what is considered to be secular or sacred. Norms and restrictions imposed on religious basis are perceived as natural, unquestionable and irrevocable. Confessional high-school students begin to act according to these norms and restrictions and any kind of disobedience from these rules is regarded as unacceptable on their behalf. Some confessional high-schools even have an elaborated system of rewards and punishments in order to implement and sustain a specific view on what an acceptable or unacceptable behaviour means. A great emphasis is put on extracurricular activities that require an active involvement in civic programs such as environmental projects, community shelter programs for children, elders or disabled members of society. At the same time, secular activities, such as going to clubs, bars, and cinemas as well as smoking, drinking, foul language are sanctioned and frowned upon by the community of faith.

> In confessional high-schools extracurricular activities are better organized than elsewhere. And here I am talking about all kinds of religious, cultural and civic programs. This is also a consequence of the fact that confessional high-schools nurture an appetite for environmental projects, for a direct interest in community life. This is also observable if you look at our organized visits to elder homes, social activities, and civic responsibility programs, because they are all related to this Christian motivational sphere. You have to do something for the city, town or village you live in. This is a major concern for us. And our children are taught to be actively involved in all these issues. *(History teacher at the Seventh Day Adventist Theological High-school in Cluj-Napoca, male, 33)*

These activities contribute to the transmission and internalization by young adults of a specific religious view. Interest in community problem solving is awakened inside these educational institutions through the types of events and activities organized there. At the same time, the interest manifested by religious

groups towards these problems is consciously adopted by students. The church and the faith community have, therefore, a major impact on the formation of attitudes in regard to social problems as well as individual problems. Confessional high-schools act, in the present context, as an interface and mediator for the influence of church upon society. This partly goes against the societal secularization process, which can be identified if we look only at the diminishing impact of religion upon the society in the largest sense.

Student involvement in these activities is assured and maintained through the idea of community life and community dedication. This way of understanding social networks that form in confessional high-schools reflects a widely spread religious attitude, according to which all members of the faith community are brothers and sisters in that faith and not just actors playing different roles that are prescribed by the institutional context in which they find themselves. The confessional environment is a stable context in which students are supposed to voluntarily adhere to and internalize values, norms, attitudes and behavioural patterns. Direct interaction with other conceptions on what is or is not acceptable and desirable comes into play only later in their life, after teenage socialization has been finalized during the high-school years. All this means that stability in those specific values, norms and attitudes is easier to be maintained during adulthood and resist to re-socialization in secular values (Berger, Luckmann, 1966; Berger, 1990).

Students in confessional high-schools are also encouraged to manifest their religious values in day to day life, aspiring to what they regard as a "higher" moral ground than the one found in the secular society. The greatest importance is placed on the ways in which the religious environment educates them in what regards abilities esteemed by the faith community. This does not mean that formal education is not important in confessional schools. It does however mean that priority is given to implementing a set of specific attitudes regarding secular and spiritual matters. All the activities in Neo-Protestant educational institutions are concerned with developing a religious perception of reality, distancing students from the secular world and guiding them towards more spiritual matters

Through all this, the social construction of a religious *habitus*, as Bourdieu would put it (Bourdieu, 2000), by means of religious socialization or re-socialization, leads to internalizing a specific religious way of looking at the world. This is manifested in the expressed values, attitudes, actions, as well as in the behavioural patterns that circumscribe to and are shaped by that specific religious world view. Involvement and adherence to religious practices can be obtained and assured thorough the implementation of strict rules concerning a members behaviour, rules that distinguish a particular religious group from all others, along with the emphasis put on community life. The

adopted and manifested religious *habitus* later influences specific occupational and social mobility patterns, which are accesible to and perceived as acceptable by students of Neo-Protestant schools. I will next focus on the influence religion in general and Neo-Protestant confessional schools in particular have on contouring occupational patterns and to what degree access to the labour market is influenced by religious adherence.

Occupational patterns of students from confessional high-schools

Rules, prescriptions, restrictions and sanctions become internalized by individuals during the process of socialization (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Some students had already been religiously socialized at home, whereas others have first come in contact with this specific worldview upon entering the confessional education system. The knowledge accumulated, once internalized, becomes transposed in dispositions that orient the actions and life choices of students. One of the ways in which religious education influences students in adulthood is that regarding the occupational pattern and the differentiated access on the labour market.

On the one hand, it is interesting to study how confessional schools influence job selection through the development of specific abilities. Since we are talking here of Neo-Protestant high-schools, putting great value on music and musical talent, many of the students choose a professional career in this area, opting for a career in music education or state Philarmonica. Interest in religious music can be identified even before the students' arrival at the confessional school, as musical talent is stimulated by most Neo-Protestant families. Singing in church choirs, playing musical instruments in church programs, are often ways for children of Neo-Protestant families to manifest their devotion to God and to the faith community. The later occupational pattern, to a lesser of greater degree, is influenced by this musical inclination. Many of the former students of Neo-Protestant schools, even if they do not follow a direct career path in music, tutor children in singing vocally and playing musical instruments. Therefore, the musical domain represents a safety net, bringing in supplementary income even when students choose other professional paths.

Music also becomes a motivating factor in determining students to actively participate in school activities. Christian music choirs represent the major extracurricular activity in these institutions. They offer students the possibility to develop their musical abilities requesting, at the same time, a complete and utter devotion from their part. Those that do not regularly participate in choir rehearsals are automatically excluded from that group. Since, as any other extracurricular activity, choir participation is voluntary, the students' devotion to music and the benefits offered for taking part in the

choir events are what maintain the stability and high status of choir group. Benefits take the form of either prestige students of the choir group possess or of choir excursions and programs abroad. Also, developing their musical abilities through choir participation, students gain the possibility to opt for a future career in music:

> I don't know what I will be doing once i finish [a. n.: my studies]. I wanted to be part of the school choir and I was for a time. But after I missed a couple of rehearsals they kicked me out...That is actually what drew me here in the first place. To this high-school I mean. I said to myself that if they are so interested in music and place a great emphasis on it, I could become a music teached once I finish my studies. At least I could have a save job, doing what I love. *(Student, Baptist Theological high-school in Cluj-Napoca, female, 16)*

One can observe, in the subject's discourse, a rationalization of her position in connection with, on the one hand, religious values and, on the other, future career possibilities. The inclination towards music and the importance of developing musical talent is manifest before attending the confessional school but, at the same time, is cultivated during the school years. Music also becomes an instrument of exerting symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2000), as students participating in choir activities gain prestige, while those who are excluded lack the consideration granted to the former. Religious music symbolizes in this context religiousness itself, as perceived by teachers and students and the symbolic capital with which musical talent is invested elevates students in the eyes of both colleagues and school staff.

One must also acknowledge that there is a strong determination of former confessional high-school students not to abandon their religious values and principles once they leave the institutional context. Certain limits in what concern occupational patterns, such as not working in environments frowned upon by the faith community (clubs, bars, theatre, film industry, law degrees, etc.), do not cause them to abandon the norms and rules internalized during school years. Consequences of abandoning some career paths and consequences of certain career decisions influenced by their religious beliefs are not seen as sacrifices but as a condition for further religious and spiritual growth. Value must be placed on spiritual and not material or professional gains. Social positions appear important only to a degree to which they contribute to a spiritual growth of individuals and of society as a whole. Therefore, occupational positions are not seem as goals in and by themselves but as means to achieving a superior, religious goal, that which is eternal live and spiritual salvation.

What is most aspired to when it comes to professional career is occupational autonomy, independence and freedom of religious expression at workplace. Those who possess sufficient financial means and resources opt for self-employment. This way they can sustain their religious values and

principles without the danger of losing their jobs as a consequence of religious expression. Social networks that form in confessional high-schools also become relevant when students enter the labour market and opt for a professional career. The social capital accumulated while still in school (close relationships developed with school mates, teachers, deans and counsellors) is now converted in a type of economic capital. Not the economic aspect per se is important here, but the social relationships that mediate an economic positioning on the market. Even though the goal is not an economic one, social networks can be used with economic ends. All students of the Neo-Protestant confessional schools analyzed for the purpose of this article conceive themselves as being brothers and sisters in a common faith, being expected to unconditionally help each other, be it spiritually or materially.

The Neo-Protestant high-school environment is perceived as an enlarged community, generating and reproducing a specific religious *habitus* among its members (Bourdieu, 2000; Dianteill, 2003). Confessional schools become socializing agents, leading to the internalization of a particular ethos that is specific to the religious community that supports and sponsors such institutions. This ethos, once assimilated and internalized, influences the entire range of choices that former students make in adult life. Moreover, through the development of social networks inside the school these young adults can later convert that social capital in forms of economic capital (Bourdieu, 2000). Looking at occupational patterns and career choices among former students of confessional schools is one way of understanding how religious socialization influences future social, economical and professional positioning.

Conclusions and discussion

Neo-Protestant groups constitute significant agents in the formation of social, moral and religious values both before and after the fall of communism. However, due to the restrictions imposed by the Communist Regime these groups were, for a long period of time, invisible to the public eye. After 1989, their activity became more and more intense and a new range of domains in which they activate developed. In the face of the new religious pluralism, possible after the fall of communism, religious groups develop specific strategies to maintain the religious attachment of their members. Concepts such as de-secularization and counter-secularization become extremely relevant here as they regard the manifest attempts of religious groups to offer religious solutions to modern issues.

Through the institutionalization of confessional education new religious alternatives are offered to public institutions. This provides an opportunity not only for a reconfiguration of moral values in a specific religious worldview, but also for the development of social networks that influence the path of

students in future life. Also, taking into consideration that adult church attendance is influenced by a religious socialization during childhood, confessional education has, as its major goal, the development and maintenance of church and religious attachment. Neo-Protestant confessional education is intended to become one of the major pillars of counter-secularization, at an individual, organizational and societal level (Dobbelaere, 2002), in a Romanian society that is faced with a propagation of de-Christianization, de-moralization and religious de-institutionalization processes among its members.

Using Bourdieu's conceptual framework, from *habitus* and *symbolic capital* to *symbolic violence* and *the religious field*, one can take into account the struggles religious institutions, such as confessional schools, engage in with public institutions in order to legitimate a specific world view and, through this, to legitimate their own existence. A further and more thorough analysis of this struggle in the religious field, between state institutions and religious institutions, to impose a specific definition of religion and spirituality is undoubtedly needed. The present article is only one step towards this, with the aim of directing attention to the study of counter-secularization movements, seen here as position takings of religious organizations in both the religious and educational field.

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Editorial note:

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DIMITRIE GUSTI ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS OF THE WILHELMIAN ERA

IMRE PÁSZKA[1]

(translated from Hungarian by István Volford)

ABSTRACT. This study follows a double aim, relying on Dimitrie Gusti's autobiography. The first is to reveal his path of life, focusing on his social networks, the university world of a Wilhelmian era, and to reconstruct the memories about his professors. The second purpose is to reveal how Gusti himself thought about that era, what was his understanding of it, what kinds of impressions, experiences did he retain from those years. Did he realize that, during his university years, modern science was about to change in epochal and paradigmatic ways? We look at Gusti's biography as being divided into three narrative episodes: the beginnings at Berlin, the continuation of his academic career at Leipzig, and the final period at Berlin. The attempt to construct Gusti's narrative life history is rather difficult, given that in his autobiography most episodes are not based on his own personal recollections or recalled reflections, but they derive from second-hand sources. The reason is that during the era of his studies, the contact with his epoch-making professors was mostly formal. His memories of Simmel's rhetoric and his sociology indicate that, because of Gusti's social background, Simmel's syllabus of sociology was not relevant for him, since his conceptualizations were not applicable in the rural atmosphere where Gusti was born, where a nation was just at the beginning of the modernization process. In Gusti's autobiography, the narrative is subjective and intentional, self-representative to affirm personal identity and legitimacy, with pedagogic and narcissistic purposes. In spite of the fact that the term "auto-sociology" was created by Gusti, his actual autobiography covers only the first 25 years of his life. Therefore I tried to reconstruct his biography not solely based on self-representations, but also on external accounts on the social history of the era and some "additives" about the characteristics of the social milieu.

Key words: Monographic Sociological School in Bucharest, autobiography, life narrative, Völkerpsychologie

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Introduction[2]

Dimitrie Gusti (1880-1955) who concentrated on village explorations between the two world wars was the establisher of the monographic sociological school at Bucharest.[3] Somlai's statement about the previous era's sociologists was true for Gusti well. Somlai stated they were "theoretical", and thought themselves as the "founders of sociology" (Somlai, 1999:18-19). Gusti expressed this idea consistently, furthermore he called his sociology as the "Sociology of the Nations", what meant, that the birth of sociology in his country can be associated with his name. Following the World War II., Gusti and his school's activity was suspended, because of the well-known reasons. From that time on, his scientific work was practically restricted to the writing of his autobiography. He marked his autobiography as his last sociological lecture and in the introduction of it he makes an attempt to conceptualize and fit this type of personal document, into his own sociological system. D. Gusti's sociological system, his school and his pupils' work will not be emphasized in this paper, because they are more or less known from the Hungarian sociological literature.[4] Although his works were published during the socialist era, neither before, nor after the fall of the communist regime, were not in the focus of the Romanian sociological analysis. His autobiography was published 15 years after his death, in which he specifies that his theory is not incompatible with the regime's ideology. By integrating his social theories into the Marxist ideology he let a chance to his pupils to continue their scientific work. That's why all his works were edited by one of his students, called Octavian Neamţu. His autobiography gives us a partly subjectvive picture about one of the most prolific periods of the european science's history. The Romanian scholars of social-history have not used that, scientific review from Gusti, not even after the revival of the scientific life after 1989.[5]

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[2] The non-edited version of this paper was originally presented by the author at a conference held to memory of the 150th anniversary of Durkheim's birth (1858) and the 100th anniversary of Simmel's death (held at Algyő-Szeged 2008 Oct. 2-3.). The conference was organized by the Sociological Section of Szeged Regional Commission of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Faculty of Social Sciences, "Eötvös Loránd" University Budapest.

[3] The work of the monographic school of sociology at Bucharest lasted from 1925-1945, but during the 2nd Word War could have worked in a moderate and formal way. So the ending point of the school's work might have altered. The Romanian Academy started to publish Gusti's work (5 volumes) after 1960ies. The last volume of the series (at about 400 pages long) is his autobiography (D. Gusti, 1971: 7-436.) Autobiographies generally can be polite literatures or not. Beside Gusti we can list Sorokin, Bücher, Wundt, Collingwood, Jaspers etc. whose autobiographies are not polite literatures, but takes a dominant part of their scientific publications. (More detailed about autobiographies and life-stories and the poetic-structural aspects in Gusti's biography see Pászka, 2007: 233-263, 482-492.)

[4] For a Hungarian study on Gusti's sociological system see: (Pászka, 1998: 69-99, Pászka, 2006: 100-148.)

[5] In 1996 (July 22-26.) during the preparation of a rural-sociological congress came up an idea to make a memoir volume on reviewing the school established by Gusti to commemorate to Gusti's desired idea about an international sociological congress at Bucharest (the social units among rural and citizens) an, which was cancelled because the war broke out. In the prologue of the volume Vintilă Mihăilescu

In Gusti's autobiography (*Fragmente autobiografice. Autosociologia unei vieți. 1880-1955) (Fragmants of an autobiography. A life's autosociology. 1880-1955)* the most important chapters for us, are in which he recaptures his university years in Germany (1899-1907). At that period he got aquintanced with some dominant figures of the sociological life, either in a direct or an indirect way. These figures were the establishers of both theoratical and methodological parts of social sciences. The evocation of these contacts and the comments on them makes a huge percent out of the whole autobiography.

This can be proved by analyzing the structure of the writing, since the chapters dealing with other parts of his life are really short and brief. On one hand these unemphasized parts are: "the argumentation" (why he decides to write the autobiography), "the dedication" (to his parents; foreigner collegaues; the peasant men of the village, those who he met during the village explorations), "the awakening"(childhood, primary school years; landscape; siblings, relatives), and the part when he describes his "high school years".

On the other hand, the more detailed chapters are: *Searching for the path,* (University years: Berlin, Leipzig (1899-1907); *Discovering Goethe* (he had a determinating role in his personality); *Spare time* (music, literature, museums); *Crises* (diseases, love, sience); *The society of the future* (getting in touch with Marxism); *His writing after the crisis* (emperor „kaiser" William's portrait); *The fulfilment* (the delineation of a cultural state's idea; his correspondence).[6] Besides describing that era's subculture among university students (fighting duels, drinking), his reminiscences are full of detailed descriptions about his relations with his teachers and friends. We can say that Gusti viewed this era from a university student's perspective. He identified whole Germany with the world within the university. His autobiography is basically the narrative of his university years. Later on he admits that those years were really determining in his life. We have to see clearly, that his narratives constructed by his walk of life are in some parts are distortional because of its subjectivity. This subjectivity

in his study named "The separation from Gusti" makes univocal to the reader that Gusti is a museum institute, and had a national cultural program, so his actuality is more than doubtful. (Mihăilescu, 1996: 49-65.) A. Marga the president of the "Babes-Bolyai" University Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár during one of our conversations told me that, wile I was a guest teacher there, unfortunately only the Transylvanian Hungarians are dealing with Gusti and his school.

6 Gusti gives an etymologic explanation of the autobiography: auto (I), bios (life), graphia (writing). He tells his own autobiography apart from journalism, bioramas, confessions, literature like autobiographies (St. Augustine, Rousseau, and Tolstoy). In Gusti's definition the autobiography is an objective, complete and honest review of the main points of ones life up to the moment of the writing. He gave the different aspects of the editing: 1.) cut the life-story into different sequencies, 2.) all social units have to be described in which the subject took place (family, friends, schools, village, army, city etc.) 3.) The analysis of the relations and effects caused by these units to the autobiography's author. (Gusti 1971:15-17) So he fits in his sociological system not only the way of writing an autobiography, but the analyzing methods, aspects of it. Gusti mainly recalls the first 25 years of his life, when he learned at German universities. (Gusti, 1971: 7-349).

is somehow forced by his aim of self-justification and exemplification. At the same time we can get an image from that era's scientific career sample, the ways of interpersonal relationships are made among scientists and how they worked with different strategies, from the university years to a foundation of a sociological school.

As we have indicated previously the whole analysis of his autobiography's narrative was not our aim. We put more emphasis on the chapters in which the teacher-student relations are described during his university years. It is the easiest to achieve if we follow the authors original text-articulation. The following of this segmentation is not just plausible, but makes the parts more understandable, where the author refers back or forward to his life and makes visible the motivations behind these processes of actions and thinking. We follow Gusti's articulation consequently, when we are describing the different stages of his studies: 1) University of Berlin – the beginnings; 2) University of Leipzig – his doctorate; 3) University of Berlin – the ending up of his legal studies.

The beginnings – The University of Berlin (1899)

In this part he mentions 4 important episodes according to the University of Berlin: 1) his matriculation, his oath of loyalty to the president of the university, his student activities; 2) Franz von Liszt's courses about international law, where Liszt gave a lecture on the situation about river Duna; 3) the centenary of the University of Berlin (1910), in which he took part as a delegated teacher of the University of Iaşi; 4) The conference held in the hall of the University of Berlin (1934), where he gave a lecture as the teacher of the University of Bucharest, about his sociological researches. (Gusti, 1971: 43.) Out of these 4 points, the first one refers to his first years at Berlin, while the second one is dealing with his studies not long before his graduation, the third and the fourth ones are to describe his successes in his career as a teacher and a researcher. His aim was unambiguous with associating 4 different time-dimensions with one place, with that he was sketching his walk of life. This walk of life is extraordinary and special; he believes this example could be followed by others. The only ordinary thing in his walk of life is the beginnings, which part is almost the same with all other youngsters coming from upper class families.

D. Gusti similarly to others coming from the same social background starts his studies at the University of Berlin at the age of 19, in 1899. He chose this University because the German Universities were mostly scientific centered (Gusti, 1971: 42-44.). Beside that fact, it is worth mentioning that his predecessors from the Moldovan scientific elite, preferred the German Universities not like the ones, who lived in Transalpine, they preferred the universities of Paris[7].

[7] The historian Nicolae Iorga (who had also Moldovan origin) and Gusti, as local patriots often acquitted that the major part of the Romanian Academy had a Moldovan origin. The Romanian scientific and polite literature's elite were mostly from Moldova and attended to German universities.

In his autobiography he starts with the description of the first period of the University of Berlin. After having described the convocation ritual and weekdays of the students, (what seemingly shocked him)[8] he writes separate subsections about F. Paulsen's, G. Simmel's, A. Wagner's and G. Schmoller's lectures and debates. Beside these he made reflections about Dilthey, and about his work to establish the psychic sciences. In this period he had personal relationship with F. Paulsen, whose lectures were not compelling – according to Gusti - not even in rhetorical sense. His explanations were full with time gaps, in which he was searching the right expression, as if it were a hard thing for him to find the appropriate term. However this technique made Paulsen clearly understandable, his simplicity and honesty made his topics traceable by his audience. That is why F. Paulsen was the most popular teacher among the students. His lectures were audited by students coming from all faculties of the university, because even the PhD. Students of chemistry or physics were made to learn philosophy and they always chose Paulsen (Gusti, 1971: 44.)

Paulsen's scientific importance – not mentioning his most important work dealing with higher education – was in his ethical, pedagogical, and cognitional theoretical knowledge. In Paulsen's work: *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Erkenntnistheorie* (1875) Kant's effect is dominant, and the most important monographic analysis on Kant's work is usually connected with him. As an ethic's teacher Paulsen is not proceeding from abstract theories, but from a personal life's experiments. That is why his work, *System der Ethik* is so important. Regarding to the number of studies about applying ethics in pedagogy, Paulsen can be mentioned as the key figure of that era's pedagogical sciences. Beside that, Paulsen was the internationally best known German philosopher what can be proved by the number of the foreign editions of one of his works, called: *Einleitung in die Philosophie.* With that study, he was first in the popularization of the German philosophy (Gusti, 1971: 44 - 45).

On the autumn of 1899 he ends up his philosophical studies at the University of Berlin, he continues his studies at the University of Leipzig, than in 1904 returns again to Berlin. In this second period at Berlin he often gets invitations from Paulsen to his house for breakfasts. At those breakfasts he got in touch with the great sociologist and statistician F. Tönnies, who later became his friend. Tönnies was a good friend and compatriot of Paulsen. He also got in touch with Eduard Spranger, "who at that time was young, but later became a professor". Paulsen introduced Gusti to his family as the incarnate of his ethical taught.

[8] It seems that his remarks about his teachers, except Paulsen, are not based on personal contacts, but the observers remarks.

That good relation between Gusti and Paulsen can explain Gusti's deep pain, what he felt during the funeral of his respected professor, who died at the age of 63 suffering from cancer (Gusti, 1971: 45).

Gusti called the debate of Adolph Wagner and Gustav Schmoller just a scientific attraction, in which they argued about the methodology of social sciences. The so-called *Der Methodenstreit* (methodological debate) of them - can be derived from prestige reasons – says Gusti – because he defines Wagner's neoclassicist and Schmoller's historical economic studies the same, only some emphasis are put into different places in their ideas. As Gusti says they both admitted the importance of the inductive historical and practical approaches and the importance of the deductive theoretical and psychological approaches and the way the two theories could be combined (Gusti 1971: 48).

The dispute mentioned by Gusti is the equivalent of that era's most important question in social sciences in Germany, since the main characters of that debate were Carl Menger and Gustav Schmoller. Adolph Wagner and Lujo Bretano (theoretical socialists, companions of Schmoller at "Verein") were just sidemen of that debate. [9] Schmoller gets involved in the dispute in 1883, when in a review he questions the importance of C. Menger's principles in economical sciences.[10] In his response Menger criticizes Schmoller because of his "history without theory". In 1883 he announced his work: *Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Economics* (*Untersuchungen über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der politischen Ökonomie insbesondere.)* From that time on we can talk about the methodological arguments between historical and theoretical schools. In his work Menger tells apart three different types of sciences, 1) theoretical sciences dealing with the phenomena's general attributes 2) the historical sciences, dealing with the individual phenomenon 3) practical sciences in which he doesn't describe what is present now, but what "should" be present now. He discerns 2 kinds of theoretical explorations: 1) empiric realistic (which deals with empiric laws, realistic types, in which understanding is unsure) while the 2) exact sciences can be described with laws used by natural sciences. Menger believes in the exact sciences and denies the possibility of typifying a nation's economic phenomena within the context of social and state development (Felkai, 1999: 292).

[9] In this section the topic is about the journal called: „*Verein für Socialpolitik*" (Social politic Association) what was established by nation-economy teachers and civil service professionals. The "Verein's associates were G. Schmoller, L. Bretano, W. Roscher, and later on M. Weber, W. Sombart as well. The debate between the manchesterians and theoretical socialists were summarized by Felkai (Felkai, 1999: 288-297).

[10] Note: we are avoiding the debate of Treitschke and Schmoller, but that debate is also the part of the methodological problem, since it is similar to Menger and Schmoller's ideas in content (Felkai, 1999: 293-295).

Gustav Schmoller was invited to the University of Berlin in 1982; his most important study is the Principles of General Economics (*Grundriß der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre*) was written in a historical-realistic and socio-ethical style. Schmoller, (not as Mengler), does not recognize huge gaps between explorations oriented by individual and historical, general and typical means, because he says the individual-inductive method gives help in creating general theories. At the same time, Schmoller from a scientific precision's point of view says that a phenomena best can be described by analyzing it from all different points of views and causes. Seemingly the proposed method is the analyzing, more precisely the "intent analysis", what can not be realized without the subordination of classification, conceptualization, and types, because this is the only method that can lead to empiric-realistic descriptions through induction, and this is how the strict and exact issues can be made. So Schmoller thought that in the understanding of the economic processes cannot be precise through only theoretical methods which can be derived from individual profit, but we have to consider the legal, moral ethical and state factors and their effects on each other. The "real cognition is above the aim to find the exact laws", if the laws are missing, the exact explorations and classifications of the reality might help the understanding (Felkai 1999: 297).

We can't claim that Gusti doesn't describe the Wagner-Schmoller debate in an essential way, but he focuses not on the methodological conflict, but on the prestige conflicts around titles used at German universities by teachers. Wagner got the "Excellenz" title while Schmoller "simply" got the title "Geheimrat". Schmoller got the "Excellence" title because of his services as the tutor of the crown prince, what he rejected because Wagner had the same title as well. The government gave him noble title what was unpaired among university teachers. Gusti mentions that Wagner's lectures were vivid, while Schmoller was dictating (Gusti, 1971: 49).

The general behavior of the teachers in Germany also surprised him; because they are really insist on their position at the university, what he explains with their professionalism instead of existential problems. In the very same section he mentions some extreme examples, when the old teachers: Paulsen, Wagner, Dilthey and Adolph Bastian were carried into the lecture's room by their relatives because they had both physical and mental problems and after few words they forgot their previous sentences. After these prove of their mental senility they cried for taking them out from the room. However their lectures were very popular simply because they had a great reputation and their scientific accomplishment was widely respected (Gusti, 1971: 53).

In Gusti's reminiscence about Georg Simmel it is an important question why the East European sociologists forgot about him at the turn of the 19-20. Century, even those who were either directly or indirectly knew his taught. The

question has a Hungarian relevance as well, because they were pioneers in the publications of German social scientists. However not even the very famous periodical, called the 20th Century ("Huszadik Század") cared about his modern ideas around money, fashion, social distances, alienation and competitions. In Hungarian context, as it seems, they had to quit the Marxist "Huszadik Század" to be able to keep up with the modern western ideas. These pioneers were Bódog Somló (neo-Kantianism), Károly Mannheim (knowledge sociology) and the early work of Lukács could be a good example in leaving the Marxist ideology. [11]

In Gusti's case this is somehow more simple but kind of similar. In his autobiography more subjective and habitual aspects turn out, that can explain why he handles Simmels ideas the way they are. The chapter dedicated to Simmels life is a whole, coherent, but single part in his biography. His remarks refer to the fact that he attended to his lectures and his opinion about him reflects that period, not the era afterwards, when he recalls Weber's and Simmel's common manifestations. That is also a fact, that the author might have put the different time dimensions together as the part of the construction. All together, that is a fact that the chapter dealing with Simmel is much longer than the one dealing with Paulsen, although he had a personal relationship with Paulsen. Gusti wrote in his autobiography that Simmel was the only teacher at the University of Berlin, who was brave enough to keep a lecture on sociology. This professionalism of Gusti can explain why he was visiting Simmel's courses so enthusiastically. By that time Simmel was no longer a regular teacher at the university, so he didn't have the right to keep exams to the students, his audience was much fluctuated, and foreign students made up the major percent of his audience. The Russian students were in the highest number and only few Germans attended his lectures. [12]

"Despite the fact that Simmel wrote wonderful essays and gave presentations in a very figurative ways, his lectures as well as his other works

[11] As an example, Bódog Somló's typology of archaic society's exchange and stock institutions could be viewed as a precursor of Károly Polányi's economical-anthropological theory of archaic markets. Bódog Somló was an internationally well-known and acknowledged law and ethics teacher at the university of Cluj between 1907 and 1920, and his work *Sociology* was first published in 1909. He is buried in the Central Cemetery (*Házsongárd)* from Cluj.

[12] It's a contradiction in Gusti's work, that at the first period of Simmel's American reception (1895-1930) the students of the John Hopkins, Harvard and Chicago Universities, who later on played an important role in the USA's sociology, were all the students of Simmel at Berlin. Albion W. Small for example at 1880 was learning at Berlin and was the schoolmate of Simmel, with who he had good relationship, and he was the first to delineate Simmel's work at the US. Simmel's American students were: Frederik A. Bushee, Charles A. Ellwood, Edward C. Hayes, Robert E. Park, Nicholas J. Spykman, Howard J. Woolston. It means that Gusti does not mentions the American students, despite the fact that Ellwood was the establisher of scientific psychological sociology (1897), and Park became Simmel's student 2 years later, at the same time with Gusti.

were disappointing." [13] "He did not care about the material sociology - the actual happenings in the society - he thought, that if things are really societal then those things must be formal as if formal and material things could exist without each other" (Gusti, 1971: 46). Although Gusti was really interested in Simmel's work, he never understood his "topic and form" dialectics in his sociological works, he preferred his ethical studies more. [14]

He emphasizes his respect to Simmel with mentioning his works, known by Gusti, in the order of appearance: [15] *On Social Differentiation (Über sociale Differenzierung* 1890), *Introduction to the Science of Ethics (Eileitung in die Moralwissenschaft* 1-2. volumes, 1892-1893), *The Problems of the Philosophy of History (Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* 1893), *The Philosophy of Money (Die Philosophie des Geldes)*, and among his numeral studies: *The Psychology of Women (Psychologie der Frau* in: Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie), *The Psycology of Money* (*Psycholgie des Geldes* in: Schmollers Jahrbruch 1889), *The problems of Sociology* (*Le probeleme de Sociologie* in: Revue de Métaphisique et Morale, 1948).

After all, Gusti showed regret about Simmel, when at the end of his life (as the teacher of Strasburg) he showed total languidity about sociology[16] , as Gusti explained: "He was a sociologist, who was worth debating with" (Gusti,

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[13] Pitrim Sorokoin had a dismissive opinion about Simmel. Sorokin found Simmel's ideas pointless, his explanations false, and warned that Simmel's theses – supported by Park and Spykman – might force the sociologists to mere speculations, and would lead to the absence of metaphysical and scientific methods (Sorokin, 1928: 502.). Theodor Abel had a similar opinion (Abel, 1929: 48.). In the case of Sorokin, Abel and Gusti the clash of views about the formal sociology came from Simmel, because in their opinion the relation between form and content were interpreted in its differences (See: 12th. footnote). Th. Abel in 1959 recalled his previous standpoint and calls Simmel the "establisher of modern sociology" and "the most important pioneers of all" (Levin, Carter and Gorman, 1975: 422).

[14] Simmel's refinement is the following: In all social phenomena the content and form makes up a unit and none of the social forms can exist without its content, just like the spatial forms which may not exist without its material which makes up its shape. In reality the content and form can not be separated from each other just like the social existence from social actions (Simmel, 2001: 9). Nowadays P. Ricoeur deals with the problem of the content and form (Pászka, 2007: 98-119). The not understanding of Simmel by Gusti could be explained by the lack of the personal relationship. The American students of Simmel: Small, Park, Spykman, who had closer relationship with Simmel after they had gone back to the USA, kept they relationship alive by spreading Simmel's thoughts. Park-Brugess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Contains ten lectures of Simmel), Spykman, (1925) *The social Theory of Georg Simmel*. Translated by Small in volulmes: AJS 2-16. S. P. Altmanm's about Simmel's essay about money. Small at the same time sent three of his students to Germany in 1900, to visit Simmel's lectures (Levin-Carter-Gorman, 1975: 417-418.) All this refers to the fact that around Simmel there might have been a group what was unable to be invisible to Gusti. At the same time this is a contradiction how could Gusti not understand the lectures of Simmel, while he was a successful and popular lecturer. The University of Freiburg gave him a informal doctorate to his work about his formal sociology. (Felkai, 2007, Vol. II: 14).

[15] Most probably Gusti took the different segments and the substantive being of sociology from Simmel.

[16] Simmel in 1899 found it offensive if someone called him a sociologists "I am still a philosopher… sociology is some kind of sub department for me" (Cited in Némedi, 2005: 172).

1971: 47, 53-55).Some kind of preconception can be discovered toward Simmel's work by Gusti. A Romanian philologist Philippide had this remark on Gusti, who advised that "Lazarus's speculations are something that has to be cared of" [17] . But when Gusti arrived to Berlin Lazarus was over the top of his career, and Philippide did not know that the stream started by Lazarus and Steinthal named he "psychology of nations and languages" was about to end, not when it was new with a good reputation (Gusti, 1971:46).

Simmel was the student of Lazarus and in his speculations there were a focused place to social psychology and he explained the social phenomena with the effect of a nation to individuals (Gusti, 1971: 46). Simmel follows Lazarus's thoughts and claims in his work *The Problems of the Philosophy of History* (*Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie)* that without psychology the whole history would be uninteresting and incomprehensible. But Simmel just like his teachers does not give an exact definition or explanation what psychology is (Gusti, 1971: 47). Gusti derives this way of thinking of Simmel from Lazarus, and supposes that this idea was a discovery from A. Comte, when Comte claimed that the society precedes the individuals, and the intelligence is a common product of a society.

In Gusti's focus of interest was not that. What he was interested in was not connected with Simmel's sociological conceptual-theoretical frames. Gusti was interested in analyzing such statements: "nations are intellectual principals" or the "entity of the nations is in their psyche". "The 20th century is dominated by solidarity and the 19th is by individual success". Etc. But the question of the questions to Gusti is also: "What is the difference between a nation's concept and the Volksgeist" (Gusti, 1971: 46.) Gusti did not find satisfying answers to those questions during his whole work. This can give an explanation why does he alienate and not understand Simmel's ideas. Not only that he did not found Simmel's work organized or scientifically proved, but as a student he could not use his works although he was a keen on his works. Gusti recollects his memories about Simmel's impressionist[18] lectures and as a conclusion he admits that the topics of the sociology remained unanswered and open to him, because as Gusti said: "A whole discipline can not be based on Simmel's formal methods". His lectures about perfume, money, women etc. were very interesting – says Gusti – but did not give a scientific answer to the bases of the social sciences (Gusti, 1971: 46).

[17] When Gusti was interested in the Lazarus Steinthal debate (what can be a reason of a theory's decline) he had thoroughly read all his works and found them containing "banalities" and "sterile thoughts" (Gusti, 1971: 46.)

[18] David Frisby found Simmel's sociology impressionist in his works appeared at the beginning if the 1980ies (Frisby 1981, 1984a). This characteristic of Simmel's sociology started to spread in Anglo-Saxon language, and got to the German translations in social sciences as well. Frisby could not have known Gusti's autobiography but Gusti was the first to recognize Simmel's sociology's impressionist characteristics.

Gusti's obstacles in understanding Simmel's work were the following: 1) Gusti admits that at the beginning of his studies he had problems with the German language and he had to have some German language courses to keep up with other students. It is easily imaginable that lectures full with rhetoric images were hardly understandable by Gusti. 2) Gusti was only in a teacher-student relation with him and did not have the chance to have closer contact, unlike the American students: Bushee, Ellwood, Hayes, Park, Spykman, and Woolston. [19] 3) In his biography the remarks about Simmel were not from his first period at Berlin, but from a later one, when either he is over his doctorate or from the period when he recollected his memories. 4) Most probably the latter one is the true, because he proclaims himself keen on social sciences but as a first year student he did not know what makes up sociology's scientific bases, while the older ones neither had a clear answer to that question. 5) The statements about Simmel's and Weber's radical debates were also made by an "older" Gusti who draws a parallel between this "crisis debate of Simmel and Weber" with the conflicts of different sociological aspects. As a main reason behind those debates he names the denial of the classical physics what can be responsible for the chaos within the social sciences. He blamed this chaos for the appearance of new theories, which wanted simply apply laws of natural sciences in the analysis of the society. 6) In Gusti's autobiography in the evocation of Simmel probably the unbalanced relationship with Leopold von Wiese assisted the most. [20] This fact leads us to another suggest, that probably Gusti's remarks about Simmel are not from his personal memories, but from secondary publicized sources. 7) What is perhaps the most important thing, that Gusti as an Eastern-European thinker, needed a modern, sociological background that could be proved with scientific background to be able to use them in the method of "nationalization". It is not by coincidence that Wundt's "Völkerpsychologie" was a pioneer in this area, because it did not want to be a simple interdisciplinary science but was a movement of the intelligent classes who wanted to fasten the development of sociology. At this point the sociology made by Gusti meets with the aims of the Hungarian "Huszadik Század's" ideas

[19] see: 14th. and 15th. footnote.

[20] Leopold von Wiese, a student of G. Schmoller made approaches to construct a general sociology based on Simmel's ideas , what starts out from the isolation and ends in the behavior patterns. He uses 10 opposite pairs: approximation/concurrence, assimilation/conflict etc. (Levine, Carter and Gorman, 1975: 837; Némedi, 2005: 285-286, Felkai, 2007: 109-110). L. von Wiese, and the associates and students of the Köln Institute who took part in a village exploration in Germany met with the students of the Gusti school at Borsec (a popular bath-village in Transylvania) in 1931. After they had changed they experiments L. von Wiese wrote a critical essay about Gusti's school and sociological system (Rostás, 2001: 95-112, Rostás 2000: 76-80.) After Hitler got onto power L. von Wiese, with others – F. Tönnies, A. Weber, A. Vierkandt, Alfred von Martin – went into inner emigration or became retired (König, 1959, Vol. II: 113-131).

because both of them wanted to use sociology as some kind appliance of reform ideas. From this perspective this is easily understandable that a student coming from an underdeveloped Eastern-European country did not find a common point with Simmel's sociology dealing with the urban and modernized country's problems such as money, fashion or perfume. In the centre of Gusti's interest were mostly his own country's essential social problems. Our suggestions as we have already mentioned can be justified by the reasons what Gusti told to explain why did he change university.

Gusti as he remembers was not satisfied with the theoretical thoughts, and with the empiric observations neither. As it seems his first year at the University of Berlin did not have any positive effects on his mental abilities, since he was not satisfied with neither of his teachers. "In Berlin I did not understand either Dilthey's or Bastian's lectures. Dilthey's have to be read, because he spoke so quietly as if he were speaking to only himself." Although he liked Simmel's lectures, sometimes he found him some kind of "intellectual clown". He admitted that he is very talented and had very enthralling observations, but some of his analyses were fragmented or meaningless to Gusti he mentions his work about the perfume as an example again[21] (Gusti, 1971: 53).

He neither was satisfied with Paulsen, because he did not have questions about different topics; he handled every fact as if it was definitely sure and unquestionable, but these theories like psychological voluntarism was originally from Wundt with some additions by Tönnies, not from Paulsen. He mostly taught other thinker's ideas. These factors altogether made him to leave Berlin and continue his studies at Leipzig (Gusti, 1971: 53-54).

Between the end of his studies at Berlin and before his studies in Leipzig there is a gap in his biography what he calls "crisis", and at the same time this period is the "revelation" in his life. Gusti very consciously wanted to be a sociologist, was very hard-working studied all night and day, visited galleries, museums until his distress. After that he got into a sanatorium in Weimar, where he starts reading Goethe. Gusti finds Goethe the greatest man, artist, sociologists, politologist, jurist, scholar etc. He believed Goethe was the most unique and dominant figure of the universal culture. That's why he writes that much of his qualities derived from Goethe in a very long part in his biography. (Gusti, 1971: 55-89). Goethe became his ideal instead of the contemporary teachers and sociologists. With his own words: "no matter what I have done, no matter where I was, Goethe was always behind me" (Gusti 1971:57).

[21] The understanding of Simmel's lectures was a difficulty not only to Gusti but to his schoolmates as well. For the audience the main problem was caused by Simmel's intellectual products: non-systematic methods and different kinds of topics and the principles were too abstract to understand them. It is not a coincidence that in his sociology Simmel advises to the reader, that they can get the best view of the content of the volume if took a glance onto the index which is in alphabetical order (Levin, Carter and Gorman, 1976: 814; Simmel, 1973: 179, Némedi, 2005: 170-173)

University of Leipzig – the doctorate (1900-1904)

When he had written down that he started his third semester at Leipzig the second thing to mention was that Goethe attended to the same university at the age of 16. After sketching the history of the universities of Jena and Leipzig he added some remarks about the freedom of the academia and the subculture of the students. (Gusti, 1971: 89-90.) There is a whole section dealing with the cooperation between the optician works of Jena and the University. This meant the future's research and development and a social politic model for him. (Gusti, 1971:90-92.)

At the University of Leipzig – as Gusti said – there were intensive researches unexampled all over the world. Beside these pioneer researches there were several differences between the University of Leipzig and all other Universities in Germany, because this was the utmost and the most traditional one as well. The university made up a whole separate district. The university owned more than 100 amphitheatres, had different lands and forests, incomes from the state, from local governments and from private persons as well. As Gusti would say the university had a moral personality. At that time Leipzig was the "Mecca" of Marxism, here was first published the socialist paper: Die Leipziger Volkszeitung. Here he mentions E. Bernstein's famous lectures on the revision of Marxism, which had a deep impact on him (Gusti, 1971: 94-95).

In his decision to go on with his studies at Leipzig the pioneer researches had a dominant role. Those scientific researches were lead by scholars like Wundt (establisher of experimental psychology) Fr. Ratzel (establisher of human geography) K. Bücher, (the "most original" economist of that era) K. Lamprecht [22] the cultivator of the "Kulturgesichte". A. D. Xenopol historian called Gusti's attention about Lamprecht's work at his hometown, Jászváros (1971: 53). Gusti himself found this period from 1900 to 1904 the most important and dominant in his life, when he protects his doctorate (with his theses and oral exam) and become the member of the German scientific publicists. He had reached the phase when he created the most (Gusti, 1971: 131.).

In his biography he associates Wundt with Cicero and in his works he finds the synthesis of the modern sciences. This section is the starter episode within the chapter about. For Gusti Wundt was not only a Renascence man, but was the "Leibnitz redivivus", as well as was a mentor of two generations of scholars. However he does not deal with Wundt's psychology, only some sentences can be found about it, so I will go into details about it.

W. Wundt, during his 40 years of activity, made Leipzig the centre of the experimental psychology. Wundt, from the department of philosophy made the first department of psychology, as Csaba Pléh said he harmonized the

[22] The student of K. Lamprecht, N. Iorga is regarded as the greatest Romanian historian (Lakatos, 2001: 9).

psychology's inner empiric conventions of the German idealist philosophy with the experiments of the natural sciences. Wundt finds man as a natural creation but one who arises from the nature. Wundt changed his ideas from the hybridization of thoughts to the hybridization of roles, with this change he made a new profession's identity what lead to not only the accumulation of the facts but to a change of attitude which had a sociological impact. (Pléh, 2000: 180-181). Wundt believed that psychology have to answer philosophical questions not practical ones. In his theory his psychology is voluntaristic: the soul is nothing more than the aim of reaching something, the need of something and the phenomena's of the psyche have to be examined by the patterns of the human mind. This is in connection with the importance of reaction-time analysis in his laboratories. Previously experimental psychology within laboratories was engaged in the examination of elemental phenomena, observation of the senses, associations, attention and things which was easily reachable for self-monitoring. Wundt had new ideas in social psychology as well instead of using the old ideas of Lazarus and Steinthal. Wundt tells apart the social acts on the aspect of the individual and socially organized intentional acts. He had a very new idea that the history is only a social spiritual product and the processes are all universal [23] and ahistoric in it (Pléh, 2000: 199-200.)

Gusti in his autobiography left out the introduction of Wundt's psychology most probably because he supposes that the readers are familiar with those ideas from his doctorate work, so he only recalls Wundt's behavior during scientific disputes, his communication from the cathedra or what he learned from him. "I have learned from Wundt that A. Comte's ideas were fake about the celebral hygiene, because he denied every idea to create his originally thinking man" (Gusti, 1971: 96).

In his lectures Wundt omitted rhetorical tricks "his movements of his hands were the only factor that expressed his controversies", "Wundt was the un-coroneted king of the University of Leipzig, his doctorate students were from all over the world and some of them remained his colleagues after they finished their studies". About Wundt's epistemology Gusti wrote that there is nothing like scientific knowledge, what is not philosophical at the same time, and there is no philosophical knowledge what is not connected with the knowledge of the particular sciences totality (Gusti, 1971: 102).

Wundt interprets his theoretical way of thinking as some kind of intermediation between the opposition pairs. In a more general way he was trying to make a compromise between idealism and realism. In a more particular way like in ethics he was trying to connect apriorism and empirism, in natural

[23] These thoughts of Wundt pointed out a possible cultural psychological scheme. Wundt had an opinion that the culture learns from psychology and not vice versa (Pléh, 2000: 200). From this point of view M. Cole's, cultural psychology goes back to the bases created by Wundt (Cole, 2005).

philosophy between atomistic and energetic, in biology between mechanic and vitalist approaches and in sociology between individualism and collectivism (Gusti, 1971: 101).

Gusti found Wundt's laboratory comic because it was too specific, and his assistants were too bureaucratic, and the cult itself around this experimental psychological laboratory was "overdid". "The students from the USA, France, Austria, Russia, England, Italy, Greece, or Romania were mostly not viewed from a physiological approach and were enthralled by the expression "experiment", hoped that the new experiments will lead to a reform in education and some believed that it will lead to brainwashing of the mankind. Beside that some believed that this new way of thinking will help in the understanding of arts and history because of the new data and counts" (Gusti, 1971: 103).

Gusti found the weak point of the experimental psychology in the isolated experiments in which the individuals are torn out from their natural environment, social networks which they live in. It abstracts from the human's social and cultural behaviour and from other psychic processes and phenomena. The measurements and counts can not be applied in the understanding of the higher psychic functions. "I know it from my own observation – says Gusti – that experiments can not be repeated in the same way because the results will depend on the complexity of one's actual state of mind." The experiment would depend on the state of mind, emotional constellation, actual oscillation and tiredness so they would not be able to get rid off the subjective analysis and descriptions. So this kind of examination makes the objectivity of the observations impossible and unreliable. At the same time the different mental phenomena can not be separated from each other because they could only be understood in the complexity of the whole, and makes an un-destroyable unit. The psychic phenomena are in the past of the individual, because the past is in everyone's memory. There are no psychic phenomena which is independent from the past of the individual and quick enough to avoid the effects on each other. The constitution of the personality may alter in every second, but the events in the past make them more complex. As Heraclitus said: "You could not step twice into the same river; for other waters are ever flowing on to you." (Gusti, 1971: 96-112). That is why we need such psychology – says Gusti – taking living humans as starting points, so a kind of social-psychology is needed within the framework of another social science which would be sociology (Gusti, 1971: 104, emphasis added by Imre Pászka).

Gusti finds the debate, which was around the process of institutionalization and professionalization of psychology very edifying. At the University of Leipzig this debate was followed by vivid argumentations by philosophers. "I have learned that most of the cases personal interests became equal with abstract principles, what more or less could be hidden" (Gusti, 1971: 104). In the debate

he found Wundt's compromising theory about opposing parts the best. In which Wundt pointed out: 1) "the experimental method may never substitute other methods because the experimental method is a partial, applicable only unique cases for example in animal and children psychology but can not be used in the observation of nations psychology, art fantasies, myths, tragedies or habits. So the idea is false that the experimental psychology can be applied in those disciplines in which the approaches are unreachable by its means. 2) "The questions of the psychology are the questions of philosophy as well, for instance the psychophysical parallelism, the energetic theories in spiritual life, intelligence, the free will, the questions of the memory what are popular topics among doctorate students. All these questions are special intellectual tournaments." 3) "Psychology is not a technique, but the scientific part of the philosophy, the science of the empiric mind." 4) Finally there are a group of sciences beside psychology but in a close contact with it: linguistics, religion, sociology, ethnology; Wundt called them collectively "Völkerpsychologie" (Gusti, 1971: 102).

So Wundt advocates to both psychologists and philosophers that both can profit of their interdependences. [24]

As Gusti said - at that time at the University of Berlin sociology was a marginal topic, cultivated by the dilatants. Only Simmel had the "courage" to keep lectures purely with sociological topics.

At Leipzig the situation was similar since a suggestion which would count with sociology in the researches would have been a heresy. The topic of his doctorate, Egoism and Altruism,[25] in which he connected an ethical and a sociological question was not without any problems. His fortune was that Wundt was interested in social-psychology so he accepted his topic and led Gusti's dissertation. The other two members of the doctorate committee was K. Lamprecht [26] and K. Bücher. [27] In his formal remarks on K. Lamprecht about his

[24] Theories Gusti used from Wundt even during at his autobiography: (1832-1920) 1) Creating synthesis, the increase of the mental energy; 2) The mental energy's increase is the result of the "aims heterogeneity"; 3) The voluntarism principle of the actuality and perception. The term voluntarism was popularized by R. Paulsen, but actually F. Tönnies created it as the opposite of "intellectualism". (He complains, when someone claims other ones as the first who used this term). In Wundt's terminology the mind is the action of the perception and the actuality; 4) Principle of relations and relationist analysis; 5) The principle of psychic contrasts and the strengthen of them, which was created by G. Tarde and Lindzer as a historical principle (Gusti, 1971: 108). Gusti remarks in 1917, when Wundt retired because of the new Nazi regime, that among soldiers with the swastika on their arm are there any chance for students to use their own flag with the sentence on it: *Vivat libertas academica* (Gusti, 1971: 112).

[25] The title of Gusti's doctorate work was: *Egoismus und Altruismus. Zur soziologischen Motivation des praktischen Wollens.* The altruism as the opposite of egoism, the term is the creation of Comte. (Vályi, 2008: 103-123.)

[26] K. Lamprecht (1856-1915) the president of the University of Leipzig is the establisher of the *Kulturgeschichte* school. As Gusti said Lamprecht supported the separation of psychology from other disciplines. That was controversial with Ranke's school's perception of history. Gusti saw the originality of Lamprecht in the approach how he had seen the German history from a social psychologist way. The

personality and work was indicated by exam situation. However he doesn't mention Lamprecht's role in the historian's methodological debate. In his masterpiece (*Deutsche Geschichte)* K. Lamprecht starts out from a preconception that a historian can discover only regularities, not precise laws like in natural sciences. Instead of the traditional German individualisational-descriptive method he believed in the genetic general development thesis. In his way of thinking the historic research can not be based on simply political history but should be on cultural, economical, legal and conceptional bases. He found Ranke's ideas old and suggested to the historians that empiric researches would be more effective than religious thoughts (Iggers, 1988: 303-5).

His relationship with K. Bücher was more personal. When he had to choose an economy teacher, Gusti chose Bücher who emphasized the economy's and society's interaction, and his "development stages" were more applicable to Eastern European countries (Gusti, 1971: 123). The subsection written about Bücher just like the one about Wundt is based on the two teachers' reminiscences, what mostly gave the major part of their biography. [28] Gusti not just mixes his own reminiscences with his teachers' memories, but as it seems the ones written by Bücher and Wundt are dominant. So as we saw this in the case of Wundt he again forgot out Bücher's theory about economic sociology (Bücher, 1984: 7-19).

German development's social psychological stages are: *Kulturzeitalter des Animismus* (Urzeit) – *Symbolismus* (to the 10th Century) - *Typismus* (10st-13th Centuries) – *Konventionalismus* (13th-15th Centuries – *Individualismus* (15th-18th Centuries) – *Subjektivismus* (19th Century). The equivalent of this stage's mental development in the material way is: primitive economy – natural economy (collective and individual). Visibly there is some kind of parallelism with economy, mental and psychic factors. Basically this parallelism makes up Gusti's sociological parallelism's thesis. In Gusti's point of view Lamprecht approached to history with an eye of an artist and with the mind of a philosopher. Lamprecht's excellence was in the establishing of the Documentary and Researcher's Institution, the "Universal and Culture History Seminar" (Gusti, 1971:112-121).

[27] K. Bücher (1847-1930), - as we know from Gusti's autobiography – was strict, cold, but the most effective teacher of the University of Leipzig, whose theory about economy could stand the test of time. In the creation of the stages by the producer and consumer he took the spatial distance as a measurement unit. Primitive economy – closed households (without exchanging, grower consumes its own goods. Economy of villages, towns (direct exchange economy, nation's economy (the good will reach the consumer only after being present in several kinds of economy.) world's economy. This theory by Bücher was published in 1876 in a journal called "Die Wage", than after several changes published again in 1898. Gusti thought that Bücher's theory was in contact with the theory of Schmoller and W. Sombart, and very briefly concerns the debate caused by Bücher. Bücher urged a new discipline to emerge, what Gusti defines neither as social history, nor as historical sociology, but simply the sociology of the past. Bücher raises Gusti's attention to the importance of using databases. That's why Gusti started the field researches with the counting of the population. With the help of Bücher the sociology of Friedrich Schäffle was published (Schäffle was one of Durkheim's students). Gusti remembers that he learned from Bücher that to became a scholar you don't have to be closed into the library: "I have learned the sociological realism from Wundt and Bücher, not from Le Play as some claim" (Gusti, 1971: 121-130).

[28] The mentioned work used by Gusti is: W. Wundt, *Erlebtes und Erkanntes*, (1920, Stuttgart), K. Bücher, *Lebensinnerungen* (1919/I. Tübingen) (see Bücher, 1984: 7-19).

University of Berlin - legal studies – finishing (1904-1907)

In 1904-1905 Gusti went back to the University of Berlin from Leipzig as the Doctor of Philosophy and as an associate of the oldest philosophical journal, to start legal studies. He explained that with his imperfection in social-sciences, what was jurisprudence, and in Berlin there was a specialized part of sociology educated by Franz von Liszt[29] called the "criminal sociology" (*Kriminalistisches Seminar*). [30] In those seminars he found more than he previously expected, that was far more than simple criminalistics. [31]

> I felt I have lot more to learn to rule the elements of social and individual sciences. It was univocal for me that the only way to save social sciences from dilettantism and amateurism is the thorough knowledge of them. I have always found people from scientific world who contemned sociology as a whole, but these opinions only helped in the rehabilitation of sociology (Gusti, 1971: 195).

His experiences at Leipzig were amended with crisis experiences at Berlin. Different social sciences had to face crises because the new ideas and thoughts were always replaced by modern ones, what created apprehension among scientists (Gusti, 1971: 179).

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[29] Franz von Liszt (1850-1919) and his younger brother Eduard Ritter von Liszt (1867-1961), are the nephews of Liszt Ferenc, the musician. Franz who is mentioned by Gusti is the teacher of the University of Berlin and he united the criminology with the penal law. Eduardot as the professor of both. (Adler-Mueller-Laufer 2000: 17). Gusti refers to Fr. von Liszt's Hungarian origin, with who he had close and affective relation. Their friendship started with Gusti's essay written about the situation with the river Duna, what Liszt appreciated and suggest for publication (Gusti, 1971: 201). Here Gusti calls the reader attention to a very interesting debate between Ma-Do-Yun and Liszt because Liszt categorized China as a semi-civilized country, which made Ma-Do-Yun to criticize list despite that he was writing his doctorate with his help. That patriotism was the reason why Gusti described the Chinese culture in his autobiography (Gusti, 1971: 203).

[30] Fr. von Liszt (*Völkerrecht systematisch dargestellt*, Berlin, 1906) in developing his "criminalist sociology" had to fight with on "two fronts". 1) He criticized the classical stream of penal law, which wanted strict judgments referring to the free will of the criminals. 2) The empiric ideas of Lombroso, because he was searching the criminal aptitude in sociological and environmental reasons. (climate, faun, soil, social relations, economic situation). In Liszt's interpretation the punishment has to have social aims, so belongs to the principle of social politics (Gusti, 1971: 216).

[31] In the rest of the study Gusti describes the law-sociology, and the state and political studies within. Here he mentions A. Grabowskyt, who was the editor of the journal: *Zeitschrift für Politik* and teacher of the *Hochschule für Politik*, which was established in Berlin following the patterns of *École libres des Sciences Politique.* Gusti presented his study: "*Die Grundbegriffe des Pressrecht"s* at Hochschule with the public opinion as its main topic. Gusti noticed that he wanted Eugen Erlicht from Vienna to teach at the University of Kolozsvár after the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy broke up, but because of political reasons it was impossible. In Gusti's interpretation the excellence of Erlich – who was the member of the Romanian Institute of Social-sciences up to the end of his life – lies in his legal environmental sociological observations, and the usage of questionnaires (Gusti, 1971: 198).

After analyzing the different social crises during history from a unique point of view, Gusti starts to deal with the problems of the relativity of causality rules (theories by: N. Bohr, W. Heisenberg, M. Planck they questioned the whole theory of causality). Gusti's problem to solve is this debate's attendance in social sciences. In his point of view: "It is true that between today's doubts there is no way to put down precise disciples but they did not consider the disciple of causality because there are not enough empiric data" (Gusti, 1971: 190).

In this part of his biography he didn't recall his own experiences as a university student, but recalled two very important debates 1) Neo-Kantian's value debate 2) the physicists relativistic and quantum theories in which the questions are around the uncertainties of the causality.

The most important question to Gusti is the relation between practical and theoretical knowledge. This debate was started by M. Weber and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Sociologie*. And from the physicists debate the appliance of causality in the reality of social sciences. In this question more uncertainties were caused to Gusti when at a congress (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie)* after the audience's applause he experienced[32], that G. Simmel as the chairman of the association stood up and said: the audiences' applause is "value adjudication". All this – adds Gusti – was at the conference of the German sociological association where the applause as the form of acclamation was forbidden since it was a form of subjection (Gusti, 1971: 186-194).

"At the same time the widely respected M. Weber in one of his speeches he claims certainly that the spiritual sciences and social sciences are dealing with value verdicts, the evaluation of different parts of life has only one aim to search, understand and explain the phenomena's causal relation to free the world from magic" (Gusti, 1971: 192).

"From 1900, the par excellence science of causality, the classical physics, what was a constructive model for social sciences became a science of probabilities, doubts, statistics, indeterminism so avoided the causal possibility of getting known the reality" (Gusti, 1971: 193). Later, during his visit to the US, Gusti was marveled and surprised when realized how widely read is M. Weber and how great influence he has in that country. He experienced the same at Leipzig, when he was honored with the doctor honoris cause degree, and met with the teacher of the philosophy department Theodor Litt, who in 1928 publicized his works "Wissenschaft, Bildung, Weltanschaung" put Weber's theory into the focus of his philosophical researches (Gusti, 1971: 192).

[32] Neither from Gusti nor from other sources we could not identify in which function was he present at the congress of the German Sociological Association. The Association was established in 1909 in Vienna, its conferences were in 1910 were in Frankfurt am Mainz and in 1912 in Berlin. At all of these conferences Simmel and Weber had lectures, but Gusti finished his studies at Germany in 1907, so most probably his memories about the conferences are not from published sources (Felkai 2006: 51-53).

Gusti's interest in Weber's work was seemingly shallow, because Gusti did not mention any of Weber's work in his biography. It is interesting because Gusti mentions lots of works and publishers (at least by title) in his biography by authors who he respected and was interested in (Gusti, 1971: 192-193). He probably forgot out his works because he wanted to project that he had personal relationship with him as well, and wanted to emphasize, that those first hand information were more significant than the secondary ones.

> Weber, whom I knew personally, was tall, had thick beard, with his itchy countenance, was some kind of Faust with huge knowledge, his works were inventive, respected and world famous. After his early death, Mariana Weber compiled a beautiful monograph to her husband's memory (Gusti, 1971: 193).

Similarly to his meeting with Weber he did not forget to write the details about meeting with Dr. Max Planck in a village at the highlands, called Harzburg, that encounter made him to read one of the professor's works at Berlin[33]. We have to see that his personal memories from his second period at Berlin was mainly concentrated around Fr. Von Liszt and his family, around the members of the seminar on criminalism and the others such as the value verdict, were not from his own experiences but from publicized works.

At this point, we mainly focus on Gusti's remarks about Simmel since his memories about the Wilhelmian era concentrates on the identity-legitimacy question of sociology interpreted by Simmel. Although Gusti wanted somehow "rehabilitate" sociology he did that among wide frames, in his thoughts sociology meant the complexity of all social sciences according to opinions from that era. In his doctorate work it is in focal position that sociology is a synthetic science and from that time on, he did not change his mind about his sociological system. This way of thinking again leads us back to Simmel's sociological thematic repertoire.

Instead of a Summary

As it seems to think through our hypothesis, that the not understanding of Simmel on the part of Gusti is not because his rhetoric style, or not because of the too abstract thoughts of him, but because of the fact, that the ideas Simmel was teaching was not applicable, did not have evidence in the Romanian circumstances. So if we construct Gusti's own social network along the 3 different time and space variable, we can see, that in all three cases his personal relationships were closer with scientists who created new ideas in the borderlines of sociology, more precisely with those, whose ideas could have been integrated into sociology, for example: ethics, politics, economy, history, geography, or psychology.

[33] The reference is to M. Planck, *Theorie des elementaren Wirkungsquantum* (1900).

[35] Regarding to Stahl's memories in the presence of Gusti the simple mentioning of P. Barth's name was prohibited (Rostás, 2001). Neither Stahl, nor other sources could explain the reason of this prohibition.



On one hand Gusti's relationship network was really fragmented, in every case when time/space dimension changes, a new subject got in the focus, while the previous focus relationships almost totally broke up. On the other hand, being purely formal, it is visible, that his sub-cultural relationships at the university, from his first period at Berlin were relatively in small number. He had only strong relationship with Paulsen. This relationship could have been defined as mutual, and through Paulsen he got in touch with F. Tönnies. Gusti visited Tönnies several times at his mansion near by Kiel. Gusti's relationship with Wagner, Schmoller and Simmel was weak. Those relationships could be defined as a teacher-student relationship because with none of them were a dialogical question-answer like relationship. It is curious because despite the fact that Gusti was really interested in Simmel's work, he did not aspire to get in contact with him neither after lectures, when it was time to have questions toward the lecturer. We can not find any recommendations about Simmel, when Gusti as a university teacher had the opportunity to send his students to

German universities. Gusti's relationship with Dilthey and Bastian is even weaker. It seems like not even a teacher-student relation, but as if he knew stories about them only from hearsays. His relationship with his colleagues and school mates is even poorer. From his reminiscences we know he was almost totally isolated. In his biography he mentions only one schoolmate from his first period at Berlin, non from the period at Leipzig, and from the second period at Berlin he mentions only a few fellows from the seminars and one Chinese associate. But those relationships were more typical only within the schoolroom rather than spare time activities or scientific. At the same time we can see, this is evident that he was not comfortable with the sub-cultural value and activity preferences. His cultural interests were interiorized and determined by his values brought from Romania. These cultural patterns made him into a much marginalized situation, but this was compensated by the fact he had higher aims to achieve more than to fit in the subculture of Germany. That is why his only chance to keep the professional communication with his fellows was narrowed to regular occasions like invitations to breakfasts or tea parties. At the same time his relationship with Paulsen was definitely not symmetric. He could not build up a bilateral relationship with Paulsen, in which both partners are equal. This relationship from the part of Gusti was cliental that is why he spoke about his patron with respect and acknowledgment in a passionate way. As we know from his autobiography, the remarks in superlatives are not missing in the case of Simmel either, but in that case there was only a formal relation, fixed in time and space, usually in the form of the lectures. At his years at Leipzig, there were more changes in his relationship network. The condensation of his communicational and cooperative acts was revealing during that period. His relationship with Wundt was asymmetric as well but was not about the replacement of prestige as in the case of Paulsen, who played a role in the annulment of his marginality within the subculture. His relations with Wundt, Bücher and partly Lamprecht were motivated by the gaining of state (doctorate). At this period at Leipzig his relations were not evidently ascriptive. Although his communicational and co-operational aspects were more dense and direct than at Berlin, he was still in a client's position. His state, doctorate and the fact that he could join the community of the scientific public admittedly assumed more intense personal relationships; however these were only present along subordination rituals. When he cites Wundt, that knowledge was not gained from him personally by dialogues, but from lectures and seminars. The superlatives to Wundt are not directly to him, but to Gusti's supervisor, who helped him to his doctorate. Although Gusti wanted to make his environment to believe that his relation with Wundt was really a master – pupil relation in a solid way, in fact it was more formal. Gusti only had closer and more personal relationship with Bücher, with who he often

discussed casual and sometimes professional tasks during their walks. The Gusti – Lamprecht relationship was similar to the Gusti – Simmel one, because it was not more than a formal correspondence between a teacher and a pupil.

At his second period at Berlin he had closer, more personal like, mutual, symmetric relationship with Liszt, who appreciated Gusti's scientific work, and gave him tasks to do one after another. At the same time we have to mention that this relationship had an emotional side as well, because Gusti showed enthusiasm for Liszt's daughter called Elsa. That is a possible reason why Gusti's visits were quite often at Liszt's home. Gusti's social network during his university year was poor within the subculture, so it is not a coincidence, that in his biography this gap is filled with the virtual mental relationship with Goethe. This contemplation's function is to prove to the ancestors that he did not wasting his time onto meaningless things, but was keen on science, was hard-working in learning and thinking about the world's important things. His intellectual interest and attendance toward the universal culture's values could be an explanation why he thinks that such things like money, fashion, perfume etc. are all insignificant things.

Gusti was an elitist, macro-structuralist thinker, in his thoughts just like in the ideas of Romanian intellectuals' the nation state's model is the Romanian village. While we are integrating the village and the state into the modernity's functional frames, we are protecting them in the same way they originally are. The "mission of the chosen ones" according to Gusti's cultural state project is not the spreading of useless novelties which will not stand the test of time (like fashion, abstract values, trends etc.), but to correct the right conduct back to the traditional values of the village. With all this ideas he is emphasizing the importance of the habitual context, along the status reaching relationship-network, to that matrix in the early socialization what can not be cancelled even during the latter socialization impacts.

The Sociology of D. Gusti is a very complex aggregation of principles. With some restrictions we can find theories such as: 1) The independence of sociology from other sciences, 2) The voluntarism of Wundt and Tönnies, 3) The psychological thinking of Wundt, 4) The historical parallelism of Lamprecht (similar to Gusti's sociological parallelism) 5) The historical-cultural integration theory of man 6) The neo-Kantian Paul Barth's[35] pedagogical, 7) F- Paulsen's ethical taught what is completed with Ratzel's human-geographical ideas 8) Bücher's economic theory 9) Liszt's unwritten laws, and the importance of a trespass's sociological background. All this refers to he had borrowed some of his ideas from his social network's focus subjects, from his "masterly" respected teachers. From these ideas (he always consistently indicates the original author of a principle), he tried to combine a coherent sociological system with the function of creating and legitimating the scientific background of necessary reforms to modernize

an undeveloped society. His sociological system was used by his followers during field-works, but his willing to create a detailed description made an unmanageable database. It is not a coincidence that the publishing of a great synthesis was cancelled, [36] just like the researches to utilize reforms in politics and culture. Gusti's significance was not in his sociological system, although it starts out from that, and sociology became an independent "synthetic" discipline in Romania after he legitimated its identity among the given circumstances. That ideological background made the institutionalization and professionalization possible such as the establishing of different sociological schools and periodicals (*Sociologie Românească – Romanian Sociology)* this processes led Romania to educate sociology first at universities (1907), later on at high schools. Although his sociological system was not accepted by all of his followers, his theoretical and methodological work was precedent (H. H. Stahl, A. Golopenţia, Tr. Herseni, M. Vulcănescu, O. Neamţu, József Vinczel). Gusti made huge efforts to integrate his sociological school into the contemporary international sociological life. [37]

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[36] One of Gusti's students, A. Golopenţia, published a synthesis based on a research exploring 60 villages, Gusti was displeased with that because he found it too early.

[37] Gusti wanted to organize the XIV. International Sociologic Congress at Bucharest, in 1939, what was cancelled because of the war broke out. He himself was present in several European and American congresses, just like his students (Stahl, Golopentia) and he kept contact with the Köln Institution of L. Von Wiese. In Hungarian relation Gábor Lükő, Béla Gunda used Gusti's methods during their researches. For more details about the correspondence of Lükő and Stahl (Gusti-school) (Rostás 2001: 95-110).

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